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Abstract
Like most Africa countries, Liberia has a dual legal system, that is, the customary and statutory.
Cultural and traditional practices influence some of the laws. Laws in both legal systems
discriminate against women in overt ways, especially laws that deal with the private sphere, such
as marriage, divorce, custody, domestic violence, property, legitimacy, and inheritance. This
dissertation seeks to identify inequality in the Liberian Domestic Relation laws that arise from
facially discriminatory laws, facially neutral laws and omissions in the law. It also posits that the
court’s role in interpreting these issues has been inadequate, and the legislature is reluctant is
amend, repeal and enact laws that will remedy the issues.
Given the above, this dissertation has reviewed four models of equality, made a comparative
analysis of how these models are utilized in four countries and recommended that substantive
equality model could help to remedy inequality problems under the Liberian Domestic Relations
Law. This dissertation concludes by suggesting draft languages to the Liberian Equal Protection
Clause, and legislative amendments to some provisions of the Domestic Relations Law, and the
Equal Rights of Customary Marriage Laws, as well as additions to the provisions of the proposed
draft domestic violence Act.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Its cultural values define Liberia’s political and legal governance in many ways. For
example, in the early periods of the Country’s history, a woman was considered as the property of
her husband and therefore could not inherit from him. Neither could she inherit from her parents
because she was expected to get married and become a member of another family. The wisdom
associated with this belief was that payment of dowry by a husband granted him absolute right
over his wife as though she were his property. Therefore, married women were not allowed to do
anything without the consent of their husbands. For instance, she was not allowed to contract in
her name unless she was considered “femme sole (Unmarried Woman).”1 Any contract entered
had to be with the consent of her husband. Although women married under the statutory law can
now exercise their rights to contract,2 women in customary marriage still need the consent of their
husbands.
Despite the change of the law to allow statutory married women to contract in their name,
Liberians have generally continued to brand women as a second class to men; a situation that
sparks at every activity in Liberia, although it is the first country in Africa to elect a female
president democratically. If having women at the highest political office is favorable for women,
why does the classification of women as second-class people in Liberia remain so persistent? How
can women achieve the equality guaranteed to all people under the several constitutions the
Country has had, ranging from the pre-republic to the Republic periods? These are the questions
that this dissertation investigates and suggests answers to, within the scope of unequal treatment
to the most marginalized groups in Liberia.

1
2

Domestic Relations Law, 10 LIBERIAN CODE OF LAWS OF 1956 § 4.45 (repealed 1973).
Domestic Relations Law, 9 LIBERIAN CODE OF LAWS REVISED § 3.4(2-3) (1973).
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Unequal treatment ranges from fuzzy women’s rights to make their own choices, the
impoverishment of women and children due to conditional property rights and illegitimacy,
violence against women, unequal treatment of Civil, Customary and Presumed Marriages, and
other human rights issues. These issues fall within the purview of Liberian Family Law, which is
known as the Liberian Domestic Relations Law.
Liberia’s domestic relations regime has, over the years, made miniature steps to improve
the content of legislation through repeals or amendments. The language of Liberia 1956, Domestic
Relations code was borrowed from the US jurisdiction. It was later revised in 1972, and approved
in 1973, giving rise to the Liberian Codes of Law Revised. The amendments made to the 1956 law
were not significant, in that the revised laws were either a verbatim quotation from the 1956 code
or paraphrased to give identical meaning, which has not yielded any substantial result.
Realistically, the revised vision did not substantively address issues of (1) customary marriage
rights as it relates to contract, divorce, and property; (2) equal custody rights for both parents; (3)
domestic violence; and (4) illegitimacy and inheritance. These are issues that are pertinent to
women and family, and the society at large. Consequently, this dissertation seeks to identify the
inequality problems in the Liberian Domestic Relations Law and analyze how the court has dealt
with these issues, how women are still affected by the court’s reluctance to opine on most of these
issues, and the failure of the legislature to amend, repeal, and enact laws that will eradicate these
problems. This dissertation also points out that the Liberian Supreme Court needs to clarify which
equality model it uses to adjudicate cases in order to enhance greater credibility on this subject not
only with Liberians but also with the international community.
The role of the Court is paramount to resolving inequality problems because of its
interpretive duty. Unlike countries that believe in the sovereignty of the parliament, such as the
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United Kingdom, the Supreme Court of Liberia, as the final arbiter, has the power to articulate
what the law is. It also determines the consistency of legislation with the Constitution, which is
the supreme law of the land. Article 2 of the Constitution states, in part, that “...any laws, treaties,
statutes, decrees, customs and regulations found to be inconsistent with it shall, to the extent of the
inconsistency, be void and of no legal effect. The Supreme Court, under its power of judicial
review, is empowered to declare any inconsistent laws unconstitutional.”3 This provision
emphasizes the court’s interpretive duty to validate statutes that are consistent with the
Constitution and invalidate others that are not. The court’s duties necessitate the constant need for
a credible judicial system that will interpret laws and dispense justice with fairness and
transparency. Consistent with this view, this dissertation posits that a clear and unequivocal
standard of review should be established to adjudicate all cases.
Additionally, this dissertation argues that courts should not determine cases merely on
discretion because discretion could be subjective or abusive when they are not defined. While it is
true that trial judges have a wide range of discretionary power, it is also important for cases to be
adjudicated based on the laws. In the same token, the court should rule based on principles of law
and a specific standard of review. Hence, the basis of recommending an equality model that will
inform the process of determining which standard of review that courts should use in adjudicating
discrimination or equal protection cases.
In this regard, four models of equality (formal, normative, rational connection and
substantive) inform the discussion on a suitable equality model that addresses the inequality
problems. These models are laid out progressively. The goal is to see the progression from one
model to the other and facilitate easier understanding of the content of each. This dissertation also

3

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA 1986, art. 2.

3

posits that Liberia can utilize more than one model of equality, but, to efficiently address
discrimination, one model is recommended to adequately afford the eradication of inequality in
both the statutory and customary legal systems. Therefore, this dissertation recommends the
substantive equality model.
The substantive equality model is both important and adequate because it puts social,
political, and economic discrimination into context and further remedies historical discrimination.
It also embodies other equality models, such as the normative equality model, which emphasizes
the idea of respect, dignity, and human rights, while at the same time considering social
implications, such as culture and tradition. The substantive model demands that there be a rational
connection between classifications and legislative enactment, recognizing that legislation should
have a nexus to the object that it intends to seek. It also guides courts in striking irrational
legislation. Substantive equality accommodates affirmative action, which is necessary for creating
a level playing field for all citizens. Affirmative action creates a medium through which citizens
can demand certain rights from their government and allows the government to design programs
and policies that will improve the lives of its citizens.
This evolution in Liberia’s jurisprudence could go beyond its borders. The substantive
equality model could be used to resolve problems of equality in other African countries that have
dual legal systems like Liberia. Many African countries have two legal systems: the statutory and
customary. Generally, the customary legal system in many African countries governs local cultural
and traditional practices, and governance is administered by chiefs, elders or religious, tribal
leaders. Governance is focused mainly on the private sphere, which deals with family-related
matters, such as marriage, divorce, support, custody, and, in rare occasions, criminal cases.4 There

4

Susan H. Williams, Women and Judging: A Feminist Approach to Judging and the Issue of Customary
Law, 36 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 25, 27 (2013) (discussing customary legal system in Liberia and South Sudan).
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is no formal court system; cases are adjudicated by respected community leaders, headed by a
chief or elder.5 According to Susan H. Williams, customary law is important to those in the
customary setting because the central government relatively neglects them and, therefore, cannot
connect with the formal legal system because they lack the financial resources. Williams further
asserts that many people in the customary setting prefer the customary system of governance
because it promotes a familial relationship rather than an adversarial one.6
Notwithstanding the admiration and respect relished on traditional leaders, their decisions
are not democratically made.7 Most customary decisions consistently promote patriarchy and
suppress women in overt ways. Women continue to be disadvantaged in the customary setting
because, in most countries, the constitution recognizes the customary law, and these laws do not
protect men and women equally.8 The unconditional recognition of customary laws that
discriminate and marginalize a certain group of people is acquiescing to these treatments, which
could translate to mean that the equal protection clause does not protect all. That is why it is
important to discuss the attempts by some countries to harmonize two or more legal systems. The
discussion on the harmonization of laws is from three perspectives. First, what does
harmonization mean? “Harmonization is a process in which diverse elements are combined or
adapted to each other to form a coherent whole while retaining their individuality.”9 The question
then is how can customary law and statutory law maintain their individuality and yet form a
coherent whole? The nature of most customary laws is discriminatory and does not see women

5

Id. at 25.
Id. at 27-28.
7
Johanna E. Bond, Gender, Discourse, and Customary Law in Africa, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 509, 560 (2010)
(discussing Customary Law and Traditional Leadership).
8
Williams, supra note 4, at 29.
9
Martin Boodman, The Myth of Harmonization of Laws, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 699, 702 (1991) (discussing
The Notion of Harmonization).
6
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as equal to men. Neither is its application democratic, unlike statutory laws in countries that have
a democratic form of government.
Second, the challenge to harmonization is that there are multiple local customs and
traditions in many African countries and, because of this diversity, their customary laws are often
not in sync with each other. In essence, to harmonize the two legal systems, one must first
harmonize the various customary laws as one body of law. For example, in Liberia, there are 16
main ethnic groups. These ethnic groups have different cultures, although there are some
similarities. These differences must be harmonized so that all 16 groups’ laws can be similar
before trying to harmonize them with statutory laws. Harmonizing these ethnic groups may be a
very difficult task. Therefore, they could all maintain their differences from each other but be
consistent with statutory law. It is worth mentioning that the customary laws of most African
countries are rooted in discriminatory practices, and their statutory laws are principally grounded
in equality.
Third, can substantive equality serve as an alternative to harmonization? Substantive
equality considers all facets of human lives; that is, the historical, social, and political contexts.10
The goal is to ameliorate discrimination in both the public and private spheres. Substantive
equality would serve as an alternative way of addressing issues that affect the lives of people
without trying to harmonize laws in plural legal systems. A constitutional provision that includes
substantive equality could provide means for women in both legal systems to assert claims

Po-Jen Yap, Four Models of Equality, 27 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 63, 86 (2005) (discussing
substantive equality).
This dissertation is a deeper study of my Master Thesis under the topic: “The Problems of gender inequality
raised by unmarried couples in Liberia.” The thesis sought to establish that women are marginalized in cohabitation
relationships; and that there is no clear line between cohabitation that could be presumed as marriage, and an illicit
relationship, based on the court’s reluctance to define presumed marriage statute. The thesis also endeavored to trace
the origin of problems that have led to the increase in the rate of cohabitation. It concludes by proposing draft language
to statutes such as: marriage presumption, custody legitimization among others.
10
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equally. Alternatively, enacting affirmative action legislation or designing programs and policies
that promote equality could harmonize both legal systems.
This dissertation is important because it highlights the discriminatory abuses in Liberia’s
Domestic Relations Law. It generally shows that marriage laws in both the statutory and
customary legal systems favor men, primarily because of cultural and traditional practices that
have consistently favored men. It also shows that the current laws on harmonization of customary
and civil marriages are superficial and need revisitation because the harmonization process did
not take cognizance of the intricacies of polygamy, limitation on women’s rights to inherit
property from their husbands upon death, or their rights in divorce. These problems trigger the
need for an equality model that will remedy claims that may arise. An equality model will
eradicate the disparity between the two legal systems and treat citizens equally. That is why this
dissertation is recommending that Liberia adopt the substantive equality model to resolve these
problems.
Chapter Two of this dissertation identifies problems that Liberian women encounter
because of discriminatory laws. The problems identified are (1) unequal treatment between civil
and customary marriages, (2) the lack or limited definition of the marriage presumption statute,
(3) custody laws that favor males over females, (4) illegitimacy/inheritance laws that favor males
over females, and (5) the absence of a dedicated and stand-alone domestic violence law. The
chapter points out how these laws continuously affect women and their children. The chapter also
delves into how the efforts to harmonize civil and customary marriages have failed miserably and
expose customary wives to traditional practices that epitomize discrimination. It further stresses
how inadequate legislative drafting results in discriminatory laws and the reluctance of the
Supreme Court to develop an equality standard that can be used to adjudicate cases.

7

Chapter Three stresses the importance of having an equality model that Liberia can use to
review discrimination cases. Therefore, it reviews the literature on four equality models: (1) formal
equality, (2) substantive equality, (3) rational connection, and (4) normative equality. The
literature identifies the strengths and weaknesses of each model. The goal is to determine whether
any of these models or some combination of them will be suitable for Liberia. Of the four models
of equality reviewed, the substantive equality model seems to be suitable for Liberia in that it
provides a means to address inequality in both the statutory and customary legal system.
Chapter Four makes a comparative analysis of the four models relative to their application
in Canada, the United States, South Africa, and Sweden. It discusses the improvements made in
reducing gender inequality and the problems that exist when using the various equality models.
The chapter illustrates that Canada and Sweden are leading in their strife to eradicate gender
inequality. It also articulates that the Swedish government has made intentional efforts to design
gender equality programs and policies. Unlike those two countries, South Africa’s substantive
equality is still lagging because of male dominance, culture, and tradition. Although there has been
improvement in women’s political participation.11 The United States has used substantive equality
minimally in disparate impact cases under Title VII, although the Supreme Court has consistently
rejected substantive equality for equal protection clause laws. However, some lessons could be
learned from each country relative to how courts have applied the models. Additionally, the
implementations of some of the models, especially the substantive equality model, do not have to
be by court order. Some governments make intentional efforts to include substantive equality in
their constitution and/or policies.

11

Janine Hills, Addressing Gender Quotas in South Africa: Women Empowerment and Gender Equality
Legislation, 20 DEAKIN L. REV. 153, 157 (2015).
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Chapter Five recommends the adoption of the substantive equality model in Liberia. It lays
out the model, highlights the parts of the model that apply to Liberia, and explains why the model
is suitable. The chapter further examines the importance of the proportionality test as a standard
of review for equality claims and how the Liberian court could utilize this standard of review. It
further stresses that the affirmative action component of substantive equality is important to
remedy discrimination. The chapter concludes that substantive equality is suitable in addressing
the menaces under the Liberian Domestic Relations Law and other discrimination cases because
it evaluates discrimination in its historical, economic, political, and cultural contexts.
Chapter Six applies the model to the gender inequality problems identified in Chapter
Two. It reiterates that gender inequality under the Liberian Domestic Relations Law stems from
facially discriminatory laws, facially neutral laws with a disparate impact on certain groups,
inadequate legal drafting, and omissions in the law. It suggests questions that could be asked by
the court when reviewing inequality claims and provides a possible standard of evaluating claims.
Chapter Seven synergizes lessons learned from countries researched in this dissertation by
making recommendations and drafting proposed language to the constitution and a portion of the
Liberian Domestic Relations Law. The recommendation affects the language of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution and custody, legitimization, marriage presumption, support,
domestic violence, and inheritance laws.
Chapter eight enunciates that gender inequality in Liberia is systemic, Liberia is a maledominated country, and cultural and traditional practices promote discrimination against women.
The chapter articulates that discrimination against women grounded in the factors mentioned
above is not unique to Liberia; it is also visible in other African countries. The chapter concludes
that the introduction of the substantive equality model will assist in ameliorating these problems.

9

It warns that the application of the substantive equality model will result in a paradigm shift.
Therefore, the conscious effort of all stakeholders is required, that is, the government, the court,
and private actors.
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CHAPTER TWO: GENDER INEQUALITY PROBLEMS
The Liberian Domestic Relations regime does not adequately address women’s issues
because of discriminatory provisions and omissions in the law. The law has several requirements
that are facially discriminatory, and others that, although gender-neutral, have a disparate impact
on women. Equally so, the absence of a dedicated and stand-alone domestic violence law has
disadvantaged many women and exposed them to various forms of abuses. This chapter discusses
five fundamental problems that are directly and indirectly related to these discriminatory
provisions: (1) unequal treatment between civil and customary marriages, (2) marriage
presumption, (3) custody laws favor fathers over mothers, (4) illegitimacy, and (5) the absence of
a dedicated and stand-alone domestic violence law. To adequately address these problems, the
methodology employed identifies current laws that perpetuate inequality and nurture these five
problems. The chapter also probes into the lapses in the law and discusses how the Supreme Court
has opined on these issues.
Liberia’s Domestic Relations Law addresses family law issues such as marriage, divorce,
and custody. The 1956 Domestic Relations Code was revised in 1972 and approved in 1973, and
then later compiled in 1998 as Domestic Relations Law- Title 9- Liberian Code of Law Revised
Volume 111, 1998. Although there have been two major revisions, the contents of the code have
remained mostly the same with only a few minor changes. The Customary Marriage Law was
amended in 2003 in order to harmonize customary and civil marriages and promote equality
between the two. The harmonization was an attempt to abolish the cultural ideology that customary
wives were chattel or property of their husbands. These cultural practices were a blatant violation
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and repugnant to Article 12 of the Liberian
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Constitution.12 While harmonization might have seemed plausible at the time, the issues of
divorce, property rights, and inheritance are not resolved adequately by the Equal Rights of
Customary Marriage Law. Facially, there appeared to have been a revision to the law, but the
impacts of the law remained the same because the review was superficial. The gaps in the law
discriminate and disadvantage a particular class of women, and they sustain the disparity between
civil and customary marriages. The lack of definition for a presumed marriage, male dominance
in custody issues, lack of automatic inheritance for children born out of wedlock, deprivation of
inheritance and property rights of customary wives, and an increase in domestic violence have
disadvantaged women.
A. Unequal Treatment between Civil and Customary Marriages
1. Marriage
The two major kinds of marriages recognized in Liberia are civil or statutory marriage and
customary/traditional marriage. A third type, marriage presumption/common law marriage, is
provided for under the Civil Procedure Law.13 This section focuses on the unequal treatment of
women in civil and customary marriages respectively; the subsequent section will elaborate on the
problems encountered under marriage presumption. The Liberian Domestic Relations Law defines
civil marriage and details the rights thereunder. It provides that marriage is “civil status, a personal
relationship arising out of a civil contract between a male and a female to mutually assume marital
rights, duties, and obligations, to which the consent of the parties capable of making such a contract
is essential.”14 The law further provides that the marriage is not prohibited in the provisions of

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA 1986. art. 12. “No person shall be held in slavery or
forced labor within the Republic, nor shall any citizen of Liberia nor any person resident therein deal in slaves or
subject any other person to forced labor, debt bondage peonage…”
13
Civil Procedure Law, 1 LIBERIAN CODE OF LAWS REVISED § 25.3 (1972).
14
Yah-Yeplah Dolo-Barbu, The Problems of Gender Inequality Raised by Unmarried Couples in Liberia
(July 2015) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Indiana University Maurer School of law) (on file with the Jerome Hall Law
Library Repository).
12
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section 2.2(3) and 2.3 of the Domestic Relations Law. Consent alone will not constitute marriage;
consent must be followed by the issuance of a license and solemnization as authorized by this
chapter.”15 The statutory age for a civil marriage is 21 for a male and 18 for a female. 16 The
exception to this rule is the requirement for parental consent for a male above the age of 16 years
and under the age of 21 years and a female above the age of 16 years and under the age of 18 years
before the issuance of a marriage license. In the absence of a parent or guardian, a presiding judge
could grant a marriage license based on what the statute considers as “proper cause.”17 Marriage
in the civil setting does not require any specific ceremony; all that is required is the declaration of
marriage in the presence of authorized officials and at least two adult witnesses, who have to be
18 years of age and above.18 The legal age of maturity in Liberia is 18. Under civil marriage, those
authorized to perform marriage ceremonies are an ordained clergyman of any religion, a justice
from the Supreme Court, a judge of a court of record, a stipendiary magistrate, or a justice of the
peace.19
One of the problems that exists in most marriages is that of property, but this problem is
more obvious in a customary marriage than in a civil marriage. Under the Domestic Relations Law,
civilly married couples can transfer real and personal property directly to each other without any
problem. They “may make partition or division of any real property held by them as a tenant in
common, joint tenants, or tenants by the entireties, provided that in the case of tenants by the
entireties, the property can only be disposed of when both parties consent.”20 A civilly married
woman has the right to control her property. Her husband does not control her property and cannot

15

Domestic Relations Law, 9 LIBERIAN CODE OF LAWS REVISED § 2.1 (1973).
See id. § 2.2(1).
17
See id. § 2.2(2).
18
See id. § 2.14(1).
19
See id. § 2.14(2)(a-b).
20
See id. § 3.3.
16
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use her property to settle his debts, and neither are his debts transferrable to her based on their
marriage. Further, a civilly married woman has all rights over her real or personal property,
including its acquisition, use, enjoyment, and disposal. She can use her property to pay her debts
as though she were not married and can contract in her name. Her contract has no bearing on her
husband or his property.21
On the other hand, the Equal Rights of Customary Marriage Law defines
customary/traditional marriage as “marriage between a man and a woman performed according to
the tribal tradition of their locality.”22 The specific tradition a couple wishes to subscribe to is
based on the ethnic group to which one or both of the couple belongs. A traditional marriage could
consist of single or multiple wives. For instance, in the Kpelle ethnic group, polygamy is culturally
ideal.23 Polygamy is not unique to the Kpelle tribe and is seen in almost all 16 ethnic groups in
Liberia.
The two forms of marriages under discussion are in two legal systems: the civil or statutory
legal system and the customary or tribal legal system. These two systems sometimes intersect
making it difficult for claimants to assert their claims and receive a remedy effectively. Civil
marriage wives have more rights than their customary counterparts; however, a more significant
portion of the country is under the customary legal system. The problems caused by the differences
between the legal systems have led to the following: (1) unequal rights between customary
marriage and civil marriage, (2) undefined dower rights of customary wives, (3) lack of absolute
control over property, (4) restriction of a widow’s liberty after her husband’s death, (5) absence of

21

Domestic Relations Law, 9 LIBERIAN CODE OF LAWS REVISED § 3.4(1-3) (1973).
Equal Rights of the Customary Marriage Law of 1998 § 1(a)—Decedents Estates Law, 8 LIBERIAN CODE
OF LAWS REVISED (1972).
23
Sonia David, You Become One in Marriage: Domestic Budgeting among the Kpelle of Liberia, 3 CAN. J.
AFR. STUD. 157, 160 (1996) (discussing Kpelle Social Organization, the idea of “multiple wives, lovers and children
born out of wedlock constitute competing demands on a man’s income and a source of conflict within marriage”).
22
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a divorce provision under customary law, and (6) limits and jurisdiction of tribal courts and how
tribal issues interface with civil authority.
2. Dower Rights for Customary Wives
Under the Equal Rights of Customary Marriage Law of 1998, spouses are entitled to onethird of each other’s personal and real property upon death, regardless of whether either party
contributed to the acquisition of the property. This law also applies to civil marriage.24 Whether a
man marries one or multiples wives, all the wives are entitled to the one-third dower rights. The
remaining two-thirds goes to the children.25 The problem with this apportionment is that it is
insensitive to the mechanisms of traditional marriage when there are multiple wives because there
is seniority among the wives. Moreover, the method of distribution is unclear.
In the past, the court did not approve admeasurement of dower to customary widows. The
Court opined that “to approve it, will not only be a measure which may disturb an immemorial
custom coeval with native social life, but it also would be depriving heirs of their father’s estate,
when four or five wives may successfully contest for the admeasurement of one third each of their
husband’s estate, both real and personal.”26 The underlying reasoning was that wives were
permanent members of the husband’s household. If they remained in the family, the next head of
the family was responsible for their support and welfare. Additionally, the Court was under
obligation to uphold native customs, and the native custom did not permit admeasurement of
dower.27 However, there are instances where of property distribution to customary widows by the
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Probate Court and executed by a Curator appointed by the Probate Court in Jartu V. The Estate of
Konneh, [1950] 10 LLR 318, 322 (LBR).28

The current Equal Rights of Customary Marriage Law makes provision for widows’ onethird dower rights and two-third for children.29 Apparently, the concerns of the Court over 60 years
ago in the case Jartu V. The Estate of Konneh, [1950] 10 LLR 318 relating to apportionment to
multiple wives and cultural norms and practices may not have been considered during the attempt
to harmonize customary and civil marriages on the issue of dower rights. The basic flaws with
harmonization are that it does not recognize that: (1) customary marriage has multiple wives, (2)
there is seniority between the wives, and (3) a wife could decide not to remain in the family of the
husband as a permanent member.
The disadvantage to customary married wives still exists because customary marriage laws
have not changed. According to the Equal Rights of Customary Marriage Law of 1998 Section 1
(a), a customary marriage “is a marriage between a man and a woman performed according to the
tribal tradition of their locality.”30 It further defines tradition as the values, norms, and customs
which a tribe of a locality has practiced over the ages and is considered their way of life, which
means that customary marriage is still conducted based on culture and traditional norms.31 Second,
the Law ought to be capable of solving the problem it was enacted to solve, as is, the application
of this statute is cumbersome. Third, the issue of property distribution to multiple wives is
unresolved because polygamy is an integral part of customary practice.
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3. Wife’s Control over Her Property
A customarily-married woman has “exclusive right over her property acquired or owned
before or during the marriage.”32 She also has the right to do business in her name, except that she
is required to have the consent of her husband.33 The right to contract conditioned by a husband’s
permission is discriminatory on its face and promotes male dominance and female subjection. The
law is an example of restrictions placed on customary women that burdens them economically and
subjects them to poverty. This provision is inconsistent with Section 2.1 of the Equal Rights of
Customary Marriage Law of 1998, which accords equal rights to both statutory and customary
wives.34 It is clear that one statute cannot override another statute; only the constitution can render
a statute void.
Currently, no court decision has resolved the issue. The contractual rights of customary
wives are still contingent upon the “full knowledge and consent of their husbands,”35 based on the
plain words of the statute. The constitution of Liberia guarantees the right to contract.36 The
customary law on contract is a blatant violation of the constitution. As written, there seems to be
no legal or logical explanation for subjecting a wife’s contractual rights to her husband’s approval,
except that culture and tradition dictate a patriarchal society that subordinates women.
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See id.
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4. Widow’s Liberty after Husband’s Death
Traditional norms restrict the rights of customary wives after the death of their husbands.
A customary wife has the right to either leave or remain in her marital home after the death of her
spouse,37 but either decision is problematic. If she goes, she forfeits her legitimate inheritance,
though it may be insignificant because of multiple wives’ interest. If she stays, she is subject to
the control of her husband’s family.

38

On the other hand, she could decide to remarry, which

serves as automatic disinheritance, except where she marries a member of her deceased husband’s
family. Similarly, if she remarries outside her deceased husband’s family, she must vacate the
premises of her husband and the property automatically reverts to the heirs (which is the man’s
family) or the decedent’s children.39 It does not matter whether the children belong to the widow.
There are two fundamental issues with this practice: (1) whether a widow is entitled to her marital
home as a matter of right and (2) whether remarriage constitutes forfeiture of property rights as a
matter of law.
In order to answer the first issue in the affirmative, the following assumptions must be
made: (1) that marital residence in a customary marriage is always solely owned by the husband,
(2) that wives do not contribute toward the acquisition of personal and real property, and (3) that
all customary marriages are polygamous. That said, customary wives should have every right to
their husbands’ homes upon their demise, regardless of whether they decide to live in the house.
According to the Equal Rights Marriage Law, both husband and wife are entitled to each other’s
property at death. As to the second issue, to deprive a widow of her property because she decides
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to remarry is a blatant violation of Articles 11(b) and 16 of the Constitution, which articulates the
issues of rights, freedom, and privacy.40
As is, customary marriage laws disadvantage women, especially widows. The law not only
restricts a widow’s liberty after her husband’s death, it also suppresses her. The law enslaves and
punishes a customary wife, depriving her of her right to her husband’s property if she remarries
someone outside of her husband’s family. The law, in essence, denotes that she can only enjoy her
property rights if she remains in the family. Further, the law promotes discriminatory cultural
practices that subordinate women. The Equal Rights of Customary Marriage Law was enacted with
the intent to equalize both customary and civil marriages, but it has not achieved its intended
objective. It reinforces the Court’s 1950 opinion cited herein, which equates women to property.
5. The Absence of Divorce Provision in Customary Law
Divorce provisions in the Domestic Relations Law only apply to civil marriage. The Equal
Rights of Customary Marriage Law does not have specifications for divorce, although it posits the
equalization of both marriages. The absence of a legal remedy or means for customary wives or
any of the parties to divorce is a significant omission in the law. Notwithstanding this flaw, in
actual practice, a man can return a woman to her family and this will serve as an official divorce.
In the past, a man could recover dowry paid from his bride’s family if he wanted to terminate the
relationship or return the woman to the family, and that would be the end of the relationship.
Currently, the customary marriage law prohibits the recovery of dowry and states that, if a
husband demands recovery of dowry, it is a first-degree felony.41 However, no alternative

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA OF 1986, art. 11(b). “All persons, irrespective of ethnic
background, race, sex, creed, place of origin or political opinion, are entitled to the fundamental rights and freedom
of the individual, subject to such qualifications as provided for in this Constitution.”; Id. at art. 16. “No person shall
be subjected to interference with his privacy of person, family, home, or correspondence except by order of a court
of competent jurisdiction.”
41
Equal Rights of the Customary Marriage Law of 1998 § 2.2—Decedents Estates Law, 8 LIBERIAN CODE
OF LAWS REVISED (1972). “The recovery of dowry (token) from the wife or her parents by the husband is hereby
40
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provision satisfies the issue. On the contrary, there is a provision that seems to be grounds for
divorce, but it falls short of articulating such a view in a definitive manner. For example, Section
2.5 states that “[e]very customary husband shall respect his wife’s Human rights; any violation of
this section shall entitle the wife to seek redress in a court of law.”42 An important question then
is whether a divorce would be an appropriate cause of action to redress such a violation of rights
and to which court (magisterial, circuit, or Supreme or tribal courts) should the wife seek redress.
For instance, in civil marriage, the grounds for divorce are clearly stated as “cruel and inhuman
treatment, desertion, the act of adultery, and incompatibility of temper.”43
B. Marriage Presumption
The marriage presumption doctrine is common-law marriage; it is a form of marriage
conferred on couples based on their conduct. This form of marriage gets its credibility from the
endorsement of family, friends, and the community. The validity of marriage presumption is
decided through judicial decision. Marriage presumption grants legal marital status to cohabitants
who uphold themselves as husband and wife.44 These cohabitants assume marital status upon
themselves even though their union was not formally solemnized or licensed. Typical factors that
motivate couples to see themselves as married are procreation and raising of children, shared last
name, common investment, listing each other as beneficiary on insurance, employment, real
property, and other crucial or essential documents, and comingling of finances. In the absence of
a dispute, the legality of the relationship is not an issue. The rights of the surviving partner to

prohibited. Any husband who collects or attempts to collect dowry from his wife or her parent by use of force, directly
or indirectly, has committed a felony of the first degree, and upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, shall
be fined the amount of not less than LD 500.00 nor more than LD 1,000.00, including restitution, if any dowry was
refunded.”
42
See id. § 2.5.
43
Domestic Relations Law, 9 LIBERIAN CODE OF LAWS REVISED § 8.1(a-d) (1973).
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benefit from the other becomes an issue for the court when there is a dispute, the dissolution of the
relationship, or when one partner dies.
Cohabitants who exercise their rights under the marriage presumption doctrine have little
protection because of the law’s ambiguity and lack of categorical definition. This section
endeavors to analyze the disadvantages of raising a claim based on the statute by highlighting its
limitations and reasons why it has been non-beneficial to its users. This section will demonstrate
effective methods of utilizing the presumed marriage statute. The basic argument articulated in
this section is that laws written to protect a specific class of people should be categorically clear
in definition. Additionally, the court should endeavor to interpret ambiguous laws in the interest
of public policy precisely.
The number of people cohabiting is almost equal to that of recognized traditional marriages
in Liberia.45 Although there are no laws that expressly forbid cohabitation, there is limited
protection for cohabitants who live together as married couples. These presumed marriages
sometimes last for many years, procreation occurs, and properties are acquired. When cohabitants
terminate their relationship, there are multiple issues that arise: (1) how property acquired during
the relationship should be distributed, (2) how children should be supported, (3) whether children
will inherit from their father, (4) whether the children are legitimate, (5) who should take custody
of children, and (6) whether the non-custodial parent should have visitation rights. The law on
marriage presumption is very vague and does not address these issues.
Liberia’s Civil Procedure Law defines the marriage presumption doctrine in a manner that
suggests that such a marriage is unconditionally legal. It states that “persons who live together as
husband and wife and hold themselves out as such are presumed to be married.”46 This statute
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raises many questions that need to be addressed by the Court since the legislative meaning is
unclear. Firstly, what does “hold themselves out” mean? To whom do the couples hold out? Is it
to their friends, family, community, or the court? How should they hold themselves out? Does it
have to be in writing, by express communication, or by conduct? Secondly, the statute does not
state the length of time couples should hold themselves out as husband and wife. Thirdly, it does
not indicate how to rebut the presumption if the presumption is not conclusive. Lastly, it is unclear
whether marriage presumption is applicable in the customary setting as well as the civil setting.
Despite its ambiguity, the statute has been utilized by many couples, to the detriment of
most women. Many women believed that the law protected them in the event of the death of their
spouse or upon termination of the relationship. In reliance on this belief, many women changed
their last names to that of their cohabitating partner. This change of name signifies to the public
that the couple is married, especially if the man acquiesces to the change. On the other hand, the
change of name is not a marriage validation requirement.
Additionally, since the statute does not have any requirement other than the couple holding
themselves out as husband and wife, a woman cannot affirmatively claim marriage based on the
change of name. There are legal requirements for change of name, such as filing a change of name
petition with the probate court and circulation of notices in recognized media.47 It is not clear
whether a presumed married couple should follow this legal procedure and whether using a man’s
last name constitutes marriage.
A vivid example of the name change scenario is evident in various concession areas in
Liberia. Women change their names to that of their cohabitating spouse, and the community and
the man’s employer know them by the man’s last name. Men usually name women as spouses and
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beneficiaries to their employers without legally marrying these women. Can this form of
arrangement be considered as holding themselves out as husband and wife? Is a woman considered
a wife just because a man names her as his wife to his employer? Does the inclusion of a partner
on the document as spouse satisfy the presumption of marriage criteria for holding out? One would
then wonder whether in the case where a title document, such as a land deed issued in the name of
a man and a woman—Mrs. Youngor Flomo and Mr. Fayiah Flomo—could be used as proof of a
valid marriage in a court of competent jurisdiction. The lack of clarity of the statute and the
Supreme Court’s reluctance to definitively declare the marriage presumption a formal marriage or
not has assisted in exacerbating problems encountered by couples upon dissolution of the
cohabitation relationship.
Because the validity of marriage presumption is subject to the court’s decision, an
assumption could be that the application of the presumption doctrine relative to holding out would
be reviewed by the court when invoked. This assumption does not prevail in the case Newindeh v.
Kromah 22 LLR 3(1973). The couple, in that case, lived together for eleven years and, upon
separation, the putative husband claimed custody of his child based on the marriage presumption
doctrine.48 The mother filed habeas corpus proceedings contending that there was no valid
marriage. On appeal, the Chamber Justice concluded that “according to customary law, the
payment of dowry is essential to constitute a marriage, and in the absence of proof of such
payment, the children resulting from the union are illegitimate and belong to the mother.”49 The
court further held that the union was an agreement to marry and differentiated marriage from an
agreement to be married based on the case Horton v. Horton, 14 LLR 57, 60-61 (1960). In Horton,
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the court held that “[m]arriage, in our law, as distinguished from the agreement to marry and from
the act of becoming married, is the civil status of one man and one woman united in law for life,
for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent on those whose
association is formed on the distinction of sex.”50
The Chamber Justice did not consider the marriage presumption doctrine claim sufficient
to warrant its review, although, the presumed husband invoked the doctrine. Instead, the court
determined that there was no customary marriage and that the relationship was an agreement to be
married. The issue of marriage was relevant in custody determination and should have prompted
the court to clarify why this doctrine was or was not applicable in this case. Instead, the Chamber
Justice expounded that the legal procedure for the father was for him to legitimize the child if he
wanted any legal rights to the child. The court also mentioned that, when custody is at issue, the
welfare of the child is the controlling consideration. In this instance, what constitutes child welfare
was not stated, at least as to the fitness of the parents. The court ordered the father to immediately
return the child to the custody of the mother, so that the child could have motherly care and
affection in an environment that was most conducive to her well-being, until such a time when the
father legitimized the child.51 There was no justification as to why motherly care and affection was
necessary to the child’s well-being. It is not clear whether the decision was based on the child’s
age, the mother’s role as the primary caregiver, or the fact that the father was estranged from his
child. These are all questions that were left unanswered by the court.
The opinion ignored the issue of marriage presumption, even though the couple had lived
together for eleven years. Instead, the Justice opined on the differences between marriage and the
agreement to marry. The differentiation is from the Bouvier Law Dictionary Marriage (Rawle’s
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3rd Rev. 1914). The rationale of using this source might be the right to seek assistance from
American jurisprudence in some instances. Under Liberian law, reference is made to a receptive
statute only if the laws of Liberia do not address the issue at bar. In the aforementioned case, the
question was not whether the couple had an agreement to marry or had breached an agreement to
marry. The father alleged the existence of a marriage and invoked the marriage presumption
statute. The opinion should have elaborated on why the couple’s relationship failed to meet the
standards of the various forms of marriages in Liberia, that is, civil marriage, customary marriage,
and presumptive marriage. The Supreme Court, as final arbiter, should leave no room for
speculation or doubt because its opinions are final. This case was a perfect opportunity for the
Court to define the statute. Instead, the conclusion left room for speculation, most likely because
the court was reluctant to chart the definitive course on this subject.
The Court’s circumvention of the issue of marriage presumption may stem from the fact
that the law is unclear and leaves too much to interpretation. For instance, the marriage
presumption statute does not state how long a couple should live together to be considered husband
and wife. If it did, consideration would have been given to the fact that the couple had lived
together for eleven years. The duration of their cohabitation would have served either as a means
of validation or invalidation of the marriage claim. A time requirement in a presumed marriage is
essential because it establishes a line of demarcation between couples that consider themselves to
be married and an illicit cohabitation relationship.
Similarly, there should be a way to rebut a presumption if that presumption is not
conclusive. A conclusive presumption is “a presumption that cannot be overcome by any
additional evidence or argument.”52 On the other hand, a rebuttable presumption is “an inference
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drawn from certain facts that establish a prima facie case, which may be overcome by the
introduction of contrary evidence.”53 There is no evidence or any case law to establish the
conclusiveness of the marriage presumption doctrine. Therefore, a party who objects to a presumed
marriage relationship could have the opportunity to state its objection. Currently, there is no legal
defense available, which is one of the significant shortfalls of the statute. The marriage
presumption statute does not expressly state how to refute the law nor has any court held this
presumption to be conclusive. In the wake of this dilemma, it seems that the court will continue to
evade this issue, and couples will not get justice from invoking the law.
When a law is ambiguous, it tends to disadvantage a certain class of people. The most
appropriate remedy for the disadvantaged class is through the court, but the court has been very
reluctant to rule on marriage presumption cases definitively. The legislature has also failed to
amend or repeal the statue. When courts fail to remedy a claim in a definitive matter, people suffer.
The Constitution of Liberia mandates that “[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are therefore
entitled to equal protection of the law.”54 The fact that other forms of marriage are well defined
and receive an adequate remedy under the law, while marriage presumption does not, indicates an
uneven playing field. In cases where marriage presumption is invoked, the Supreme Court should
deal adequately to avoid marginalization of certain people. In the cases Manney v. Money, 2 LLR
618, 620(1927), Newindeh v. Kromah, 22 LLR 3(1973), and Twe et al. v. Twe-Paye et al., 39 LLR
474 (1999), the Court had perfect opportunities to rule on marriage presumption issues, but evaded
the questions. All these cases presented a common problem of whether or not the couple’s
relationship constituted a valid marriage. These lapses have left many women and children
deprived of property, support, custody, inheritance, and legal status.
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1. Holding Out
Holding out is a critical element of marriage presumption, but the statute does not elucidate
on what it means. For example, it does not articulate what constitutes holding out. Therefore, it is
difficult to assert a claim of marriage when the definition of an essential phrase in the statute is
missing.
2. Time
Many common law married couples are denied marital status because of the ambiguity of
the statute. The couples are unable to adequately present claims of marriage because the statute
does not state the duration of time in which cohabitants must live together in order to be considered
married. Marriage presumption should have a time frame because cohabitants do not go through
any legal ceremony or legal documentation. A time frame for how long a couple should live
together to be considered married should be established to avoid conflict upon the death of a spouse
or the dissolution of the relationship. Many couples live together for several years, and when one
partner dies, the marital status of the surviving spouse comes into question. Sometimes, the
surviving spouse loses inheritance rights because someone alleges that the couple was not married.
This allegation is usually made by family members or other interested parties who want to benefit
from the decedent’s property. On the other hand, because time is not a factor that determines the
validity of a presumed marriage, time cannot be used as a defense to validate or invalidate the
marital status of a relationship. Most often, women are the ones disadvantaged by the law. They
lost their relationship and property acquired, but have the burden of caring for any child born
because the child is deemed illegitimate. In other instances, the relationship is considered illicit.
Time could be beneficial evidence to a claim of marriage.
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3. Rebuttal
Presumptions are indefinite, which creates an environment for defending and opposing.
The presumption under review does not establish any method or criteria for rebuttal. The statute
should be clear on what constitutes a rebuttal to marriage presumption. Currently, there is no
defined rebuttal to the marriage presumption doctrine because of inadequate legislative drafting.
A spouse cannot affirmatively assert marital status. Therefore, there is insecurity as to what
happens when death occurs or upon the termination of a relationship.
4. Civil and Customary Marriages
An important point to note is whether the marriage presumption doctrine is applicable in
the civil or customary settings in Liberia. So far, it is unclear whether the law is applicable in both
settings. The Constitution of Liberia recognizes two forms of marriages; these marriages are
recognized under the Liberian Domestic Relation Statute and the Equal Rights of Customary
Marriage Law. Unlike these two forms of marriages, the marriage presumption law is only
recognized in the Civil Procedure Law. One could assume that since it is in the civil procedure
code, it is applicable in the civil setting rather than customary setting because civil procedure law
is “the body of law- usually rules enacted by the legislature or court- governing the method and
procedure used in civil litigation in a particular jurisdiction.”55 By the same token, it could also be
assumed that the law was meant to be fully defined through judicial decision since civil procedure
has to do with the method and practice used in carrying out civil litigation. Lastly, marriage
presumption could also apply in the customary setting where couples have cohabitated and held
themselves out as married, without dowry payment.
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These assumptions stem from the fact that civil marriage laws, as well as customary
marriage laws, are codified. Disputes arising from customary marriage laws should not be resolved
only in tribal courts but also civil courts. On the contrary, disputes arising from civil marriage are
settled just in civil courts. This means that a customary marriage gets its authority from civil laws
and, because of the influence that civil law has on customary law, the line that separates the two
is fragile. To presume marriage in a civil setting is much simpler than in the customary setting
because of cultural restrictions and polygamy in the latter. A woman alleging a presumed marriage
in a customary environment is fully aware that her husband has the right to marry many women.
However, upon the death of her husband, she could allege that a woman is not a customary wife
of her husband based on recommended criteria set forth. In a traditional setting, this may prove
very difficult to resolve because of the restrictions imposed on women and because men make the
rules and administer the tribal courts. Other than the tribal setting, the only other remedy available
will be a civil court, which may prove too expensive for a traditional woman.
5. Inheritance/Property Rights
There is no definite law on the inheritance rights of a presumed married woman. It is
difficult for an unmarried woman to inherit under the presumptive doctrine because of the
ambiguity of the statute. Therefore, even if a couple conducts themselves as married, upon death,
dissolution, or termination of their relationship, it is unclear how to distribute property. Women in
long-term relationships face uncertainty upon termination of the relationship. Sometimes the men
take all the property and deprive the women. There is no clear legal path to remedy this situation.
As a result, some men unjustly enrich themselves or their families inherit their property, while
subjecting the women and their children to hardship. In other scenarios, when the man dies, the
relationship is categorized as an illicit relationship, further denying her of inheritance.
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C. Custody
1. Civil Marriage
Custody laws favor men in the civil legal systems. In civil legal systems, custody is granted
to the father as a matter of law, except where the man is found to be unfit. Sometimes, the court
awards custody rights to other relatives over the rights of the mother.
Married couples have joint responsibility to care for, nurture, and educate their minor
children. When they separate, the father is the principal custodian of any minor child(ren) unless
the court finds him morally unfit and unable to carry out his legal, parental, moral, and natural
duties. If the “father cannot fulfill his responsibilities, the mother or some other person must
petition the court for the writ of habeas corpus showing therein that the father is unable to carry
out his responsibilities. The court in its discretion decides who to grant custody.”56 There is no
preference given to the mother. For instance, the law does not state that, if the father is found unfit,
the mother should be granted automatic custody, unless she too is adjudged unfit. The mother has
competing rights with what the law refers to as “some other person.”57
There is no legal justification as to why the father is the paramount custodian except that it
furthers the historical stereotype that men are the breadwinners and women the caregivers. Holding
such an argument at face value, does being a breadwinner make a parent fit to have custody of a
child? A breadwinner could be abusive, a drunkard, and immoral. Being a breadwinner should not

Domestic Relations Law, 9 LIBERIAN CODE OF LAWS REVISED § 4.1(a-d) (1973). “A married woman is a
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be the only standard to inform the granting of custody. Other factors, such as a primary caregiver,
safe environment, proper upbringing, school, and close connection to family and other siblings,
should also be examined.58 The law grants automatic custody to mothers if the father is dead or
absent unless she is unfit. The law applies a double standard. A mother is not awarded custody
upon separation, but is granted custody when the father is dead or absent. The law is gender biased
on its face in that it gives fathers the right to custody over the mother without determining the
fitness of each parent.
The custody law promotes the superiority of males over their female partners. The law has
violated the Constitution by implying that one parent is more fit than the other without due process.
The statute has ignored both Articles 11(c) of the Constitution of Liberia which states, “All persons
are equal before the law and are therefore entitled to the equal protection of the Law.”59 Article
20(a) states that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, security of the person, property,
privileges, or any other right except as the outcome of a hearing judgment consistent with the
provision laid down in this Constitution and accordance with due process of law.” If all individuals
are equal before the law, why does the father become the paramount custodian of the child without
adjudication of fitness? The law as written is discriminatory on its face and does not accord the
mother an opportunity to prove her fitness.
Section 4.1 of the Domestic Relations Law states emphatically that the father is the
paramount custodian upon separation. On the contrary, Section 9.5 states in part that:
In any action brought to declare the nullity of a void marriage, or to annul a
voidable marriage, or for a divorce and in a writ of habeas corpus proceeding
instituted by petition and order to show cause therefor, if an issue is presented
therein concerning the custody of or right to visitation of any minor child of
the marriage or concerning the care, education and maintenance of any such
Mark A. Snover & Marcus M. Kasper, Maintaining the Child’s Best Interest in the Determination of a
Child Custody Dispute, 96 MICH. B. J. 18, 20-21 (2017).
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minor child or of any child of the marriage twenty-one years of age or older
who is unable to maintain himself and is likely to become a public charge, the
court must give such direction, between the parties, for the custody, care,
education, and maintenance of such child or the parties, as in the court’s
discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the respective
parties and the best interest of the child. Such direction may make provision
for the education and maintenance of the child out of the property of either or
both of its parents. Such direction may require thereof, sum or sums of money
either directly to the wife or the third person for goods or services furnished
for such child, or for both payments to the wife and to such third person... 60
Two germane issues contrast Section 9.5 from Section 4.1. Firstly, Section 4.1 states when “the
parents are living in a state of separation, the father shall be the custodian of the minor children of
the marriage…”61 Section 9.5 articulates that custody is awarded upon divorce, void marriages and
voidable marriages. The major point of interest is the legal difference between “divorce” and
“living in the state of separation” under Liberian law. Chapter 8 of the Domestic Relations Law
talks about divorce, its grounds, time limitations, bars for granting a divorce, and other necessary
issues that relate to the cause of action. On the contrary, the Domestic Relations Law does not
expound on the issue of separation except in Section 4.1. The court opined in Daniels v. Daniels
16LLR 58, 68(1964) and White v. Witherspoon 9LLR 101, 106(1945) that “in all cases of divorce,
the father shall support the children during the pendency of the action, and that after its termination
he shall take possession of them unless the court shall decide otherwise…”62
The ruling articulates that custody is granted to the father after divorce is final. The period
of separation is the time between when the parties separate and when a divorce is granted. During
this time, the father has custody. Then, the court must decide whether it is in the best interest of
the child for the father to continue to have custody when it rules on the divorce. The courts have
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repeatedly ruled that fathers are the primary custodian of minor children upon divorce, although
their custodianship is not absolute.63 In Okagbare v. Okagbare 13 LRSC (1960) where the parents
contested the custody of their 15-month-old infant, the court held in part that “where the father and
the mother are living together they are jointly entitled to the custody of their children. But the
primary right to custody of their children is in the father, and at common law, in case the parents
are living apart, and there is a dispute as to custody, the right of the father is superior to that of the
mother.”64
Second, there are no standard rules for the granting of custody prescribed by the statute.
Therefore, determination of custody is at the discretion of judges. The interpretations of undefined
laws are subjective and prone to inconsistencies and injustices. A judge that uses discretionary
power has a wide range of usage at his disposal. He could abuse his power or use it unwisely or
inappropriately, which could result in injustice and untold suffering. Because there is no standard
by which custody is granted, in some cases, the judges’ rule is based on the mere letter of the law.
2. Customary Marriage
Custody of children in a customary marriage is with the surviving spouse upon the death
of the other spouse.65 The family of the decedent spouse does not have the right to custody of the
children over that of the surviving spouse.66 The standard of review for custody determination is
in the best interest of the child.67 No provision in the Equal Rights of Customary Marriage Law
grants custody to either parent upon divorce or while living in separation.68 Two assumptions could
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be derived from the absence of a law on the issue. First, customary marriage does not recognize
divorce. Second, the same custody law that applies to civil marriage also applies to customary law,
since Title 9 of the Liberian Codes of Law Revised, Domestic Relations Law is fully incorporated
in the Equal Rights of Customary Marriage Law.69 Assuming that the absence of a law on divorce
in a customary marriage is because divorce is not recognized, this would mean that marriage is an
irreversible commitment, which would be a basic human rights violation of freedom of choice.
Further, it violates Article 11(b) of the Liberian Constitution, which speaks to freedom of the
individual.70 On the other hand, if the second assumption applies, then all the inequalities
enumerated in civil marriage custody law also apply to customary marriage. The flaws recounted
leave significant room for interpretation and leave much to the discretion of judges.
D. The Absence of Dedicated and Stand-Alone Domestic Violence Law
Domestic violence is one of the issues that has been relegated to the private sphere with
the belief that it can be handled domestically or by family intervention. A study in 2007 conducted
in Nimba and Montserrado, the two largest counties in Liberia, showed that out of 300 women
interviewed, 93% suffered domestic violence at the hands of their husbands and other partners.71
According to the International Rescue Committee 2012 “Let me not die before my time” Domestic
Violence in West Africa Report, women and girls are abused on a daily basis, mostly by intimate
partners. Women in Liberia encounter multiple forms of domestic violence abuse, including
verbal, physical, emotional, and economic. In most instances, these abuses were not recognized or
acknowledged. The backlash of domestic violence is fear and isolation. The report further
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emphases that domestic violence can be traced to historical oppression and discrimination against
women.72 As rightly stated in the IRC’s Report, domestic violence has been neglected, with little
acknowledgment. As a result, there is no stand-alone domestic violence legislation. There are bits
and pieces of legislation that address domestic violence, but only in limited ways.
Currently, there is not a specific domestic violence statute in Liberia. There are domestic
violence provisions in the Liberian Penal Code and the Children’s Bill; however, there is not a
specific stand-alone statute dedicated to domestic violence, and the current provisions included in
other laws are inadequate to resolve all domestic violence problems. For example, the issues of
restraining orders, victim protection, and enforcement mechanisms were not addressed
sufficiently. Therefore, the following discussion will center on how the Liberian Penal Code and
the Children’s Bill address domestic violence and the importance of having a specific statute
dedicated to domestic violence.
First, domestic violence as it relates to children is in the Penal Code of Liberia. Chapter 16
of the Penal Code discusses domestic violence against children under the topic Offenses Against
the Family. Section 16.4 expounds on endangering the welfare of children. It says that a
misdemeanor of the first degree is committed when there is a breach of one’s legal duty of care,
protection or support to a child.73 Section 11.11 (d), referenced in Section 16.4, does not
specifically articulate harm resulting from domestic violence. It deals with the child’s
psychological needs and the need for food, shelter, clothing, education, and proper upbringing.
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Notwithstanding, a domestic violence cause of action can derive from Section 16.4 because of the
duty to protect.
Section 16.4 does not in any way cover domestic violence where the victim is an adult.
Therefore, adults who are victims of physical domestic violence could seek remedy under Chapter
14, Subchapter B of the Penal Code captioned “Assaults, Endangering Behavior and Threats.” The
points of reference in this subchapter are Section 14.20, which deals with Aggravated Assault, and
Section 14.21, which deals with Simple Assault.74 The fundamental problem with asserting a cause
of action under these provisions is that it limits domestic violence to physical abuse, which is a
disservice to the thousands of citizens that suffer other forms of domestic violence abuses, such as
verbal abuse, psychological abuse, sexual abuse, and economic abuse.
Secondly, Article 111, Section 21.1 and Section 21.2 of the Children’s Bill articulate the
rights of children to be protected from abuse and exploitation. Specifically, the rights against
sexual abuse and exploitation, prostitution and pornography.75 Similar to the Penal Code, the
Children’s Bill lacks definition making its utility and enforcement minimal. For example, other
provisions in the Children’s Bill give specific responsibilities to government entities to ensure the
protection of rights. Article 111, Section 19.1 enunciates the right to participate in cultural
activities, and Section 19.2 mandates the Ministry of Information Culture and Tourism to promote
activities that commensurate with the promotion of honorable child life. Not only is the provision
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of domestic violence inadequate in its definition but it also lacks a specific government entity that
has oversight responsibility to guarantee its enforcement.
An important question that arises out of the absence of a specific statute dedicated to
addressing domestic violence is whether victims of domestic violence can assert a right to remedy
against the state for its failure to protect them against their offenders. Article 26 of the Liberian
Constitution guarantees that anyone injured by the act of the government shall have the right to
sue for appropriate redress; it further states that such suit can be in property, tort, or contract. And
that the Claims Court has original jurisdiction over the suit.76 Of interest is that there is no Claims
Court in Liberia, which leaves the victims in a state of hopelessness for dismissal of complaints
on jurisdictional grounds.
Given the above, current victims of domestic violence in Liberia could assert a claim
against the state based on the state’s obligation under Article 11 (c) of the constitution to provide
equal protection for all citizens.77 Notwithstanding, a well-defined statute dedicated to addressing
the problems of domestic violence would assist in remedying cases.
In 2015, a draft domestic violence act was submitted by the Ministry of Gender, Children
and Social Protection to the legislature for enactment. After three years, that draft act is still
pending before the legislature. The draft act seeks to provide protection and therapeutic counseling
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for survivors and victims of domestic violence. It also aims to rehabilitate perpetrators and
provides emergency services for survivors, victims, and their families. It prescribes punishment or
rehabilitation for perpetrators and compensates victims and survivors. This draft lacks pertinent
provisions that should help in the utilization of the statute, however, which will be discussed later.
E. Illegitimacy
Children born in civil or customary marriages are legitimate, but those born in a presumed
marriage are illegitimate, although the Civil Procedure law recognizes marriage presumption as a
valid marriage. Generally, a child born to unmarried parents is illegitimate unless the father takes
steps to legitimize that child. Legitimation is a process by which an illegitimate child becomes
legitimate and enjoys equal rights as a child born in wedlock. This process allows the natural father
to petition the court to grant legal status to the child as though the child were born in marriage.78
A father’s failure to file this petition would affect the child’s inheritance rights and render the child
illegitimate under the law.
The original domestic relations laws of Liberia did not make provision for the legitimation
of children. Children born in an unwed relationship were called bastards, which meant that they
did not have “inheritable blood and [could not] be heirs to anyone by the Common-law”79 The
Liberian Domestic Relations Law was later amended to provide for legitimation. This allowed
illegitimate children to become legitimate and gave them the right to inherit from their fathers.80
The process of legitimation is at the sole discretion of the father. Neither the mother nor the child
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nor the court can compel legitimation. The law subjects the legal status of innocent children to the
will and pleasure of the person responsible for placing them in the state of illegitimacy.
Since a child is not responsible for being born legitimate or illegitimate, their fate should
not lie solely in the hands of one parent. The mother or the child should be allowed to compel
legitimation to protect the child from being deprived of inheritance from their father. Mothers
should be allowed to compel legitimation upon the establishment of paternity. If a man has been
determined by the court to be the father of the child or has acknowledged the child to be his, it
should not be left to his discretion to decide whether the child benefits from his inheritance. The
court should declare that child legitimate as though the child were born in wedlock.
The statute, as written, is facially gender discriminatory in that it gives fathers the right of
legitimation and the mother only the right to object to the legitimation. To make this statute gender
balanced, women should have the power to compel legitimation. Currently, a mother can only
petition the court to establish the paternity of her child. When paternity is established, the father
becomes obligated to support the child. It does not necessarily mean that the child is entitled to
inheritance from the father. That child can still be denied inherence if his/her legal status is
challenged in court because he/she is said to lack inheritable blood. To date, children born out of
wedlock are still called bastards and do not have automatic inheritance from their fathers, but they
can inherit from their mothers and maternal linkage.81
Presently in Liberia, courts rely on ancient statutes, such as the bastardy statute borrowed
from the United States of America, specifically, from Arkansas, Alabama, and Georgia. The court
has defined bastard in Prout v. Cooper 5LLR 412(1937) as “a child born before the marriage of his
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parents.”82 The bastardy statute enacted in the 1800s was a criminal statute. The statute was
intended to promote traditional marriage and to deter a mother from birthing children that could
likely become a public charge. With the multiplicity of children born as bastards in Liberia today,
the original intent of the statute seems to be moot. Therefore, the legislature ought to revisit the
statute to determine whether it still meets its intended purpose.
According to Section 3.5 of the Decedents Estates Law, inheritance for children born out
of wedlock is automatic from the mother’s perspective but conditional from the father’s. A father
must legitimize his child before that child can inherit from him and vice versa. There are ways in
which an illegitimate child can inherit, though. Section 3.5 of the Decedents Estates Law provides
that:
An illegitimate child and his issue shall inherit under the provisions of section 3.2
from his mother and her lineal and collateral relatives, and his mother and her lineal
and collateral relatives shall inherit from such child and his issue as if he were
legitimate.” An illegitimate child and his issue shall inherit under the provisions of
section 3.2 from his father and the linear, and collateral relatives of the father, and
the father and his lineal and collateral relatives shall inherit from such child and his
issue as if he were legitimate under any of the following conditions:
a) If the child is adopted by his father; or
b) If the father acknowledges his paternity in writing before a justice of the
peace or notary public and such acknowledgment is probated and registered;
or
c) If the parents marry after the birth; or
d) If the child has been legitimated under the provision of the Domestic
Relation Law; or
e) If the paternity of the child has been adjudicated by a court of appropriate
jurisdiction.
Such child shall be treated as if he were the legitimate child of his mother, and if
any of the conditions enumerated in this section is present, as the legitimate child
of his father, for the purpose also of receiving benefits under section 4.3 and 4.4.83
Section 3.5 (e) above reveals that, once paternity is adjudicated, the child becomes entitled
to inheritance. This inheritance right is, however, limited to personal property valued at $500 and
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the right to reside in the decent’s dweller home for seven months until letters of administration are
issued, that is, if the person dies without a will.84
The Supreme Court has, from time to time, established that, for a child born out of wedlock
to inherit from the father, the father should necessarily legitimize the child. This rule was
established in Johnson v. Fadel, 25 LLR 174, 180(1976), Newindeh v. Kromah 22 LLR 3, 9(1973),
and Prout v. Cooper 5LLR 412(1973). As per the Court’s recent opinion in Cole v. His Hon. Wah
et al., LRSC 9 (16 January 2014), even where there is sufficient evidence that the father recognizes
the illegitimate child as his and the father’s relatives did the same, that child still does not have
automatic rights and, if a legitimate child challenges his/her status, the legitimate child will
prevail.85 It is clear from the above cases and the Supreme Court’s opinion that the correct way to
establish inheritance for an illegitimate child is through legitimation.
The Court relies on the Liberian Code of Laws Revised -Title 9- Domestic Relations Law
Section 4.92 in the above cases.86 However, in Section 3.5 (e) of the Decedents Estates Law, a
child may inherit based on the establishment of paternity even though born out of wedlock. There
is tension between the laws and the opinion of the Court, which leads to the question of what
adjudication of paternity of the child actually means. Answering this question could give a more
realistic evaluation of whether the inheritance right of children born out of wedlock is strictly
conditioned on a deliberate action by the father through legitimization or the intent of the father
for the child to inherit based on the establishment of paternity. Although there is tension between
the laws, based on the Court’s repeated opinions regarding legitimation as a basis for rightful
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inheritance, it is safe to say that the inheritance rights of an illegitimate child from his father is
based on legitimization.
Although, the court relies on Section 4.92 of the Domestic Relations Law to render
decisions regarding the inheritance of children born out of wedlock, the language of the statute is
not bereft of problems. The problem is that inheritance rights for children born out of wedlock are
at the sole discretion of the father. The law essentially allows a father to segregate among his
children by making them legitimate and illegitimate. Since children do not participate in their birth
decision, they should not bear such unjustified treatments. Despite the above, under the Decedents
Estates Law of Liberia, a father can devise his property through a Will to his illegitimate child(ren).
Secondly, Section 4.92 promotes patriarchy; it is gender biased and ambiguous. Thirdly,
the law discriminates based on social status, that is, a child born in wedlock is accorded special
privileges over other siblings who are not. The legitimation law discriminates against mothers,
which is a blatant violation of the Liberian Constitution’s equal protection provision.”87 The
Constitution states that “any laws, treaties, statutes, decrees, customs, and regulations found to be
inconsistent with it shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void and of no legal effect.”88
Therefore, a statute that does not protect both males and females equally is inconsistent with the
Constitution and should be void.
While legitimation entitles a child to inherit from the father, the process of inheritance does
not start with legitimation, but rather with the establishment of paternity. A mother must first
obtain a ruling from a competent court that a man is the father of her child. Though a mother can
litigate paternity, the father can also voluntarily declare himself as the father of a child. Both
parents can petition the court to establish paternity. There are three ways to establish paternity: (1)
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when a man acknowledges a child to be his,89 (2) blood testing,90 and (3) adjudication.91 Although
the three methods stated above establish paternity, they do not legitimize a child. The
establishment of paternity sets the stage for a support obligation. The differences between
legitimation and paternity are that legitimation establishes an automatic legal right to inherit from
a biological father, whereas paternity simply creates a support obligation.
About the above, legitimation establishes paternity and grants the child lawful status as
though the child were born in wedlock. Even though the law seems to be clear on the methods of
establishing paternity, there is still a need to clarify further what acknowledgment of a child means;
acknowledgment needs to be categorically defined. As it stands, this law appears to be concerned
with absolving the man from his fatherly obligation. The law promotes patriarchy, which has
consistently suppressed women. Again, this law is gender-biased and needs to be re-written in a
gender-neutral manner to benefit both parents equally.
F. Conclusion
Three fundamental problems have affected the Liberian Domestic Relations Law: (1) laws
that facially discriminate against women, (2) gender neutral laws that have a disparate impact on
women, and (3) inadequate legislative drafting, which has to do with ambiguities and omissions
in the law. The laws on custody and legitimation are examples of facially discriminatory laws that
consistently deprive women of their right to custody of their children, especially children of tender
age, and the right of their children to inherit from their fathers, which by extension puts the burden
of care on the mother. The custody law favors fathers over mothers in granting custody upon
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divorce while the legitimation law gives the father the discretion to decide whether his child born
out of wedlock should inherit from him. Second, the marriage presumption law, though gender
neutral, has a disparate impact on women. Women are often deprived of property rights upon
termination of the relationship because the marriage presumption law lacks a categorical
definition. The lack of adequate redress for women who find themselves in presumed marriages
leads to poverty. Women are disadvantaged by their spouses, and sometimes by extended family
members, who unjustly benefit from their inheritance because the relationship is considered illicit
upon the termination or death of their spouse.
Some provisions of the Domestic Relations Law are ambiguous, thereby placing party
litigants at the discretion of judges. For example, the marriage presumption law is unclear
regarding time, rebuttal, and what “holding out” means and to whom the couple should hold
themselves out. The problems that women encounter further illuminate the failure of the
legislature to enact laws that would address critical issues like divorce in a customary marriage
or domestic violence. The lack of will to make substantive revisions, to amend inadequate laws,
and to repeal obsolete laws has consistently deprived women of their fundamental human,
property, and inheritance rights.
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CHAPTER THREE: MODELS OF EQUALITY: FORMAL, RATIONAL
CONNECTION, NORMATIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE
To adequately address the inequality problems enumerated in Chapter Two, there must be
an equality model that will guide the legislature in developing legislation, the executive in
enforcing, and the judiciary in reviewing claims that may arise. Therefore, this chapter examines
the literature on four models of equality: formal, rational connection, normative, and substantive.
The purpose is to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses, noting that each theory of equality has
its limitations that need to be enhanced to increase its utility. Additionally, the chapter reviews the
literature on affirmative actions, to illustrate the need for affirmative actions in addressing the
socio-economic and political problems of citizens in a developing country. The chapter further
demonstrates how affirmative action is utilized in both the normative and substantive equality
models to ameliorate past and continuing discrimination. It is important to note that the models are
discussed cumulatively, starting from the weakest to the strongest. Some of the models have some
characteristics that need to complement others.
A. Formal Equality
The literature on the formal equality model dictates that the government treats all persons
within each legislative classification alike.92 If those that are within the same legislative
classification are treated the same, then there is no discrimination within that class and the object
of formal equality is achieved.93 Many legal scholars support this theory, although there have also
been many criticisms. In analyzing these positions, the model is discussed within the context of
formal equality of opportunity and legal decision-making. The focus of this section will be on the
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following: (1) what formal equality theorists have said, (2) the strengths of the formal equality
model, and (3) the problems or limitations of the model.
According to Robin West, formal equality is fundamental to legal decision-making based
on three ideologies: (1) the economist/utilitarian ideology, (2) the traditionalist ideology, and (3)
the humanistic ideology. She addresses these ideologies by raising three essential issues: “(1) Why
formal equality? (2) What does it mean to treat likes alike? And, (3) why this value almost
inevitably appears, and reappears, as so central to the law?”94 West argues that these questions can
be answered from the traditionalist, utilitarian/economic, and humanistic approaches.
Economically, treating likes alike and insisting that legal players, in particular, do so
increases individual well-being.95 Further, “by doing so, we preserve the cultural and social
traditions that constitute our communal architecture.”96 Finally, “by treating likes alike, through
law, we recognize and reaffirm a universal and complex human nature, and the equal moral worth
of all who fall within the legal regime.”97 When all humans are viewed through the same lens and
afforded the same treatment by the law, the universal nature of human beings is acknowledged and
recognized. The failure to do so will result in injustice, dehumanization, and exclusion; hence, the
failure to treat likes alike.98
Entranced in formal equality legal jurisprudence is the fundamental idea of treating likes
alike, where judges decide cases based on precedents, and lawyers and legal scholars endeavor to
establish similarities and dissimilarities of legal opinions with current cases. Robin West, in
support of the importance of formal equality to legal thinking, argues that, despite the attacks on
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formal equality, its critics have failed to displace the importance of formal equality to legal
thinking, adjudication, constitutionalism, and education.99 She articulates that judges and lawyers
analogize cases to prior cases and continue to look for similarities and differences between the
cases, individuals, and groups. She states that there has been no other alternative method suggested
by the formal equality critics. West further notes that, regardless of the large and powerful body
of critique, formal equality, more than any other commitment, continues to define a distinctively
legal approach to social discord.100
West reviews two ideologies of formal equality: utilitarian/economics and traditionalist.
She asks two basic questions: why should likes be treated alike and why is formal equality central
to the law? The goal is to establish similarities and differences between these two schools of
thought, to identify their limitations, and to suggest what ideas she believes best address the issues.
The utilitarian/economics believe that formal equality is universal and shares one universal
attribute. That is, a human’s ability to make choices and benefit from them.101 The
utilitarian/economics scholars argue that humans are naturally born traders and that characteristic
is central to the economics of law.102 They espouse that humans have little in common beyond
their ability to make choices and improve their welfare, which is why they are universally
individuals and that universal nature is thin.103 They emphasize that humans are self-aware and
self-interested in profiting from the choices that they make, therefore, humans have much to gain
by having more choices available to them; hence the ability to bargain and maximize their
choices.104
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West, addressing the issue of why formal equality is central to law, posits that both formal
equality and law maximize individual freedom by increasing predictability in the law.105 She
argues that when courts decide cases in like manner, and legislation reliably groups people together
for legal treatment, there is increased certainty and increased individual liberty. By that,
individuals will know how to plan their future and present choices accordingly; they will know
how their conduct runs contrary to or is in line with requirements under the law.106 She concludes
that when laws are made and practiced in the “realm of formal equality, individual liberty increases
and the threat of violence decreases.”107
In support of the argument of precedents being central to law, Professor Fredrick Schauer
approaches his assertion from the basis of fairness, predictability, and strengthening decisionmaking.108 Fairness he claims requires that all cases of the same kind be treated alike based on
previous decisions. He emphasizes the point of similarity in the content of cases as a basis for
similar treatment. As an important moral value, Schauer argues that, for individuals to plan their
lives effectively, laws should be predictable. He stresses that predictability has its costs and
benefits, which must be balanced.109 Schauer arguing on strengthening decision asserts the value
of precedence in relation to saving time and energy on cases with similar facts and circumstances;
deciding in like manner enhances credibility and power to the decision makers.110
On the other hand, Anthony Kronman endeavors to contrast law and philosophy. He argues
that precedent for lawyers and judges has value and power to render a current action legitimate
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based on past decisions; but in philosophy, the past has no legitimate power over the present. 111
The past has no “authoritative force, no power of its own to legitimate or justify,”112 any situation
or action of the present.113 Anthony Kronman asserts that formal equality serves the end of
individual fairness and the preservation of culture, that is, rules, traditions, and relations that
structure social life.114
Kronman further argues that treating likes alike, or judges obligating the court to respect
precedents, levies upon the court the obligation to discover and reaffirm what constitutes social
values, institutions, and traditions and the social foundation of each category. For example, when
married women are treated alike, there is redefinition and recommitment.115 “Traditionalists
believe that humans have virtually no shared attributes, no particular sets of traits besides the fact
that they are all human beings;” but have shared trait by tradition and culture.116 Their social roles
define humans, for example, fathers, mothers, child, etc. 117 Similarly, Hobbes avers that oral and
written laws should be subject to interpretation. Therefore, court decisions should be based on the
truth without deference to the past because judges are liable to mistakes and should reverse their
opinion when errors occur. He stated that “no man’s error should become his law or obligates him
to persist in it.”118 Holmes believes that “the basis of principle is tradition,”… “that is, to do as
your father has done.”119
There are strong differences between the economic and traditionalist theories.
Notwithstanding, West recognizes that there are substantial commonalities: (1) they stress the
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importance of moral value as a basis of law and legal decision making and the preservation of
lawfulness of decision-making and (2) both emphasize that the interpretation of formal equality
rests on the description of human nature.120 West concludes that the answer to why likes are treated
alike, and why formal equality is central to the law, is both “economic and traditional.” It is
economical because treating likes alike “increases individual welfare.” Secondly, it “preserves the
culture and social tradition that constitutes shared communal architecture.” West also asserts that
there is a third piece of this puzzle, which she calls “humanistic,” that finalizes the argument. The
humanistic view espouses that, when likes are treated alike, there is a recognition and reaffirmation
of how universal and complex human nature is and the “equal worth of all who fall within the legal
regime.”121 West further states that the failure to treat likes alike leads to “dehumanization,
exclusion, limits on individual liberty and destroys some social tradition and excommunicate
others; thereby destroying humanistic core ideal.”122
Although support for formal equality may seem plausible, the model still needs to address
many hurdles. West, Kronman, and other scholars have strived to make convincing arguments as
to why formal equality is important to humans and central to legal jurisprudence. According to
Justice Antonin Scalia, “formal equality is entrenched in legal justice.”123 Those thoughts are
cardinal to the application of formal equality, although there are many gaps in the theory that could
disadvantage many individuals and groups in society. For example, formal equality does not
articulate the derivative of legislative classifications or why one class should be treated differently
from the other. There should be standards that inform the basis for legislative classification or
some explanation. Such standards should be used as a basis for citizens to declare their rights or
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to seek remedy based on violations of established standards. Additionally, since the legislature is
the voice or representation of the people, to solicit the people’s views in such a process eliminates
future discontentment. Formal equality does not view treating one class alike and the other
different as a form of discrimination; that is, arbitrary placement of people into classes without
setting any standard or provision for change of status and total disregard for the equal protection
clause, which enshrined in most constitutions. Should individuals be treated differently just
because of social or economic status? Does the government have an obligation to improve the lives
of its citizens without drawing lines based on where they come from, how they look, and what
they have or do not have? These cardinal issues must be addressed to discuss equality/equal
protection. Formal equality does not recognize that there are legislative divisions within classes.
The legislature places people into classes, but the lack of standards to determine how these classes
are derived has created more problems.
In the case of Liberia, civil married women have more rights than customary married
women. The issue then becomes whether customary wives and civil married wives should be
treated alike or should be treated differently. The same legislature has sub-divided the same class
of people and prescribed different treatments for each of them. Formal equality recognizes
inequality when there is differentiation within the same legislative class. For example, if some
civilly married women were treated differently from the others. It does not take into consideration
how situations beyond individuals’ control influence their ability to compete. Social, economic,
cultural, and other conditions play a pivotal role in the lives of individuals. Most often, these
individuals do not contribute or have little or no way of removing themselves from the situation.
If they are not the cause of their situation and are powerless to help themselves, should they be
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further penalized by the legislature subjecting them to different treatment? Does such treatment
amount to institutionalized discrimination?
Formal equality mainly deals with individuals in the public sphere and not the private
sphere. Seldom has the legislature/government regulated private conduct because of its obligation
to maintain the privacy of people. Nevertheless, the government has the power to regulate private
conduct, to an extent, to promote equal treatment in both the public and private spheres. Although
the government has that authority, the exercise thereof is cost intensive and opens doors to
litigation. Further, the implementation and enforcement of regulation on private conduct may
prove very challenging. The model assumes that when people are given the same treatment, then
there is equality. For example, in Liberia, married women, under both customary and civil legal
systems, are entitled to a one-third property right upon the death of their spouse. The irony is that,
under civil marriage, there is only one wife; however, under customary marriage, there are often
multiple wives. Therefore, the distribution of the one-third property rights to multiple wives
becomes a predicament. This model on its face seems to perpetuate discrimination most overtly
by its division of people into sameness and differences, especially because there are no standards
that justify the classification.
Formal equality of opportunity posits that all citizens with equal qualities and capacities
be afforded the same platform in society to maximize their potential.124 Everyone should have
entry to desired jobs, positions, and social situations by participating through the same procedural
and legal means. It means that, to be deemed qualified for a post, the applicant must meet the
prescribed job description and qualification. On the other hand, the standard of formal equality is
fulfilled when employers, through job postings, make all vacancies public to everyone who is
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desirous of applying, and all applications are evaluated through the same procedure.125 The bottom
line is that selection is based on merit, and no other factors such as race, religion, gender, or
minority should be considered in the employment process.126
The idea of a merit-based system seems plausible because the concept of formal equality
views meritocracy as neutral and objective. It ignores the fact that sometimes merit criteria can be
biased because the people that encounter these criteria may not be similarly situated. For example,
formal equality eliminates the chances of reserved rights, i.e., privileges for specific groups and
social categories that have experienced past and continuing discrimination, and promotes a system
based on merits.127 For instance, if a male and a female are applying for admission at a university,
the university could consider the proportion of male to female enrollment and tilt the process a
little in favor of one sex to accept more of that sex. The university could do this to encourage
and/or promote the admission of that sex in order to improve gender balance. This form of
selection, which is not merit based, may not fit into the formal equality model.
On a similar note, Justice McIntyre of the Canadian Supreme Court in Andrew v. Law
Society of British Columbia opined, “A bad law will not be saved merely because it operates
equally upon those to whom it has application.”128 He asserts that applying the similarly situated
test is equivalent to Adolf Hilter’s Nuremberg Law.129 He further argues that the similarly situated
test falls short of identifying its targeted beneficiaries and does not provide substantive justification
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for treating others differently. Concisely, “The Formal equality model does not afford a realistic
test for determining whether a state has violated an individual’s or group’s constitutional right to
equal treatment and protection.”130
B. Rational Connection Equality Model
The rational connection equality model is a function of a judicial decision; it tells what the
court will or will not do. The court looks for a rational basis in treating persons within the same
legislative classification alike. The reasoning could be policy based, moral, or substantive. The
rational connection equality model is an upshot of the formal equality model in treating persons
within the same legislative classification alike.131.132 A legislative class is reasonable if there is a
rational connection between the legal classification and a legitimate legislative goal or issue at bar.
Classification will be held constitutionally legitimate by a court if it furthers a legitimate state
interest or end.133 In essence, no arbitrary legislation will pass constitutional review. The model
goes a little further beyond formal equality; it does not solely require all persons sharing the same
classification to be treated equally but requires that legislation have a rational connection between
the legislative classification and the governmental interests that it seeks to promote 134
In a way, this model is heavily leaning on the side of governmental interest in legislation.
While it is true that the court seeks to establish this rational connection, the court can also establish
an irrational interest.135 In this regard, the court has the discretion to invalidate legislative policies
that are harmful, discriminatory, unreasonable, unjust, and irrational, but, in most instances, the
court sustains such legislation.136 Although the court could use its discretionary power in rational
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connection cases to rule reasonably, it often does not, as long as there is a nexus between the object
it seeks to achieve and the classification.137 The United States Supreme Court has suggested that
it is almost entirely impossible for a plaintiff to prevail on equal protection grounds under the
rational basis standard.138
Courts will ordinarily find a rational connection between legislation and a government
interest, except in the instance that the legislation is found to be unreasonable or irrational. For
example, a legislative classification may be illegitimate where the resulting discrimination
indicates that “the law is not a result of legislative rationality under some legitimate objective.”139
Be that as it may, the court will go above and beyond to establish a nexus between the
classifications and a governmental purpose. For example, in deciding whether there is a nexus, the
court strives to establish “whether the classification is most remote, or in a tenuous way further or
promote a legitimate actual or hypothetical goal.”140 It insinuates that the court prefers to establish
a connection between the statute and governmental interest in that it begins its review with a strong
presumption that the classification under scrutiny is constitutional, thereby placing a burden of
proof on the plaintiff.141
There are three important questions that emanate from how courts have handled cases
under the rational bases review: (1) Has the court been consistent in deciding cases involving
similarly situated individuals? (2) How does the court’s decision impact party litigants? (3) Are
there limitations to the rational connection equality theory?
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The Court has sometimes been inconsistent in deciding cases of similarly situated persons
seeking remedy in equal protection cases. In Reed v. Reed 404 U.S 71 92 S. Ct. 251 30 L. Ed. 2d.225,
71, 76 (1971), a minor child died intestate and both parents who were separated petitioned the

probate court for letters of administration to administer the decedent’s estate. The probate court
granted letters of administration to the father based on Section 15-314 of Idaho’s Probate Law,
which states that “of several persons claiming and equally entitled to administer, the male must be
preferred to females and relatives of the whole to those of the half-blood.” The United States
Supreme Court opined that “to give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over
members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearing on the merits, is to make
the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”142 The Court concluded that, under the Fourth Amendment, legislative
classifications must be reasonable, not arbitrary and “must rest upon some ground of difference,
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, for similarly situated persons
to be treated alike.” It concluded that the legislation was discriminatory on its face and did not
serve a legitimate governmental interest.143 The case illuminates how the model is used to limit
arbitrary government action. Another way in which the model has placed limits to government
action was exemplified when the United States Supreme Court struck down a statue in Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620(1996). In Romer, the State passed a constitutional amendment that stated:
No protected Status based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation”
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or department, nor any
of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact,
adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute
or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or a class of persons to have or
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claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination.144
In deciding Romer, the Supreme Court stated that the amendment failed and defied the
conventional inquiry of rational basis review by placing a broad and undifferentiated disability on
a single named group through exceptional and invalid legislation. Secondly, the amendment was
animus toward the affected class because it lacked a rational relationship to legitimate state
interest. The Court reiterated the need for a rational connection between classifications and object
of the law because such nexus gives substance to the equal protection clause. 145 The court
concluded that “the amendment did not have any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete object.
It is a status-based enactment that does not have a legitimate state interest; it is a classification of
persons undertaken for its own sake; something the equal protection clause does not permit.”146
In the cases cited above, the Court struck down legislation that was unreasonable,
irrational, and invidiously discriminatory that did not foster any government interest. The court
has reasoned that legislation cannot be based on animus and enacted for its own sake. In the cases
that follow, the court has upheld legislation that it believed to have a nexus to its object. In
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. 348 U.S. 483, 75 S. Ct. 461, 99 L. Ed. 563, 483 484-85
(1955), one of the issues the court was required to answer was whether a portion of Oklahoma

legislation, which bars a person who is not an optometrist or an ophthalmologist from fitting lenses,
duplicating, or replacing into frames lenses or other optical appliances without a prescription from
an ophthalmologist or optometrist, was constitutional.147 This issue was a claim of violation of
Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court relied on its ruling in Roschen v. Ward, 279
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U.S 337, when it upheld a “New York statute making it unlawful to sell eyeglasses at retail in any
store unless a duly licensed physician or optometrist was in charge or personal attendance.”148 That
Court also held that “wherever the requirements of the Act stop, there can be no doubt that the
presence and superintendence of the Specialist tend to diminish an evil.”149
There is little benefit to attain regarding the rational connection model in that the court,
using the rational basis standard, has used different tests to arrive at a justifiable reason why
legislation has a rational nexus to a stated governmental interest or not. Nevertheless, courts
endeavor to establish a rational relationship between a legislative classification and a governmental
interest. That is why courts seek to find whether the “statute is most remote or in a tenuous way
further or promote a legitimate, actual or hypothetical goal.”150
Like other equality models, the rational connection model has limitations. First, there is no
inquiry into the legitimacy of the classification or connection. There is an assumption that the
legislature as the representative of the people makes law based on the people’s situation or
addresses issues that are paramount to the people. Therefore, the court feels obligated to uphold
legislation by finding reasons that will best fit the circumstance.
On the contrary, the legislature, though representatives of the people, sometimes make laws
that discriminate among the very people they represent and sometimes legislation is politically
motivated. The issue then becomes, should the court delve into the intent of the legislature? Or has
the situation changed since the law was enacted, and, therefore, the law should be amended or
repealed based on judicial opinion?
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Second, the effect of the legislative classification is not examined.151 Does the legislature
revert to its constituents to ascertain whether the classification benefits or disadvantages them?
Does it conduct public hearings to get feedback? Generally, they do not. In situations where
legislation divides citizens into classes and does not revisit such classification to examine the effect
as to its utility, then the court, through its power of judicial review, should determine whether the
law is applicable in contemporary times. Though legislation may seem neutral on its face, it may
sometimes have a disparate impact. For example, a custody law may require that custody of a child
be granted based on which parent has the higher income. Although this law may seem to be neutral,
it could have a disparate impact on mothers because most fathers have a higher income than
mothers do. Therefore, other factors, such as primary caregiver and best interest of the child,
should be considered in conjunction with income.
Similarly, legislation with a rational connection can lead to high inequality. For instance,
children born out of wedlock are considered illegitimate and, therefore, do not inherit from their
fathers. The rationale is to promote and protect traditional family values, which is commendable.
The result, though, is penalizing children for acts they did not commit or situations they did not
create. Meanwhile, the main perpetrator, which is the father, benefits from his action by solely
having the option to decide which of his children becomes legitimate or illegitimate. Situations
like these disadvantage children, and primarily translates into them being inferior to their other
siblings. It also sends a signal that their birth was an unfortunate event, and therefore, they should
live by the attending consequences. How can a legislature justify penalizing a child for the acts of
their parents, considering the prevalence of children born out of wedlock in these contemporary
times?
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Third, it gives the government excessive power over ordinary citizens. The Republic of
Liberia comprises three branches of government: legislative, executive, and judiciary. The
legislature enacts laws, the executive enforces laws, and the court interprets laws. The rational
connection model goes over and beyond to strengthen collaboration between the three and creates
a familial bond, even though they are separate and distinct branches of government. For instance,
the goal of the court is not to invalidate legislation, but to find a reasonable means to uphold the
law. Therefore, it generally assumes that a legislative classification is rational and that it supports
a governmental objective.
Additionally, the court’s main priority is to establish a nexus between the statute and the
object of the law and, therefore, stretches its boundaries to make such an establishment. When an
inequality claim is raised, it is a case of either equal treatment or equal protection or sometimes
equal opportunity. When it comes to equal treatment and protection, it is usually a case between
the government and a group or an individual. There is a heavy burden on the claimant to establish
an irrational connection. On the other hand, the court stretches its boundary to find reasons to
support the legislation.
C. Normative Model
The normative model is similar to the rational connection model in that courts look for a
rational connection between legislative class and permissible state objective. The difference is that,
in the normative model, the legislative classification should not only be reasonable but should also
be normatively justifiable in light of human dignity and respect.152 This model seeks to identify
unfair legislative differentiation, by demanding that legislation not be stereotypical and not
negatively affect a person’s character. If legislation bears a rational connection to a governmental
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interest, a person can demonstrate unfair discrimination by proving that the “grounds for
discrimination is based on attribute or characteristics which have the potential to impair the
fundamental human dignity of the persons as a human being.”153 The test for unfairness is “focused
on the impact of discrimination on the claimant and similarly situated people.”154
The fundamental driving force of the normative model of equality is to create a platform
where human beings can be treated fairly, with respect and dignity, and having recourse to the law
when the need arises. It speaks to the issue of separate rights to people and equal treatment for
differently situated people, as well as an equal entitlement that is generated because of separate
and distinct situations.155 It means that the normative model stresses more on the concept of human
dignity rather than equality. Each person is entitled to certain rights because he or she is human.
The normative equality model prevents governments from intruding on citizens’ fundamental
rights, liberties, and equal protection. That is, all persons are equal before the law, regardless of
their backgrounds. Therefore, all human beings are entitled to privacy, dignity, and equal
treatment.
The normative model of equality focuses on differential treatment between categories of
people and legislative classification to trigger the court’s review. Therefore, there is no inequality
when differently situated persons get similar treatment.156 For example, customary and statutory
wives are differently situated regarding legal jurisdiction. If both receive the same treatment in
both systems, there is no discrimination; fulfilling the purpose of identifying prohibited bases of
legislative differentiation.157 The normative equality model pursues the elimination of
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discrimination by barring distinction on morally irrelevant grounds and defines the relevant
features for differentiating legislative treatment by focusing not only on the ends of the law but
also upon how to achieve its objectives.158
The difficulty with this model is that it concentrates only on differential treatment and
legislative classification.159 As a result, the court becomes powerless to adjudicate cases that are
outside of such classification, thereby promoting inequality when differently situated persons are
treated similarly—although this may not be plausible in the application. Normative right could
mean that two persons, though differently situated, are treated equally or given equal entitlement
although their rights may be separate. It indicates that being entitled to treatment does not mean
that if one person is denied a perceived benefit, they can raise an inequality or discrimination claim
because their entitlement may not have a significant connection or be contingent in any way. For
example, if two children ask to be taken to a football match and one caught the flu, the parent could
decide to make one of three decisions: (1) stay home with both children, (2) take the healthy child
to the game, or (3) take both children to the game despite the other child’s health. Each person
could assert a claim of their own, but not as an outcome of a comparative right because the
circumstances that give rise to the right or benefit are different. The result is that, though two
persons are treated equally, they may not have equal rights to “equal treatment but only separate
rights to particular treatments.”160 Sometimes the treatments that the persons may receive could be
the same and sometimes not. It raises the idea of comparative rights since there is no standard to
determine the differences or sameness between people. Can an individual claim a right because
another was accorded the same or is the nature of differences implicit in the normative model since
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human dignity is at its core? To understand the comparative nature of normative equality, let us
delve into the normative principles that comparative rights propose.
The comparative rights model suggests two normative principles: (1) similarly situated
cases should be treated the same and (2) differently situated cases should receive treatment
individually.161 In the first instance, persons or groups of the same relevant class can claim the
same treatment, that is, if group A received certain treatment, then group B could demand the same
treatment. Second, the doctrine of comparative rights enunciates equal treatment based on
particular circumstances that equalize the treatment of people who are differently situated and/or
that create some relative relationship in treatment by providing equal treatment to differently
situated people or giving preferential treatment to a group of people to have some form of
equality.162 An affirmative action plan has to be developed in order to meet the objective of
achieving equality through comparative rights.
The normative model, like previously discussed models, has limitations that have
compelled scholars to investigate alternative models of equality. Treating differently situated
persons alike has its advantages and disadvantages. One position could be creating an opportunity
for minorities to enjoy the same rights and privileges as the majority. While on the other hand, a
disadvantage could be that some people may be forced into an unfavorable situation or condition
based on a past court decision. The normative model stresses the eradication of biases and prevents
discrimination that bears on human dignity, liberty, respect, and freedom. It creates a platform
where humans are treated fairly. On the contrary, the normative model is not triggered when
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differently situated people get similar treatment. Differentiation outside a classification is equal
treatment.
D. Substantive Equality Model
The substantive equality model “demands that an equality claim is examined within a
broader social and political context, considering persistent disadvantage suffered by a certain
group independent of the differentiating or facially neutral law under scrutiny.” 163 It requires
careful consideration of the situation in which these disadvantaged or minority groups find
themselves in order to determine the relationship or differences that exist. The aim is to identify
claims that will place an obligation on the state for its action. “The role of states is not to stop
discrimination (based on individualism) but to take positive steps and measures to remedy group
disadvantage.”164
Measures such as equal distribution or redistributive justice may have to be employed to
achieve substantive equality. While it is true that some critics of substantive equality have deemed
equal distribution of goods and benefits as a form of discrimination, Ronald Dworkin asserts that
equal distribution is equivalent to the rights to equal concern and respect.165 He argues that
“equality does not prescribe the right to equal treatment for all persons but the right of a person to
equal concern and respect.”166 Equal distribution does not necessarily mean that all goods and
benefits in society will be divided equally amongst everyone. It means that all individuals and
groups will have the opportunity to enjoy their basic needs, such as food, clothing, shelter, health,
education, participation and the like, without hindrance.
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On the other hand, redistribution is essentially re-dividing to improve the welfare of the
underprivileged;167 that is, an attempt to eliminate persistent disadvantage suffered by a particular
group, which could be a way of making up for the past in the present. The loss in this sense is not
to take all from one person and give to another, but to take a portion so that the other will benefit
to an extent as the one who has more. Such a division may not be equal, but it would be equitable.
According to Sandra Fredman, substantive equality entails the duty to provide; and this duty is
from two perspectives: (1) equality of opportunity and (2) equality of results.168 She posits that
equality of opportunity is the elimination of all hindrances that limit one’s prospects in the job
market. She further asserts that even if these hindrances were removed, those harmed previously
might not have the capacity or qualification to attain available jobs. There must be affirmative
duties on the part of the state to provide education, training, and family-friend measures to
eradicate past discrimination and ensure equality of opportunity.169
She argues that equality of result demands substantial changes in society, in employment
procedures and criteria and provision of resources to the disadvantaged; it is not only about one
person gaining while another loses. She emphasizes that both equalities of opportunity and equality
of result require positive duties and the enforcement of these duties rests on the court, which has
the obligation to both “detect and address inequality.”170 She states that the court has been reluctant
to address the issue of affirmative obligations and has instead preferred not to interfere with the
question of resource distribution because the court believes that resource distribution is policyoriented and not a law issue.171 Despite these assertions, substantive equality also focuses on long-
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term systemic inequalities that have persisted in society. Substantive equality seeks to eradicate
these inequalities and create a culture where people are treated fairly.
The fundamental difference between the three models of equality discussed earlier and
substantive equality is that substantive equality recognizes the discrimination that is embedded in
facially neutral laws, while the other three models do not.172 The substantive equality model
requires the courts to “confront the reality that persons may suffer systematic abuse because of
their place in the established discriminatory social and economic orders, whether they are sexual,
racial or otherwise, beyond the facially neutral dimension of the law.”173 Substantive equality has
three basic claims for which an applicant can seek redress from their government; these claims
may be rooted in “direct, indirect, and unconscious” discrimination.174 According to Tom
Campbell, direct discrimination is when unreasonable allocations that mistreat a certain group or
persons is designed to define the persons who the discrimination is intended against clearly, while
“indirect discrimination may occur when a neutral criterion is used, which has the consequence of
disfavoring the group in question.”175 He also claims that unconscious discrimination is when a
discriminator is unaware that the criteria applied are irrelevant to the situation at hand.176 He further
asserts that both direct and indirect discrimination can be unconscious. Omitted from his analysis
is discrimination that arises from omission in the law. Sometimes people encounter discrimination
because of the absence of laws to address certain issues.
The three discrimination claims that could be asserted under substantive equality are from:
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1. Laws that are facially discriminatory; laws that categorically treat people differently, which
is based on the legislative classification of individuals or groups. In this category, there is
overt discrimination, which may or may not be geared toward achieving a governmental
interest. Most discriminatory laws do not operate in a vacuum; victims are targeted and not
arbitrarily selected; discrimination takes place because a person belongs to a certain class
or group.177
2. Laws that are facially neutral, but have a disparate impact on certain groups or individuals;
substantive equality may derive from claims that do not lie in discriminatory laws. For
example, a law that grants one-third dower rights to married women upon the death of their
husbands may seem neutral on its face as it applies to all married women, but, in a situation
where there are customary and statutory marriages, the law could adversely affect women
in customary marriage because of its plural nature. While a single woman is entitled to
one-third dower rights in statutory marriage, there might be three or four wives entitled to
the same in customary marriage.
3. The issue of citizens demanding their legislature to enact laws that could assure rights and
remedies to which they are entitled may be due to omissions in the law.
Although the substantive model seems suitable, there are also issues that need to be addressed.
Substantive equality may place positive obligations on the state because it is necessary for society
and government to dismantle long-standing systemic cultural disadvantages suffered by certain
groups.178 For instance, the government may not only have the duty to provide education for
children but it may also have the duty to ensure that all children of school going age are in school.
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Additionally, the government must standardize the curriculum of all schools to meet the
educational needs of all children. Sometimes, extra-budgetary allotment may be required to satisfy
a substantive equality claim. Substantive equality introduces the idea of economic equality and
redistribution into status-based anti-discrimination laws.179 Substantive equality accomplishes
economic equality through affirmative action programs or policies that improve income through
economic activities, such as small loans for marginalized groups (women), and empower citizens
via training programs that prepare them for the job market. Substantive equality requires radical
change. There must be some leveling down or leveling up to achieve substantive equality, which
could cause changes in the status of the beneficiaries and/or the affected class. States may not be
able to honor the obligation of substantive equality without compromising other important social
policies. Substantive equality, at times, requires affirmative action and such action may have
financial implications that are not budgeted.
1. Affirmative Action
According to Tom Campbell, affirmative action is defined as the intentional design of
policies by governments to benefit groups that have encountered historical disadvantage and,
because of discrimination, have been under-represented in society. He asserts that affirmative
action can be implemented by using “criteria for preferment which would be irrelevant under
normal circumstances.”180 For instance, in many African settings, girls were given out in early
marriages and, at other times, they were not permitted to get a formal education. As a result, there
is a high illiteracy rate amongst African women. For any government to ameliorate such a situation,
there must be policies that will facilitate an increase in girls’ education and adult literacy programs
for women. Such policies could be in the form of scholarships, tuition-free schools, and/or a
179
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monetary incentive for women to work and go to school. Some scholars refer to this practice as
reverse or positive discrimination because it is a method used to improve historical discrimination
by using unfair means.181
Campbell argues that considering affirmative action to be reverse or positive discrimination
“draws attention to the use of irrelevant criteria in social situations which are affected by bias,
although the criteria may not have certain direct relevance and the aim is to correct, not to
perpetuate, prejudice.”182 Campbell further states that affirmative action measures are designed to
afford disadvantaged individuals or groups equal opportunity in order to benefit from societal
resources of which they have been deprived. Therefore, they require action from both the executive
and the legislature to implement policies and legislation for their effective operation.183
Both normative and substantive equality embrace the idea of affirmative action. Normative
equality embraces the concept of comparative rights that requires affirmative action to implement.
This means that, for example, in order for B to demand the same treatments that A has previously
enjoyed, although B and A may not necessarily be similarly situated, there must be affirmative
action policies or legislation to trigger that claim. In the absence of such policy or legislation, there
may not be a legal or moral basis for the claim or the court’s review. For example, to reduce
poverty and improve the living standard of ordinary Liberians through food production, legislation
to encourage professionals in the field of agriculture could be enacted. That is, award full
government scholarship to agriculture students with the proviso that the Ministry of Agriculture
will employ them upon graduation.
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On the other hand, substantive equality takes account of historical disadvantage and
discrimination, which is remedied by leveling up and redistributing resources to individuals and
groups that have suffered. The way to get around this situation is through affirmative action
legislation, executive policies, or constitutional provisions. Otherwise, the courts will be powerless
to decide cases when claims arise. A real-life situation in Liberia could be in the education sector.
To ensure that people born during the war years, who did not begin school until late in their teens,
were able to graduate from high school early, legislation could be enacted to place persons of
certain ages in specialized schools not available to younger persons in order to accelerate their
learning.
Despite its numerous benefits, many scholars criticize affirmative action as being a form
of discrimination; that is, it takes from some and gives to another. This is a critique within a formal
equality perspective. Tom Campbell argues that equating affirmative action to discrimination is
misleading because the “Irrelevant criteria utilized is to remedy a social situation,”184 and it is not
based in partiality and does not perpetuate wrong or prejudice. The benefits are that the
redistribution of resources involved is to ameliorate past and continuing disadvantage, thereby
creating some semblance of equality in the present and future.
He emphasizes that there are two primary justifications for affirmative action. First, “is the
redress and compensation for past discrimination by redirecting benefits and opportunities to the
group which has been, or still is, the object of the prejudice-related disfavors.”185 The way to
realize this goal is to “specify directly or indirectly, the disfavored group to be compensated,
making the previously irrelevant characteristics relevant.”186 Second, “to secure in a reasonable
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period a balance of social groups in a certain position in society, a balance which is thought to be
valuable for reasons of social harmony, the appropriate ministration of social groups, or provision
of suitable role-models to help eradicate discriminatory practices.”187
On the same note, another proponent, Lance W. Roberts, shares the belief that affirmative
action is the preferred treatment to disadvantaged individuals or groups for past discrimination that
could be ameliorated through compensation.188 He asserts that affirmative action programs are
public recognition of past and present discrimination, and the programs/policies are designed to
give relief to the affected groups and to provide opportunities for increased participation in
society.189
Similarly, Anita L. Allen argued against critics that claim affirmative action is wrong, that
it violates principles of color-blind public policies, and that it upsets the moral principle of fairness
and constitutional principles of equality and due process.190 These critics further assert that
affirmative action is “socially and politically divisive,” it “stigmatizes its beneficiaries,” and
“compromises self-esteem and self-respect of beneficiaries who have been awarded preferential
treatment.”191 They argue that affirmative action is historically known for not improving the lives
of its beneficiaries. Therefore, it should not be important to the advancement or improvement of
women or the marginalized.192 Allen argues that affirmative action has positive moral psychology;
that is, the way affirmative action beneficiaries feel and think.193 She says that positive moral
psychology has two elements: (1) attending the wound and (2) attending the fallout. By that, she
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meant that affirmative action is a means of remedying historical imbalances, such as
marginalization, suppression, and discrimination. Therefore, affirmative action programs
minimize current injustices and assure fair representation in the present by providing opportunities
educationally, economically, and professionally. She also believes that “competently designed
affirmative action programs can comport with ethics, law, and utility.”194 The idea of placing a
positive obligation on government or enacting laws that benefit the disadvantaged and curtail or
eradicate discrimination is rooted in the principle of affirmative action.195 Robust affirmative
action programs also eliminate discrimination in the present and stop the perpetuation of
discrimination.
E. Conclusion
I have discussed four models of equality and the idea of affirmative action. The formal
equality model dictates that the state treats all persons within each legislative classification alike.
When individuals within the same legislative classification are treated alike, and there is no
discrimination within the class, the objective of formal equality is achieved. The flaw in this model
is that, if a person or group of persons were treated wrongly, as a precedent, other individuals
would receive that same treatment for equality to exist. The idea of relying on the remedy of the
past to deal with the present is evident in how the judicial system operates, by relying on precedent
to adjudicate present cases.
The rational connection model posits that legislation has a rational connection between the
legislative classification and the governmental interests that the law promotes. A legislative class
is deemed reasonable if there is a rational connection between the legislative classification and a
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legitimate legislative goal or an issue at bar. Arbitrary legislation does not pass constitutional
scrutiny. The limitations of the rational connection model are: (1) there is no inquiry into the
legitimacy of the classification or connection, (2) the legislative intent is not questioned, (3) the
effect of the legislative classification is not examined, and (4) it favors government over the
ordinary citizens. The court’s main priority is to establish a nexus between the statute and the
object and, therefore, stretch its boundaries to make such an establishment. The burden of proving
an irrational connection is on the claimant. The normative equality model is like the rational
connection model in that the court looks for a rational connection between the legislative class and
a permissible state objective. The difference is that the legislative classification should not treat
people in a way that fails to respect them as persons. It seeks to identify prohibited bases of
legislative differentiation by requiring that legislative classification refrain from mirroring social
categorizations that affect the personal characteristics of the individual or that place a person in a
position that degrades his or her dignity.
Unlike the formal, rational connection, and normative equality models, the substantive
equality model takes a broader look into social and political situations, considering purposeful
disadvantage suffered by certain groups. It also seeks to address claims deriving from facially
discriminatory laws, facially neutral laws, and omissions in the law. However, like normative
equality, substantive equality utilizes affirmative action to remedy past and continuing
discrimination through comparative rights and redistribution of resources to individuals and groups
that have been historically disadvantaged.
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CHAPTER FOUR: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MODELS OF
EQUALITY AS UTILIZED IN CANADA, UNITED STATES, SWEDEN,
AND SOUTH AFRICA
Laws affect individuals and groups differently depending on how the laws are written,
interpreted, and implemented. Some are privileged while others are disadvantaged. It could be
attributed to the fact that some laws facially discriminate and others are facially neutral, but have
a disparate impact, or, more generally, because of omissions in the law. Many countries develop
or use equality models that help resolve disadvantages and marginalization as a means of
improving discrimination. Some states use one equality model while others use multiple. This
chapter makes a comparative analysis of the four models of equality discussed in the previous
chapter. It outlines how the models are utilized in Canada, South Africa, Sweden, and the United
States. The goal is to determine (1) whether there are commonalities as to usage or purpose, (2)
whether there was a decline or eradication of discrimination when a specific model was used, and
(3) whether disadvantages or marginalization existed based on the usage of the particular equality
model. The objective is to evaluate the practical use of the models, examine their impact on
inequality problems, show their strengths and weaknesses, and determine why specific models
succeeded and others failed.
A notation is made herein that most countries vacillate between various models of equality.
Therefore, readers will observe that the model that is dominantly practiced in each state is the
focus of the chapter. For example, Canada and South Africa use the substantive equality model,
which is embedded in their constitution and empowers citizens to demand action from their
governments. Substantive equality also allows the government to take affirmative action to
improve the welfare of its citizens. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a part of Canada’s
Constitution, expressly authorizes substantive equality in Chapter 1, Article 2, while Chapter 2,
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Article 12 and Article 13 prohibit discrimination and promote equality.196 The Constitution of
South Africa Section 9 allows substantive equality.197 In the United States of America, the formal
equality, normative, and rational connection models are used to decide invidious discrimination
and facially discriminatory cases. Sweden, which is a welfare state, utilizes the substantive model
of equality.
In Canada, the United States, and South Africa, the foundation of equality is rooted in their
equal protection clauses. Each of these countries’ equal protection clause is a constitutional
provision. The wordings of these equal protection clauses are essential to their application and
interpretation of equality. Some are narrow in definition and, therefore, restrict expansion. Others
are broad, thereby giving room for development and in-depth analysis. Courts in these countries
play pivotal roles in determining whether a group or persons have been disadvantaged,
marginalized, or received discriminatory treatment.
Similarly, Sweden’s Constitution guarantees equal protection. Article 2 of the Instrument
of Government mandates the government to exercise power equally and maintain individual liberty
and dignity respectfully.198 Additionally, the Constitution authorizes affirmative action and assures
democracy and the protection of individual’s private and family lives.199 Sweden promotes
equality based on the status of people. For example, a working woman is regarded both as a mother
and professional person and enjoys the benefits appertaining to both capacities. Sweden is noted
for granting public childcare services, as well as both maternal and paternal leave. It is also noted
for its high rate of women in paid jobs.
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While the United States, Canada, and South Africa have similarities in their equal
protection clauses, there are differences in the way the model of equality is used. The United
States has its foundation in formal equality, which treats likes alike and does not necessarily
support affirmative action. Unlike the United States, Canada explicitly supports affirmative action
under Section 15(2) of its Charter of Rights and Freedom.200 That provision promotes the
enactment of laws, programs, and activities aimed at reforming or improving the lives of
disadvantaged groups and removing the possibility of discriminatory laws and policies. On the
other hand, South Africa’s affirmative action was established to address conflicting issues
regarding gender and race after 46 years of apartheid. The South African Constitution explicitly
authorizes affirmative action to remedy unfair discrimination. Under Chapter 2 of the Constitution,
captioned Bill of Rights, Section 9(2), which is part of the Equality provision, states: “Equality
includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of
equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.”201
South Africa is known for its many years of racial and gender discrimination because of a
governance system in which the white minority race held power and suppressed the majority
comprising of blacks and other races. At that time, whites were only 11% of South Africa’s 44
million population while 77% were indigenous Africans, of which 52% were women, in addition
to 9% colored and 3% Indians and Asians.202 The two legal documents that served as the
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framework of affirmative action in South Africa were the Employment Equality Act (EEA) 55
(1998) and the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (BB-BEE) 2003).203
This chapter shows how the equality models have proven effective in some countries to
ameliorate unfair discrimination that has persistently disadvantaged certain groups or persons. It
demonstrates that a defined equality model is vital in assisting courts to opine on issues arising
from discriminatory legislation and practices. The chapter also indicates that citizens can demand
equality rights through the various equality models, especially the substantive model. Regardless
of these equality models, some governments intentionally take steps to curtail discrimination by
designing affirmative action programs and policies. For example, even though Sweden’s
Constitution authorizes affirmative action, which gives citizens the right to demand action, the
government intentionally designs programs and policies to curtail discrimination and promote
equality in both the public and private spheres. In Canada, with the help of advocacy groups and
the courts, there has been an improvement in gender equality. Unlike Sweden and Canada, South
Africa’s affirmative action programs have not been very useful, and there is much to be achieved
in bridging the gap between males and females. The United States practices formal equality, but
under extreme circumstances, it allows affirmative action. Generally, the implementation of the
various models of equality is bolstered when the constitution mandates it. This section makes an
in-depth analysis of the usage of the models in each of the four countries. The review of these
models illustrates that the achievement of a successful equality model depends on the inclusion of
equality provisions in a country’s constitution, how the court interprets those provisions, and the
intentional efforts by governments to design programs and policies that promote equality.
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A. Canada
1. Substantive Equality
Canada once practiced formal equality; it now recognizes substantive equality through its
court and Constitution in its bid to rid the country of inequality. Inequality between males and
females in Canada can be traced to its founding in 1867.204 Canada’s initial Constitution did not
have any provision that expressly guaranteed human rights or civil liberties.205 The absence of
human rights or civil liberties provisions was exemplified in the Canadian Supreme Court in 1928
when it stated that women were not persons.206 The Law Lords of the British Privy Council, the
highest appeal court at the time, reversed the Supreme Court’s 1928 decision.207 Although women
were declared persons by the 1929 decision of the appeals court, women were not considered equal
to men when it came to pay work and the right to own property.208 It was not until 1960 that the
Canadian Bill of Rights recognized both male and female “rights to equality before the law and
equal protection of the law.”209 The Court narrowly construed the Bill of Rights as formal and
procedural rights, not substantive rights. Women did not feel protected by the Bill of Rights, so
they organized themselves and, in 1980, contributed significantly to the language of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, specifically Section 15(1) and (2) that guarantees equal protection to all.210
The Canadian Charter is modeled after an International Convention on Human Rights (Universal
Declaration of Human Rights).211
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Nonetheless, it was not until 1989 that the Canadian Supreme Court recognized Substantive
equality in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia 1 S.C.R. 143 (1989).212 In Andrews, the
court reversed Aristotelian “Likes alike, unlike, unlike and replace it with a Substantive test of
historical disadvantage on enumerated and akin concrete grounds.”213 Andrews, a permanent
resident, was denied admission to the British Columbia Bar because he lacked Canadian
citizenship. Andrews claimed that his denial violated Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.214 The issues before the Canadian Supreme Court were: (1) whether the
Canadian citizenship requirement for admission into the British Columbia Bar infringed or denied
the equality rights guaranteed by Section 15(1) of the Charter and (2) whether Section 1of the
Charter justified the infringement.215 The Court in Andrews recognized what Canadians perceive
as substantive equality, expressed in Section 15 of the Charter, as the protection and promotion of
equality.216
The Canadian substantive equality model has an equal protection clause that is a
constitutional provision. The clause states that “Every individual is equal before and under the law
and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination.”217 It
has been argued however that, although the substantive model of equality approach is used in
Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court has been “inconsistent in its understanding of the reasonable
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limits that may be placed on the constitutional rights to equality,”218 since rights are not absolute
and must be weighed against competing claims from different segments of the society.219
Substantive equality is indeed a foundational constitutional principle in Canada. It serves
as a mechanism to include individuals and groups that are excluded through unequal treatment,
which could be demonstrated using legal inequality, social inequality, economic inequality, moral
inequality, and political inequality.220 It signifies that equality has been the bedrock of societal
value in Canada and is exemplified through governmental policies and the interpretation of laws
in the private sphere.221 As one may see here, evidently, “the concept of equality is grounded in
the idea that all members of society have equal moral worth and as a consequence are entitled to
equal consideration in how society is organized and structured.”222 Because equality, in general, is
a hallmark of the Canadian society, substantive equality is widespread through the public and
private sectors with regards to the making of policies.223 Therefore, substantive equality has been
accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada as “an appropriate way to define equality in the
constitutional context.”224 Equality cases are adjudged not only in a legal context but also social
and political.225
Despite the general perception that substantive equality is an established fundamental
constitutional principle recognized and practiced in Canada, many critics still debate as to the
rationale of it being a separate and distinct foundational constitutional principle.226 Three main
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arguments against recognizing substantive equality as a foundational constitutional principle stand
out in this debate. The first argument is that equality is already guaranteed under the constitution.
As such, there is no need to recognize substantive equality as a distinct constitutional principle;
doing so would be a duplication. The second argument is that equality is recognized in the rule of
law. The final argument is that minority rights are already provided for under the constitution.
Therefore, there is no need to highlight it in a separate equality model.227 In essence, these critics
are contending that, because equality is already embedded in the constitution, it does not serve any
useful purpose.
A counter-argument, at least from Hughes’ perspective, is that there are significant reasons
why substantive equality should be a foundational constitutional principle. In her counterargument,
Hughes states that, though equality is guaranteed under the Canadian Constitution, the importance
of fundamental constitutional principles goes beyond a constitutional provision. It allows a claim
when there is discriminatory legislation that could be justified by the government. It also applies
to the action of courts, “regardless of whether their actions fall within the confines of the relevant
express constitutional guarantee.”228 For example, minority groups that are disadvantaged by laws,
legislation, or regulations, can raise an inequality claim, and an investigation into such claim,
especially as it relates to a government obligation, will require a substantive equality analysis.
Hughes asserts that substantive equality has not developed in the rule of law, only formal
equality.229 Formal equality posits that those similarly situated should receive similar treatment;
this is, the principle of stare decisis has been historically, and is presently, the foundation of court
rulings. She states that formal equality is essential in “requiring all to obey the law, especially
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those in power, this statement of legal equality underlies our legal system, but fail to acknowledge
that laws affect people differently.”230 Hence, “equality as a core constitutional principle should
be recognized as going beyond the formal ‘rule of law equality’ to a distinct substantive equality
principle to reflect changing social realities in keeping with the necessary evolution of
constitutional principle.”231 Notwithstanding her position, substantive equality does not oppose the
principle of stare decisis in legal decision-making. When substantive equality is applied to
precedent, the decision might be different from that of formal equality. For example, the emphasis
in a substantive equality decision could be on the impact of a law, while formal equality may focus
on treating similarly situated people alike. Arguably, it is inadequate to apply laws to everyone
equally, but, instead, the laws should be implemented in a manner that promotes equality.
Addressing the critique on minority rights as being a constitutional provision that should
not be given additional recognition, Hughes further argues that, although many equality principles
may be similar, the similarity does not negate the indisputable fact that there is a need to articulate
specific principles that address issues. For example, a law that may seem neutral on its face, that
is intended to benefit a certain group, could have a disparate impact on a segment of the same
group. Take for instance a law enacted for a group of similarly situated men and women. Though
the law may be beneficial to all the men in the group, it could have a disparate impact on the
women because the needs and concerns of men, for example, vary from women.232
Although substantive equality may seem to be minority rights, the difference between
minorities that a claim is based upon matters. It is not principally about treating them the same,
but recognizing that they too have differences or could be treated divisively. Hughes notes that
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“minority rights are about protection and substantive equality is about transformation.”233 In short,
minority rights may not necessarily provide the result that substantive equality provides, insofar
as equal treatment under the law is concerned. Minority rights are defined differently under a
regime of substantive equality as opposed to formal equality. Substantive equality provides a
medium through which government actions are analyzed and interpreted and a means “through
which equality seekers may have their experiences reflected in policies and assess for conformity
of government action within the constitutional framework.”234
The value of substantive equality is traceable to its origin in Canada. The entrenchment of
substantive equality in Canadian society can be traced to the efforts of women’s movements. The
movements were feminist movements against gender-based inequality in the workplace and in
politics that affected women, both economically and politically. The advocacy of the women’s
movement was due to the adoption of international treaties, such as the Convention for the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), UN Charter, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women.235
With pressure from grassroots and professional women, the Canadian government’s formation of
the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada also helped the process. The movements
were instrumental in promoting the status of women in paid work and education and in “examining
how social attitudes and expectations-maintained women in a separate status and keep prejudice
against women very much alive.”
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groups, legislation and laws were enacted to promote equality for women, which, in many ways,
assisted in giving meaning to equality in Canadian Law, including Section 15. (1) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) that guaranteed equality.237
The works of various women’s organizations and other stakeholders have not only
contributed to the entrenchment of substantive equality in Canadian society but have also affected
it in positive ways. For instance, in 1967, women received 20 percent of all market incomes. This
percentage of women increased to 36 percent in 1997. Similarly, in 1967, 33 percent of Canadian
women were engaged in paid work and, by 1997, there was a 19.5 percent increase.238 Between
1967 and 1995, the economic status of women changed, placing Canada at the top rank of the
UN’s human development index (HDI) and the gender-related index (GDI). At that point, Canada
ranked at the top of the indices of both the HDI and GDI for four consecutive years.239 This
remarkable success was attributed to the changes in the social and economic status of women,
which have had a significant impact on their earnings and income. Notwithstanding, in 2001
Canada’s ranking in the GDI dropped to third and, in 2006, dropped to seventh. By 2009, Canada
ranked twenty-fifth.240
Despite the growth in women’s earnings and income, there is a growing problem in this
area. Although Canada made prior gains in improving the status of women in paid work and
economic income using substantive equality initiatives, there has been a decline in recent years
due to the resistance towards women’s equality. In 2010, the income gap between female and male
graduates was 18.4 percent. The difference is basically due to economic development that favors
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male in important economic sectors.241 Even the Canadian Supreme Court has been reluctant to
rule in discrimination cases utilizing substantive equality grounds or reasoning. The Court has
rather opined in a formalistic manner;242 that is, using the formal equality model, where likes are
treated alike. As a result, the growth percentage of women’s income and earnings has been
stagnant, although more women have entered the workforce. This stagnation attributes principally
to “unequal allocation of all types of paid work.”243
Although there is a decline in using substantive equality to promote issues relating to
women, this decline does not impair the nature of substantive equality. A significant character of
substantive equality is that “it encompasses forms of difference and mutual recognition,”244
evincing that substantive equality has been effective in promoting the equality of other groups as
enshrined in Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom. Importantly, the Supreme
Court of Canada has indicated that “it has the understanding of substantive equality as grounded
in the appropriate recognition of the interrelation between sameness and difference.”245
Further, Section 15(2) of the Charter gives explicit authorization for affirmative action.
There is an obligation upon the government to design programs and policies that will address
discrimination and marginalization. The basic problem is the enforcement of this mandate. For
instance, there is not much effort by the government to promote gender equality or design programs
and policies to address inequality. Therefore, the bulk is passed on to the courts to adjudicate cases
in a fair and just manner that will promote substantive equality. That is why the Canadian Supreme
Court has developed the proportionality test to review substantive equality claims.
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The proportionality review is about giving an explicit construction or interpretation of
reasonable limits placed on rights because the rights and freedoms assured in the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedom are not absolute. However, “limits on them are exceptions and can be
justified by exceptional criteria.”246 To remedy claims of rights based on the constitutionality of
the violation, the Supreme Court of Canada has opined that there should be a fit between the means
and the objective.
In determining this fit, the Supreme Court of Canada set the rule in R v. Oakes where the
defendant was charged with the possession of narcotics with the purpose of trafficking.247 The
Ontario Court of Appeals found that the Narcotic Act constituted a reverse onus and concluded
that the Act was unconstitutional because it violated the presumption of innocence guaranteed
under Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom. The Crown appealed raising
two issues: (1) whether Section 8 of the Narcotic Control Act248 violated Section 11 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom,249 thereby rendering the Act of no force and effect; and
(2) whether Section 8 of the Act was a reasonable limit prescribed by law and demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society for Section 1 of the Charter.250
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To answer the first question, the High Court opined that it was undisputed that the accused
was caught in possession of narcotics. Therefore the burden was on him to prove that it was not
for trafficking. It further said that presumption of innocence was a protected right under the
Charter, therefore, the standard of review for the presumption of innocence was, (1) an individual
be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the state must bear the burden of proof, and (3)
criminal prosecution must be carried out in accordance with lawful procedures and fairness. The
Court concluded that Section 8 of the Narcotic Act under review infringes on the guaranteed of
the presumption of innocence as prescribed by Section 11(b) of the Charter.251 On this issue, the
Court also said that the rational connection test was inappropriate. Because the problem was not
about finding a rational connection between the basic fact and the presumed fact, because “a basic
fact may rationally tend to prove a presumed fact, but still not prove its existence beyond a
reasonable doubt, which is an important aspect of the presumption of innocence.252
On the second question, the Court determined that the burden of proving that any limitation
on a Charter right is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society is on
the one placing the limitation. It further said that “Limits on constitutionally guaranteed rights are
exceptions to the general guarantee.”253 The Court sets two criteria that must be satisfied to
determine that the limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society:
(1) “the objective to be served by the measures limiting Charter rights must be sufficiently
important to warrant overriding the constitutionally protected right or freedom.” That is, the
objective of the limitation must be pressing and substantial; and (2) the person invoking Section 1
of the Charter must show the means to be reasonable and demonstrably justified. This process
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involves the three-prong proportionality test: (1) “the measure must be fair and not arbitrary,
carefully designed to achieve the objective in question and rationally connected to that objective;”
(2) “the means should impair the rights in question a little as possible:” and (3) “there must be a
proportionality between the effects of the limiting measure, and the objective.”254 The Court
concluded that “there was no rational connection between the basic fact of possession and the
presumed fact of possession with the purpose of trafficking. The possession of a small or negligible
quantity of narcotics would not support the inference of trafficking.”255
B. South Africa
1. Substantive Equality
Like Canada, South Africa also practices substantive equality. South Africa is known for
(segregation) apartheid, which promoted inequality at various levels in its society: race, gender,
and employment, in both the public and private spheres. South Africa sought to eradicate its
systemic inequality problem through a constitutional commitment to substantive equality by
promoting equality through the enactment of laws.256 These commitments were rooted in the idea
of transformation and inclusion based on social and economic factors. Socially, certain groups
were disadvantaged or stigmatized because of their culture, values, and behaviors while others
were affirmed and privileged, perpetuating inequality.257 Similarly, economic inequality was
unequal “access to the distribution of basic needs, opportunities, and material resources.”258
Because of the racial discrimination, the privileged white race disadvantaged the other races
socially, economically, and politically.
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To overcome this situation, South Africa made a conscious decision to include substantive
equality provisions in its Constitution considering the need for political change, conforming to
international legal and human rights standard, and comparing the outcome of formal equality
against substantive equality in other countries. Since the initiation of this equality pursuit through
dismantling apartheid, the South African Constitutional Court has been very instrumental in
institutionalizing substantive equality by “strengthening of indirect anti-discriminatory laws or
inclusion of positive measures within anti-discrimination laws.”259 Additionally, supporting
institutions such as the South African Human Rights Commission and the Commission for Gender
Equality are greatly involved in settling discrimination cases because they are vested with
investigatory powers.260
The Equality Court supports the Constitutional Court in remedying discrimination cases.261
The South African Constitution guarantees multitudes of rights in its post-apartheid era and
sustaining those rights will be inadequate without the Courts. The courts are important in
interpreting and protecting the rights provided by the Constitution. Major problems faced by South
Africans are access to the Courts, high litigation fees, long litigation periods, and lack of
information to adequately navigate the legal system.262 In this regard, Equality Courts were
established under the Promotion of Equality and for the Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act
(PEPUDA) of 2000.263 The purpose of the Act was to address the high cost of litigation, lack of
information as to how the legal system works, the intimidating nature of the courts, and long
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litigation period. 264 The goal of establishing the Equality Court was to create access to the court
especially for the underprivileged by making the process affordable. Litigants did not necessarily
need to be represented by lawyers, only a minimum fee paid to witnesses, and litigation time
drastically reduced. Additionally, the intent was to place the Equality courts everywhere there was
a magisterial court. Since the creation of the court, it has made some gains including the fact that
uneducated individuals can file their complaints without lawyers, and physically challenged
persons now have access to the Courts and government offices. Contrarily, there have also been
challenges, such as the lack of adequate support by the South African Government, to make the
Court visible and the lack of Equality courts nationwide. According to a 2004 survey by the
Institute for Democracy in South Africa, only 43 out of 220 designated Equality Courts have been
created.265
The South Africa Court used four approaches in dealing with substantive equality.266 The
approaches are as follows: (1) Transformative potential: Could substantive equality transform the
country’s social and historical problem in any significant manner - in a way that it can remedy
cases in both the public and private spheres? For instance, equality would be promoted publicly,
like in the workplace and other public arenas. Say, for example, a boss impregnates his maid. The
child should get the same treatment as his other children or the maid could get a remedy for
support. (2) Recognition of difference as a positive feature in society: Like many other countries,
South Africa recognizes that inequality problems do not derive from the differences in people. It
is the factor of how those differences come into play with authority, status, and power and the
utilization of the named factors to marginalize or disadvantage others. (3) Concern for overall
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remedy: The Constitution requires eradication from society subordination and disadvantage, which
is why it deals with both the public and private spheres. (4) The impact of inequality on the alleged
complainant: That is, understanding the context in which the inequality occurred.267
The institutionalization of substantive equality and its application and enforcement by the
Constitutional Court has boosted gender equality in a meaningful way. Women, once the
underprivileged and disadvantaged group, have been included in the democratic process as a
distinct group of citizens.268 It was made possible through the instrumentality of women activist
groups such as the Women National Coalition (WNC). The WNC was also instrumental in the
country’s inclusion of a constitutional commitment to gender equality.269 The Constitution
obligates the government to improve the social and economic lives of people, thereby curtailing
gender and racial inequality prevailing in the society. The WNC initiative increased women’s
participation in the public sphere.270 Great strides have been made to ensure women participation,
the outcome of these initiatives has been very encouraging, especially, regarding the impact on
men to women income ratio, and poverty rate between the two. 271 These resulted in 27.7 percent
of women in elected positions in 1994 and 29.5 percent in 1999.272 By 2006, the number of women
in parliament had increased to 33 percent.273 In 2007 the number of women in parliament was still
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at 33 percent but the number of women in cabinet position was 43 percent.274 By 2015, the number
of women in parliament increased to 41.5 percent.275
Another area of grave concern is the determination of how individuals and groups benefit
from substantive equality in the private sphere. How does the government ensure equality in
homes, especially when it comes to the domestic division of labor, maintenance, child care, and
other gender issues? Through the efforts of women’s organizations and other stakeholders, some
legislations criminalized domestic violence, required maintenance, and protected women’s
reproductive rights.276 Though legislation has been enacted to promote gender equality, some
constraints hinder their implementation. These legislations place positive obligations on
government, and there is a continuous struggle in government to suppress efforts that elevate
women, such as, the low budgetary allocation for programs that benefit women, particularly
women in rural areas.277 Another dimension is the constant struggle between women in politics
and civil society organizations.278 Women in politics most times do not advocate for their
counterparts against governmental policies that adversely affect other women.279
The apartheid regime in South Africa perpetuated discrimination between its elite white
race, the blacks, and other races. Women encountered both racial, and gender discriminations,
based on traditional cultural roles prescribed for women and because South Africa is a maledominated country. Installing the first democratically elected government in 1994, brought about
tremendous changes to the constitution and legislatively enacted laws that transformed the lives of
women. One such legislation is the Employment Equity Act (EEA) of 1998 that explicitly
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authorized the use of affirmative action to remedy historical disadvantage in employment. 280 The
EEA was enacted with the intent of increasing women participation in the workforce because
women are the major disadvantaged group. The EEA has succeeded in increasing women
participation in middle-level jobs.281 Statistics from 2015 show that 43 percent were in a cabinet
position.
The South African government and the corporate society have endorsed affirmative action.
Former Present Nelson Mandela described the affirmative action as, “a corrective action to bring
previously disadvantaged people to the same competitive levels as those who have been
advantaged,”282 President Mandela’s definition is grounded in the country’s laws. There is an
explicit authorization of affirmative action in Section 9 (2) of the South African Constitution:
“equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons or
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.”283 Despite
constitutional and legislative explicit authorizations of affirmative action, the government is not
pressured to take actions or design programs and policies to ameliorate inequality. Interestingly,
some scholars and ordinary South Africans believe that affirmative action is primarily designed to
benefit the black middle class; it also “deepens the inherited class inequality in the South African
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society.”284 Their rationale is that affirmative action is reversed discrimination and that its
utilization perpetuates racism by dividing people into racial classes when consistently referring to
people as either black, white, colored, etc.
Other scholars have also noted that affirmative action lowers societal standards and does
not promote a merit system, 285 although some argue that merit-based policy can be bias.286 What
is absent from this argument is the failure to recognize that those disadvantaged by the laws did
not contribute in any way to the situation and therefore should be compensated for the loss suffered
and the harm caused them, so that they can level up to the advantaged. Systemic discrimination
translates to a loss of education, poverty, and other societal ills. There must be some give and take
to remedy these ills. A merit system cannot level the playing field because of previous deprivation
and marginalization.
Consequently, the system that has created an unequal society owes it to its citizens to
remove the peril it has created and place the disadvantaged in a situation but for the discriminative
laws, unequal treatment and continuing discrimination, they would have been. For this reason, the
Constitution has guaranteed non-discrimination laws, and the Constitutional Court and the
Equality Court, along with the South Africa Human Rights Commission, and the Commission on
Gender Equality, serve as its enforcement and implementing arms. Like the Canadian Court, the
South African Constitutional Court seeks to analyze the justification of limits placed on rights.
In National Coalition of Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v. Minister of Justice and Others,
the applicants sought to declare unconstitutional the criminalization of sodomy, and the
commission of unnatural sexual acts between males. They contended that such criminalization
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was discrimination based on sexual orientation and that they should not be penalized for sexual
conducts that are not punishable when engaged in by a man and a woman. They further asserted
such criminalization was based on historical animus, personal disgust, and religious conviction.
The Court opined that the South Africa Republic was at a higher level of maturity that recognized
the dignity and inherent worth of every citizen. It held that the Constitution encourages equal
treatment of all persons before the law. The Court concluded that there was no rational basis for
the limitation placed on the rights of persons of different sexual orientation, in this case, same-sex
couples. This case is evidence of historical biases and discrimination that the South African Court
has endeavored to eradicate via substantive equality method. The court sought to determine
unfairness, justifiability and rational basis to strike down the legislation. Like Canada, the South
African Court sought to investigate whether there is a limitation placed on rights, whether the
limitation was unfair and whether the unfair limitation was justifiable.287
Some discrimination cases are decided based on the equal protection provisions of the
Constitution and the provisions of the Promotion of equality and Prevention of Unfair
Discrimination Act of 2000, also known as the Equality Act.288 In Sonke Gender Justice Network
v. Malem, a hate speech claim was filed asserting that the speech was offensive to gender equality.
The Defendant made the following assertion in the said speech, “when a woman didn’t enjoy it;
she leaves early in the morning. Those who had a nice time will wait until the sun comes out
request breakfast and taxi money. In the morning that lady requested breakfast and taxi money.
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You don’t ask for taxi money, from somebody who raped you.” The defendant was referring to a
woman in a renowned rape case. 289
In its opinion, the court said that the dispositive issue was whether the said comments
amounted to hate speech and or harassment relative to the Equality Act, and or the constitution.
The Equality Court utilized sections 9, 10, and 16 of the Republic of South Africa’s Constitution
of 1996 and Sections 3, 10, 11, and 12 of the Equality Act.290
To answer the questions of whether speech was intended to hurt, harm or incite hatred, and
whether the words used were prohibited, the court held that the test for answering these questions
where (1) whether a reasonable person would construe the speech as demonstrating a clear
intention to be hurtful, and (2) whether section 12 of the Equality Act does not prohibit the words
used. The Court determined that based on section 10 and 16 of the Constitution, the speech was
hurtful and that the words used were prohibited grounds based on gender and sex.291
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In South Africa, there is constitutional and statutory support to promoting substantive
equality. Notwithstanding these assurances, gender and race discrimination still exist.
2. Normative equality
South Africa with its historical record of discrimination has expanded the use of the normative
model of equality while interpreting its equal protection clause. It reviews the “reasonableness of
classification, to determine whether legislation is unfair; the test for unfairness being whether the
legislation has the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons or human
being.”292 South Africa has also expressly prohibited discrimination in its constitution.
Additionally, it has mandated its government to design policies and the legislature to enact laws
that will promote equality. Sections 9(2) (3) and (4) of South Africa’s Constitution expressly state
that:
9(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair
discrimination may be taken. 9(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly
or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex,
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual orientation, age,
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth. 9(4)No person
may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more
grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent
or prohibit unfair discrimination.293
Given the historical discrimination in South Africa, the current constitution was written to address
the problems that relate to human dignity, discrimination, and respect for culture. For example,
black women in South Africa encountered double discrimination, i.e., gender and race. Women
faced gender discrimination not only from whites but also from black males because of cultural
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dictates. Women were regarded as the property of men and therefore subjected to them, further
promoting patriarchy.
The normative model of equality identifies it prohibited bases of legislative separation. The
idea is to discourage autonomous or self-governing differentiations, such as race, color, gender,
and creed.

294

For example, women should not be discriminated against just because they are

women. Legislative classifications should be rational and not based on everyday circumstances
such as gender, race or the like because these circumstances are beyond the control of the
individual. Legislation that is based on these certain circumstances should be barred or viewed by
the courts as unreasonable.
Like Canada, affirmative action in South Africa is geared toward improving the status of
women in both the public and private spheres. During the apartheid regime, women were regarded
as second-class citizens or minors 295 and viewed as inferior to their male counterparts. After South
Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, the issues of “women’s rights, equality, and
empowerment”296 gained momentum. The government made deliberate efforts to enact legislation
that dealt with the widespread inequality problems to curtail social vices against women. Some
steps taken were to ratify the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) and enact the Gender Policy Framework (GPF).297 The purpose of the
GPF was to ensure that: “women’s rights are perceived as human rights, they have equality as
active citizens, their social development is given priority, they are beneficiaries in political,
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economic, social and cultural areas, and affirmative action programs targeting women are
implemented.”298
Affirmative Action has been used at times to bridge the gap caused by inequality; though
many see it as a way of taking wealth from one group of people and giving it to another. What is
lacking in such analysis is that these critics do not take into consideration the factors that led to the
systemic inequality and the realization that the inequality is not the making of those that are
disadvantaged. To raise the living standard of the disadvantaged, or eradicate discrimination,
radical steps and programs must be implemented. Looking at affirmative action broadly, though
some may have to give a little while others take a little, the benefits derived by the society, in
general, is phenomenal.
C. Sweden
1. Substantive Equality
In the 1920s, social reforms helped to shape equality in Sweden through student
movements and other Solidarity Groups. The focus of these groups were “unjust war, the working
class, women, prisoners, drug addicts, children, and the environment.”299 The rebellion of these
Movements triggered Political changes.300 These efforts were further bolstered when the Social
Democracy Party joined the quest for equality, promoting programs that included women’s
issues.301 Since then, there has been gradual progress toward promoting equality by the
government. The government has defined gender equality as, “women and men should have the
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same rights, obligations, and possibilities in all important areas of life.”302 The government’s
efforts are exemplified in its provision of public childcare, to enable mothers to participate fully
in the labor market and parental leave for men to take some responsibility for domestic work.303
As far back as 1927, the chairman of the Social Democratic Party, who later became the Prime
Minister of Sweden in 1932, Per Albin Hansson, included women issues in the Social Democratic
project.304 In the 1930s and 1940s, there was much criticism of this process as many saw it as a
“National suicide.”305 Despite the criticism, the 1950's and 1960s saw a 30 percent increase of
women participation in the labor market.306 Two major policies that boosted women participation
were employment and family policies. They made women work in paid jobs and at the same time
catered to children. The increase in women’s participation in the labor market can also be attributed
to the government’s provision of public daycare facilities. Others that enhanced this process were
the dual-breadwinner and the separate taxation policies.307
Like Canada and South Africa, Sweden has substantive equality embedded in its
Constitution. Its Constitution has four fundamental laws: The Instrument of Government, The Act
of Succession, The Freedom of the Press and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression.308
Moreover, the Swedish government obligates itself to promote gender equality because it views
men and women the same.309 It has led to the development of policies and programs such as
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paternal leave, publicly financed child care, and parental allowance,310 which have substantially
improved the lives of its citizens. Sweden’s programs and policies squarely fall within the range
of substantive equality, though they prefer to be known by the world as a gender equality
country.311 As a substantive equality country, Sweden promotes equality through government
programs and policies.
Sweden’s equality methodology can be fully discussed using the substantive equality
model. For instance, the following substantive equality characteristics are embedded in Sweden’s
welfare model. (1) Sweden focuses on equality for historically disadvantaged groups, therefore its
concentration is on empowering females to bring them on par with their male counterparts through
programs, policies and legislation,312 (2) the State intervenes in societal problems to eliminate
inequality between males and females by affording both equal chances at employment and sharing
in domestic work. That is, the State emphasizes equality in both the public and the private
spheres,313 (3) The State strives to provide equal opportunity for both males and females, thereby
improving their economic and social lives through public policies such as parental leaves, the tax
deduction for domestic services and publicly financed childcare.314 Sweden is a proud exporter of
gender equality, which it considers as its state identity.315 Consequently, in 2001 it declared gender
equality as a “prioritized goal to permeate all other issue areas,” when it assumed the presidency
of the Council of Ministers of the European Union.316 These are important substantive equality
qualities that Sweden has adopted, and lessons to learn in countries still experiencing gross
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inequality. The Swedish government obligates itself to affirmative actions that create equal
opportunities for both men and women. As a Welfare State that strives to build “the people’s
home;”317 this building process comprises “Big People Home” which refers to building the
country, and “Small People’s Home,” referring to building individual families.318
Gender equality in Sweden is more of creating an avenue in society for women and
children, by designing programs and policies that are geared toward improving their lives. The rate
of progress of gender equality has improved over the years. In 1979, 27 percent of children below
school age were in public child care; by 1987, the percentage of children in public care had
increased to 47 percent; 29 percent of this amount was in daycare. 319 In 1974 Sweden introduce
parental insurance in furtherance of the quest to increase women participation, and gave women
compensation for child care. Parental care compensation was also given to men, as a way of
encouraging men also to take on the responsibility of childcare. Later, parental leave was
introduced, replacing maternity leave. Initially, parental leave was for six months.320 By 1980, the
duration of parental leave increased to twelve months.321Since 1980, there has been another
increase in the number of parental leave. In 2002, the number of days for parental leave increased
to 480, 60 of those days allocated to each parent. The 60 days are not transferable between
parents.322
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As seen here, Sweden’s equality model is not solely based on providing equal opportunity
for women and men in the public space; it is geared toward improving both the public and private
spheres, and though there are downsides, the benefits are unquantifiable. Specific roles of women
were considered. For example, the dual role of a working mother was recognized; and policies
were designed to increase participation in the labor market and at home. In 1985, women took 94%
of their days of parental allowance and men 6%. By 2013, women took 75% and men 25%. 323 In
1986, 89.8 percent of women between the ages of 25 and 50 were employed and 85.6 percent of
women with children under seven years were also in the labor market. In 1987, the employment
rate was 82 % for women and men 88%. In 2000, it was 76% for women and 81% for men, and in
2013 77% for women and 82% for men.324 Sweden’s programs and policies helped women to work
and care for their children at the same time.325
According to a 2014 Statistic on Women and Men Report, in 1986, 21, 000 women and
11,000 men graduated from Universities and other higher education institutes. In 2013 the number
doubled for both women and men, 47,000 women and men 27,000 respectively. The statistic also
showed that in 1994 women were paid 84% of what men were paid. By 2012, the percentage
increased to 86%. Similarly, in 1985 the number of women in parliament was 31 % women and
69% men. By 2010, it increased to 45% women and 55% men.326
The distribution of domestic task is unequal, with women been responsible for most of the
domestic work. Despite the low percentage of men engaged in domestic work, statistics show that
“30 percent of women and 20 percent of men view the current division of domestic work as unfair,
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which translates into 70 percent of women and 80 percent of men seeing it as fair.”327 This view
brings to light the historical perception that men are the breadwinners and women the caregivers;
despite the increase of women in the workforce. Sweden has championed gender equality
internationally; it has succeeded mainly in increasing women participation in the public sphere and
men ’s respond in the private sphere.
The goal of gender equality in Sweden is to define the relationship between women and
men. It is believed that “all people are of equal value, regardless of sex, ethnic origin, religion or
social class.”328The relationship is viewed from quantitative and qualitative perspectives.
Qualitatively, gender equality measures knowledge, experience, and value of women and men to
determine how to improve all aspects of their lives. On the other hand, the quantitative approach
takes into consideration equal treatment of women and men as regard work, education, recreation
and position of power.329 These approaches highlight how deliberate Sweden is focused on
creating equality in all sphere of human lives.

D. United States
1. Formal equality model
The United States of America (US) has principally utilized three equality models: the
formal, normative, and rational connection. The Supreme Court has generally rejected substantive
equality, but there is a small window under Title VII disparate impact where substantive equality
is allowed. Discussions in this section are centered on how theorists viewed these models and how
the Supreme Court has addressed discrimination issues relating to disparate treatment and
disparate impact and the standard of review used. The section reveals that the Court has primarily
used a formal model of equality in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause. The chapter closes by
327
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discussing the limitation of formal equality and the extent to which substantive equality has been
utilized under Title VII.
Formal equality was endorsed in the early days in the US, especially by women. Women
rationalized that classifications based on gender difference tended to exclude and subordinate
women.330 According to Fineman, the US today has come to understand “equality narrowly as the
requirement of the sameness of treatment, a formal equality anti-discrimination mandate, primarily
enforced through the courts.”331 Formal equality is cardinal to US jurisprudence in that it is the
basis for administering its equal protection clause. When determining equal protection cases, the
court strives to ascertain whether people within the same legislative class are treated alike or
discriminatorily by similarly situated people. For instance, if the law states that all children should
inherit from their fathers, then a child cannot be denied inheritance because she/he was born out
of wedlock. The court could consider such categorization irrational. Inheritance in this instance
should not be sub-divided into legitimacy and illegitimacy; doing so would be treating the same
legislative class differently.
The court mostly based its rationality standard on whether those in the same legislative
class are treated alike. In short, when those in the same class are treated alike, then formal equality
is achieved. On the other hand, if the court determines that classification is irrational, or
disadvantages certain people by treating those in the same legislative class differently, then the
law is said to have treated similarly situated people differently, which is formal equality.
Under the formal model of equality, when a classification is discriminatory on its face, it
is a violation of the formal model of equality. Formal equality does not care about background,
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historical, or social and structural inequality. It requires that there is a discriminatory intent because
intentional discrimination is unfair and unjust, and it treats people differently based on
characteristics that are irrelevant. On the other hand, when classification does not discriminate on
its face, a discriminatory intent must be shown in order for it to pass an equal protection analysis.
According to Richard A. Primus, a statute that seeks to “prohibit subconscious discrimination
against anyone, rather than to protect certain specified group, the motive behind the statute would
not violate the equal protection clause as long as the aim of prohibiting subconscious
discrimination is understood to be about banning present wrongful action rather than redressing
historical hierarchies.”332 A discriminatory intent or disparate treatment analysis under the equal
protection clause is also formal equality.
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees that the law treats similarly situated people alike.
A claim of an equal protection violation gets three different levels of scrutiny. The type of scrutiny
applied is specific to the classification. A classification based on race, national origin, and those
affecting fundamental rights get strict scrutiny. For classification to pass strict scrutiny, it must
serve a compelling governmental interest that it wants to achieve. The intermediate scrutiny is
used when legislative classifications are based on sex or illegitimacy. Under intermediate scrutiny,
a legislative classification can only pass muster if the classification is substantially related to an
important government objective. The lowest level of scrutiny is the rational basis review, which
requires that a classification must be rationally related to a governmental goal.333
The US Supreme Court has applied these three levels of scrutiny in cases regarding both
state and federal laws. The US approach to equality is formalistic, and its Equal Protection Clause
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provides for equal treatment for all.334 However, equal treatment is dispensed selectively.335 For
instance, sexual orientation and disability are not considered suspect classes and, therefore, are not
protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. The following sections demonstrate
how the court has applied the three levels of scrutiny.
In Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., the Court was faced with two issues rising from the
Richmond City Council’s use of a race-based measure to address the effect of past discrimination
in the construction industry. The City adopted a plan mandating a prime contractor to subcontract
30% of the contract awarded by the City to one or more Minority Business Enterprises (MBE).
The goal was to promote the participation of minority businesses in the construction industry. The
court answered two issues in resolving the matter.336 The first issue was “whether the legislative
history of the City demonstrates that the Council reasonably concluded that private and
governmental discrimination has contributed to the negligible percentage of public contracts
awarded to minority contractors?”337 The Court determined that the City violated the Equal
Protection Clause and was, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny. The City failed to demonstrate a
compelling state interest for apportioning public contract by race. To accept a claim that past
societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preference would be opening
the door to competing claims of remedial relief for every disadvantaged group. The Court also
held that “the only government interest suitably compelling to justify the use of racial
classifications are programs designed to remedy specific instances of past discrimination.”338 On
the issue of the 30% quota, the Court held that the quota was not narrowly tailored to achieve any
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goal. To prove that a plan is narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination, the proponent must
have a “strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.”339
Additionally, the City did not use any factor or a race-neutral means to increase minority
participation in the City contracting plan. Its use of a quota “rest[s] upon the completely unrealistic
assumption that minority will choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their
representation in the local population.”340
In Glenn v. Brumby, the plaintiff filed a suit of discrimination based on sex and medical
condition. She asserted that these issues were a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The
Plaintiff claimed that the defendant discriminated against her because she did not conform to the
defendant’s stereotype regarding the appearance and behavior of a male, and, because of that, her
employment was terminated. She also claimed that she was denied equal protection and treated
differently from other similarly situated persons. She asserted that her termination did not bear any
substantial relationship to an important government interest.341
In analyzing the first issue, the Court stated that, to establish a claim in equal protection,
the claimant must establish the following: (1) that the Claimant is a member of an identifiable
group and subjected to differential treatment from other similarly situated persons and (2) that the
difference in treatment was based on the Claimant’s group.342 When that happens, the Claimant
has to prove that s/he has been discriminated against based on her/his group. In the aforementioned
case, it was based on gender. The Plaintiff also had to prove that gender discrimination was either
purposeful or intentional.343 When discrimination has been proven to be either purposeful or

339

Id. at 510.
Id. at 207.
341
Glenn v. Brumby et al., 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1296 (N.D. Ga. 2010), aff’d, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir.
340

2011).
342
343

Id.
Id. at 1297.

108

intentional, the burden of proof passes on to the defendant to provide an “exceeding persuasive
justification that the discriminatory classification serves important governmental objectives and
that the means employed substantially relates to the achievement of those objectives.”344 When
this is established, the burden returns to the Claimant to prove that the reasons provided by the
defense were pretextual and to provide substantial evidence to convince a jury that the
discrimination was purposeful or intentional.345
In Glenn v. Brumby, the court used intermediate scrutiny to determine that the Claimant
proved a prima facie case of gender discrimination based on sex. The Court concluded that
discrimination against transgender people because they failed to conform to gender stereotypes
constituted sex discrimination.346 The Court further held that the Plaintiff properly stated a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause based upon sex stereotype. 347 Under the rational basis
review, the Court found a violation under the Equal Protection Clause when legislative
classifications were arbitrary and irrational.348
According to Fineman (2008), formal equality has several limitations. Formal equality
diminishes the concept of equality to the sameness of treatment, which could prove insufficient to
remedy historical or persistent subordination and/or disadvantage.349 She asserts that, because the
Equal Protection Clause does not recognize some forms of discrimination, such as disability and
sexual orientation, the formal model could fail to address claims on these issues. She further asserts
that the formal model is weak in addressing social and economic disproportions and, therefore, it
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could legitimize institutions that benefit some and disadvantage others.350 The gaps in the formal
equality model may be the US’s rationale for using more than one equality model.
The formal equality model has been used to address some discrimination problems
successfully, but has been unsuccessful in others, especially when dealing with differently situated
persons. Although formal equality is dominantly practiced, its primary limitation is that equality
is likened to sameness; that is, those who are the same should be treated the same.351 Formal
equality does not inquire into status, income, or level of participation in the workforce. It does not
make allowance for persons of different economic situation to be treated the same. Neither does it
delve into why others, women for example, should be treated differently in the workplace when
they are pregnant. Formal equality leaves undisturbed or may even validate existing institutional
arrangements that privilege some and disadvantage others.352 It does not provide a framework for
challenging the existing allocation of resources and power. It also fails to consider the current
inequality of circumstances that underlie persistent forms of inequality.353
2. Rational Connection Equality Model
The rational connection equality model is also used in the US to review discrimination
cases. Under the rational connection model, the court applies the rational basis review to scrutinize
cases.354 The rational basis review endeavors to find a rational relationship between legislation and
a legitimate governmental policy or action. It seeks to ascertain whether a governmental action is
arbitrary.355 However, this standard of review presumes that the government has a constitutional
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basis for its operation or policy and, therefore, its interest is “construed broadly, while individual
interest is construed narrowly.”356
The rational connection model is heavily influenced by government in that the court strives
to promote the government’s interest. The court could use such flexibility at its discretion to
rationalize a case in favor of the government. Although it may seem like the courts favor the
government in reviewing on a rational basis, they discourage the enactment of any legislation that
will deprive a certain group of persons of seeking their rights to specific protection under the law.
For example, in Romer v. Evans (1996), same-sex couples sought court action to declare an
amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited protection for homosexuals as
unconstitutional. The court opined that:
Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee
of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain
open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance. Equal protection of the law
is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities. Respect for this
principle explains why laws singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored
legal status or general hardship are rare. A law declaring that in general, it shall be
more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the
government is itself a denial of equal protection of the law in the most literal sense.
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal
laws.357
Despite court’s efforts to ensure that legislation does not discriminate among classes of citizens, it is
evident that some legislation enacted by the government is either facially discriminatory or facially
neutral, but has a disparate impact on certain groups. Disparate treatment and disparate impact cases
are usually grounded in an Equal Protection Clause or Title VII claim. Under the rational connection
model, the court applies the rational basis review. The rational basis scrutiny is a low standard of
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review. Under rational basis review, discriminations that are arbitrary or irrational do not pass muster,
and legislation must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective to pass muster.
3. Normative Model
The normative model of equality has not been known as a significant equality model in any of
the countries under review; notwithstanding, it has been used by courts in the US and the Republic
of South Africa to decide cases of equal protection. In the US, this model has been used to decide
matters relating to discrimination based on race, creed, color, gender, sex, and alienage. The basic
idea is to discourage government’s disadvantage or marginalization of the minority.358 The normative
model polices government from using classification that will serve as an impediment to a particular
class of persons from either exercising their rights or denying them public funding. An example of
such classification is when a government policy denies people of color from using public facilities,
such as the library, transportation, and recreation. When this kind of differentiation is done, it gives
rise to a normative claim under the law.
The normative model of equality in the US is also grounded in respect for human dignity and
identity and forbids the government from intruding into personal territory.359 In Goodridge v. Dep’t
of Pub. Health, a sexual orientation case, a same-sex couple filed a suit claiming that they were denied
access to obtain a marriage license and that the prohibition violated their rights. In its review, the
court found that the Massachusetts statute was not “rationally related to the Commonwealth’s asserted
rationale for prohibiting same-sex marriage. The court emphasized that prohibiting an individual of
the right to choose to marry is to exclude one from the full range of human experience and denied
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full protection of the laws for one’s avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting human
relationship.”360
The court further analyzed that the case was both a substantive due process and an equal
protection case and that both can be reviewed using the rational basis review. Under the substantive
due process review, the law in question must bear a real and substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or some other phase of the general welfare.361 In an equal protection claim, the
“rational basis test requires that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the classification
would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the member of a disadvantaged class.”362 The
court found that the marriage ban statute between same-sex couples did not meet the rational basis
test for either substantive due process or equal protection because it identified persons based on a
single trait and then denied them protection across the board. It was an endorsement of “destructive
stereotype that same-sex relationship is inherently unstable and inferior to opposite-sex and not
worthy of respect.”363
Under normative equality analysis, the court takes into consideration violations of basic human
morals, respect, dignity, and identity. Claims of the substantive due process and equal protection are
scrutinized under the rational basis review.
4. Affirmative Action
The US has allowed affirmative action on the basis of diversity in higher education and
remediation in employment. The United States Supreme Court has also reviewed cases about past
and continuing discrimination based on race, national origin, gender, and sex. The court uses strict
scrutiny in discrimination cases involving race and national origin and intermediate scrutiny in
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gender or sex claims. In short, affirmative action has not been embraced wholeheartedly by the
Constitution because of these gaps, mainly because it most often does not pass the strict scrutiny
test set by the Supreme Court.364 This section will review cases in the previously mentioned
categories and analyze the doctrine the Court uses in its review.
The Supreme Court has struck affirmative action plans that arbitrarily used race-based
discrimination to ameliorate past discrimination and discouraged the use of quotas as a remedial
action absent other qualifying criteria. Notwithstanding, the Court has upheld affirmative action
diversity plans that used race as a “plus” factor through an individualized selection process. In
Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court held that the law school had a compelling interest in attaining a
diverse student body.365 The Court further said that its decision was based on its view that
“attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law school institutional mission, and that
good faith on the part of the university is presumed, absent a showing to the contrary.”366
Also, in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193(1979), there was a legal challenge to
an affirmative action plan that reserved 50% of the openings in an in-plant craft-training program
to black employees until the percentage of black craft workers in the plant was commensurate with
the percentage of black employees in the local labor force. The issue presented to the Court was
“whether Congress in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.
C. §2000e et Seq., left employers and unions in the private sectors free to take such race-conscious
step to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories?”367 Before
answering the question, the Court looked at the legislative history of Title VII. The goal of the Act
entailed the integration of black people into the mainstream of American Society. Congress
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identified the main problem as the lack of employment opportunities for black people in
occupations that were traditionally closed to them. Title VII was enacted to prohibit racial
discrimination in employment.368 The Court concluded that “the affirmative action plan was within
the area of discretion left by Title VII to the private sector voluntarily to adopt affirmative action
plan designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job
categories.”369
In Setser v. Novak Inv. Co. an employee filed an action against his private employer
claiming reversed discrimination based on race. The court held that for an employer race-based
affirmative action plan to pass muster, the employer has to prove that there has been prior racial
discrimination that it wants to remedy and that the affirmative action plan was a response to that
racial imbalance.370 Second, the employer must prove that the affirmative action plan reasonably
relates to the remedial purpose.

371

On the other hand, the Employee can refute the employer by

proving the following evidence: (1) that employer had some motivation other than the remedial
reason for the affirmative action, and (2) that the plan unreasonably exceeded its remedial
purpose.372 When an employee provides these evidence, the court then has the burden of finding
the validity of the affirmative action plan. The plan is determined to be bona fide if “it is reasonably
related to its remedial purpose.”373 However, a plan can be invalidated if “there is a genuine issue
as to whether the treatment of the employee was related to the plan.”374 The Court used strict
scrutiny to review race-based reversed discrimination cases.
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In Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Dep’t, the court was faced with a gender discrimination
case based on an affirmative action plan. The employer set a 36% hiring goal for women. The
Plaintiff claimed that the Employer long-term hiring goal of 36 percent women was unreasonable
and that women were disinterested in being a firefighter and that the statistic relied on was
unrealistic. Unlike the race-conscious affirmative action plan where a “strong basis in evidence is
required, in a gender-conscious affirmative action plan, an employer must provide sufficient
probative evidence to support the plan.375 The Employer must show that there has been past
discrimination against women, not necessarily by the government and that affirmative action was
not used only based on reaction to stereotype but a result of an analysis done. 376 The court used
intermediate scrutiny to review the case. The court also stressed the importance of time in said
analysis. It stated that an “affirmative action plan might be lawful at one point in time does not
mean that such discrimination may be countenanced in the future.”377
In other instance, affirmative action can be used in higher education admissions, to allow
minority race admissions into traditionally white Universities. The legal rationale that has
supported this action is diversity and remediation. A proponent of affirmative action enunciates
that diversity allows the interaction of both black and white students, and the interactions enrich
the learning environment. It creates a cross-racial understanding that challenges and reduces racial
stereotypes, allows for a more energetic classroom conversation, and prepares students to
participate in a diversified workplace. It further states that diversity in color and white female
students considers both race and gender.378 Additionally, remedial affirmative action benefits these
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categories in that it improves social services such as healthcare, legal services education, business,
in minority localities, it also empowers future leadership of those communities that could serve as
role models.
The constitutional validity of a racial classification is determined if it survives strict
scrutiny if the classification does not have racial animus. For classification to pass strict scrutiny,
it must serve a compelling state interest. On the other hand, laws that discriminate based on gender
but does not have a sexist animus is constitutional when it survives intermediate scrutiny.
Intermediate scrutiny requires that the law serves an important state interest that is substantially
related to a governmental interest.
The US Supreme Court has allowed affirmative action in cases involving diversity in
higher education and remediation of past discrimination. Strict scrutiny is applied in reviewing
race-based discrimination, and gender-based discrimination has to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.
The Court has also opined that in race or gender higher education plan, diversity is a compelling
state interest but must be accompanied by other factors other than race or gender. The Court also
takes into consideration the educational judgment of the institution. The Court has rejected
affirmative action plan that allows quotas. All affirmative plan must necessarily have a time limit.
5. Substantive Equality model
The Court has generally rejected substantive equality, but there is a little window were
substantive equality has been more acceptable, that is, the disparate impact branch of Title VII.
Discrimination cases based on disparate treatment or disparate impact can be analyzed based on
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C section 2000e et seq. Under Title VII disparate
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impact, proof of discriminatory intent is not a requirement; disparate impact could be enough on
its own to invalidate a rule.
Disparate impact discrimination arises when there is no intent to discriminate, and facially
neutral laws have a discriminatory impact on a protected class.379 Guz v. Bechtel National sets the
test for the inference of disparate impact as follows: (1) that s/he is a member of a protected class,
(2) that s/he is qualified for the position, (3) that s/he suffered adverse employment action, such as
termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) no discrimination is required for
disparate impact. A plaintiff is under obligation at trial to establish a prima facie case of presumed
bias by providing statistical evidence of disparate impact on a protected group. A defendant will
be required to rebut the presumption by providing admissible proof that the requirement imposed
was a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to prove
that there are other ways to meet the employe’s needs without the rule that causes the disparate
impact.
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for a plaintiff to prevail in a disparate treatment
case, the plaintiff must establish the following, (1) that s/he belongs to a protected class. (2) that
s/he was qualified for the position. (3) That s/he suffered an adverse employment action. And (4)
that the adverse employment action occurred under the circumstances giving rise to an inference
of discriminatory intent.380 When the plaintiff establishes that, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to provide a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the disputed employment action,
if the defendant provides a reason, the plaintiff, on the other hand, could show that the reason is
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pretextual. In proving pretext, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that the real reason for the disputed
employment action was based on his or her race or gender. The Court requires the plaintiff to show
sufficient evidence to convince a rational jury that the defendant reasons provided are false. The
Court also stated that in proving pretext, the motive is an essential element.
Substantive equality in the United States tries to remedy discrimination regarding facially
neutral laws that impact individuals or groups. Discrimination under substantive equality does not
depend on the legislative classification of persons or differentiated treatment. It cures
discrimination when the state treats unequally similarly situated persons who are differently
situated.381And discourage inequality based on arbitrary state action.382A significant characteristic
of substantive equality in the United States is that it remedies equality based on facially neutral
law.
In Congregation Rabbinical College of Tartikov, Inc. v. Vill of Pomona, the Plaintiff filed
a suit challenging a zoning ordinance adopted by the Village of Pomona. Plaintiffs’ claims were
grounded in facially discriminatory laws and facially neutral discrimination. The Plaintiffs claimed
that the zoning regulation ordinance unlawfully prevented them from owning, holding, building
and operating a rabbinical college on their property located in the Village. The Plaintiffs claimed
that the ordinance, though facially neutral, had an impact on them.383
The court’s evaluation was based on claims rooted in the equal protection clause and
expression of Free speech. In reviewing the equal protection claim, the court used the three-prong
test. (1) Identifying a law that expressly classifies on the bases of race, (2) identifying a facially
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neutral law or policy that has been applied in an unlawfully discriminatory manner, and (3)
identifying a fiscally neutral law or policy that has an adverse effect and that was motivated by
discriminatory animus.384 The plaintiff’s case was grounded on the third prong and claimed that
because the ordinance had both discriminatory purpose and effect, it raises a claim of equal
protection violation.
To prove that the policy or regulation had both a discriminatory purpose and effect. To
establish discriminatory purpose, the Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the government selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action “at least in part because of and not merely in spite of its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group. Discriminatory purpose and intent are when
government acts or seeks to disadvantage or negatively impact groups or persons.”385 The court
looks into both circumstantial and direct evidence to determine whether a discriminatory purpose
drove the government’s action.386
On the other hand, to prove discriminatory effect, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the
adverse effect of the ordinance violated their equal protection rights, because of its discriminatory
animus. In other words, effect alone is never enough under Equal Protection. In showing
discriminatory effect, the plaintiffs do not have to make a showing of better treatment for similarly
situated persons. All they have to show is that they were adversely affected.387
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Although substantively equality is not encouraged by the United State Supreme Court, it
is tolerated when there are claims of discrimination based on facially neutral law. The burden of
proof is usually with the plaintiff.
A. Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated how the formal equality, rational connection, normative models,
affirmative action and substantive model of equality have been used in the United States.
Especially in its legal jurisprudence, although there have been many criticisms regarding the gap
in the models. Many critics have stated that the formal model perpetuates wrongs and the
multiplication of wrong creates disadvantage and marginalizes people instead of promoting
equality. On the other hand, those in favor of the model see it as promoting consistency, especially
in the legal system. Despite the pros and cons, the US has used the formal equality model along
with the rational connection model in its courts. The rational connection model is not devoid of
flaws, but the courts have used this model to determine whether there is a nexus between legislation
and the government’s interest that it seeks to promote. While it is true that the court goes over and
above to establish a nexus between the two, it has struck down legislation that is arbitrary and
irrational.
On the contrary, the normative model has not been used as extensively as the formal or rational
connection models. It has been used when there is a differentiation of legislative classification.
Where legislation is facially discriminatory, it gets strict automatic scrutiny, but where there is
facially neutral legislation, the proof of intent to discriminate must be shown to get strict scrutiny
review. Notwithstanding, the model has been used to decide cases relating to discrimination based
on race, creed, color, gender, and alienage. The normative model has also been used in cases of
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sexual orientation discrimination, to strike down laws that violate normative standard even when
there is no suspect class. The basic idea is to discourage government legislation that would
disadvantage or marginalize the minority. The normative model prohibits the government from
classifying persons or groups in such a manner that prevents them from either exercising their
rights or preventing them from benefiting from public resources.
The United States Supreme Court has generally rejected the substantive model of equality. But
substantive equality is tolerated in the United States only under Title VII disparate impact branch
and not for the equal protection clause.
In Canada, the substantive equality model has been used to raise the living standard of women’s
income and earnings. There has been a deliberate effort on the part of the government to include
substantive equality in the constitution. This initiative on the part of the government increased
women’s status economically, politically and socially. Currently, the rate in women’s income and
earning has decreased because there are many oppositions to women’s empowerment because they
consider it a form of discrimination. Like Canada, South Africa, after its apartheid regime,
included substantive equality in its constitution. The incorporation of substantive equality was
based mainly on the prevalence of racial discrimination. The whites suppressed the other races
socially, economically and politically. Socially, certain groups were disadvantaged or stigmatized
because of their culture, values, and behaviors; while others were affirmed and privileged,
perpetuating inequality.388 Economic inequality was seen from unequal “access to the distribution
of basic needs, opportunities, and material resources;”389 and politically, the government was
predominantly white.
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In the same token, a normative model of equality has been used in South Africa to address
discrimination based on gender, culture and other classifications seeking to determine the
reasonableness of a classification. The major disadvantage of the model is that there must be
differentiation before it can be triggered; as such, there is no remedy when different classes of
people get similar treatment.
In Canada, the normative model has been utilized minimally. Canada in its limited use of the
model has employed this approach to distinguish liberty and equality. Similarly, the normative
approach has been used in criminal law to determine whether there are cultural reasons why people
commit crimes and whether those reasons can justifiably pass muster.
In general, substantive equality model which has affirmative action incorporated has reduced
inequality in Canada, Sweden, and South Africa. It allows citizens to demand action from their
government while serving as a foundation for claimants to get remedy under the law for political,
historical and social discrimination. Incorporating substantive equality provisions in constitutions
has also bolstered the utility of the model. Additionally, Sweden’s politicians have used gender
equality as an important platform, and at the same time, the government has intentionally designed
equality programs and policies to improve discrimination, which has served as a basis for equal
opportunity for both women and men.
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CHAPTER FIVE: RECOMMENDED EQUALITY THEORY FOR
LIBERIA: SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
The substantive equality model is recommended to assist the amelioration of
discriminatory laws in Liberia. Substantive equality is most appropriate because it deals with
facially neutral laws and omissions in the law and allows affirmative action. It also deals directly
with facially discriminatory laws and can resolve the problems that emanate from the facially
neutral law. For example, custody law favors fathers over mothers. The law could be written in a
gender-neutral manner to say that custody is awarded to the parent with good financial standing.
In that case, the language becomes gender neutral. However, though the language is facially
neutral, the law may still have a disparate impact on women because most men have a better
income than do women. Therefore, there must be other elements incorporated into the law to
remove the possibility of disparate impact and make the law gender balanced.
Additionally, because Liberia is a patriarchal society, substantive equality is essential to
address the historical discrimination encountered by women. As a male-dominated nation, most
laws favor men. Male preference is also visible in governance and political participation. Because
Liberian society is patriarchal, the country needs an active approach to addressing gender
discrimination. The substantive equality model is very suitable in treating background cultures of
inequality.
Further, substantive equality is appropriate for addressing discriminatory laws in the
customary legal system. Customary laws are very patriarchal; they promote male supremacy. In a
country where customary law and statutory law are adopted, treatment of people in both legal
systems seems like something that substantive equality will tolerate and work well with by helping
to reduce tension between them.
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On the other hand, substantive equality may be a challenge for the Liberian judicial system
because of its activist role for judges, which is against the age-old legal culture. Another problem
could be the positive obligation it places on government. While positive obligation may not always
result in a financial burden, it could require the government to take specific actions by designing
programs and policies.
This chapter articulates the appropriateness of substantive equality in addressing
discriminatory claims by laying out its application to discrimination problems identified in earlier
chapters. The chapter concludes that other models of equality could be applicable in Liberia, but
substantive equality is most suitable because it addresses historical discrimination.
The laws of Liberia generally provide for equality and equal treatment of all persons. The
Liberian Constitution contains several equality provisions, including Chapter Three, which
includes the bill of rights. The Constitutional provisions that provide for equality are Article 11 (a)
and (c) and Article 18.390 Additionally, statutory provisions address questions of equality, and
several programs and policies of the government aim, theoretically, at addressing this critical issue,
drawing on both social and political equality. The problem is there is no established standard that
the courts and equality advocacy groups can reference as authoritative reliance in ways that
eliminate the need for a case-by-case interpretation of what the guarantee means. Currently, there
is no clear equality standard the court relies on to determine cases, especially equal protection
cases. Most of the equal protection cases, especially those that raise constitutional questions are
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Liberian citizens shall have equal opportunity for work and employment regardless of sex, creed, religion, ethnic
background, place of origin or political affiliation, and all shall be entitled to equal pay for equal work.”
390

125

usually regarded as political questions; hence, people injured do not receive an adequate remedy.
Based on these shortcomings, this chapter prescribes a set of realistic solutions to the problem.
An equality model is vital to address disadvantages and discrimination from two
perspectives: (1) the disparity between statutory and customary legal systems, with the former
being superior to the latter, and (2) cultural and traditional practices that have systematically
marginalized women and endorsed gender inequality. Culture and tradition play a pivotal part in
Liberia’s dual legal system. There is an imaginary line drawn between rural and urban
communities. Those in rural communities are generally subjects of customary legal systems, while
urban dwellers use the statutory legal system. The exception is when people in either of the two
jurisdictions subject themselves to one or the other.
Cultural and traditional norms are usually practiced in rural areas. Therefore, customary
law more prevalently applies. The cardinal issue is that, in the customary setting, males are superior
to females; hence, laws favor males over females. This system is enhanced by the fact that most
customary laws are not written, but are practiced or handed down from generation to generation.
Notwithstanding, there have been efforts to harmonize two critical areas of the customary legal
system: marriage and inheritance laws. The Equal Rights of Customary Marriage was enacted to
equalize marriage and inheritance in the two legal systems on par. Unfortunately, this effort has
not yielded the intended result because there are enormous disparities in the net effect of the
harmonization. Additionally, some of the written customary marriage and inheritance laws further
discriminate and disadvantage females. At the same time, when comparing women in both legal
systems, some laws like custody, legitimation, and marriage presumption, equally disadvantage
women in both legal systems.
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Given the above, it is imperative to have an equality model that bridges the gap between
the two systems, thereby curtailing discrimination in the social, economic, political and cultural
spheres of Liberian society. Having such a model would give voice to the disadvantaged and
underrepresented, and allow them to participate appreciably and benefit from state resources.
Therefore, it is recommended that Liberia adopt the substantive equality model, which examines
inequality within a broad social, political, and economic context. This model takes into
consideration historical discrimination against women based on cultural and traditional reasoning
that has denied women based on their sex. It also considers facially neutral laws that have disparate
impacts, especially on women, in both statutory and customary legal systems. The aim is to identify
claims that will obligate the government to take affirmative actions, such as devising measures
that would require equitable distribution of state resources, enabling all citizens to have access to
basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter, education, health, and guaranteeing participation
without avoidable and unwarranted hindrances.
A precise model undoubtedly helps countries and their international partners to assess how
the courts in a particular jurisdiction handle equal protection, equal opportunity, and equal
treatment cases, which is cardinal to bilateral relationship and support. Most importantly, the
utilization of the substantive model of equality will articulate to both local and international
stakeholders that there are specific models of equality used in Liberian jurisprudence and that the
court will apply the determined model of equality when applicable. The truth is, the identification
of an equality model in jurisprudence is essential to avoid arbitrariness in the adjudication of cases
and to prohibit judges from resorting to using their own discretion.
Further, a defined model of equality is essential to a court because it reduces judicial
discretion, it helps build international support and understanding, and it helps build public
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confidence. These reasons justify the need for an equality model. First, an equality model reduces
the need for judicial discretion. Generally, discretion refers to choice.391 When referring to judges,
discretion is either primary or secondary.392 Primary discretion is when a judge is given a large
scope from which he has an option to decide. There is no limit or constraint on his options; that is,
the court has the freedom to determine the way they choose, regardless of the law.393 Secondary
discretion refers to “hierarchical relations among judges.”394 Secondary discretion is given to
judges, and high court judges cannot reverse their decision, even if the discretion was wrong.395
Whether discretion is primary or secondary, decision making power is with the judge regardless
of the law.
Second, an equality model is vital for international support and understanding. When there
is a clear equality model used in a jurisdiction, it helps courts in other jurisdictions to understand
the procedure used by the court. Other jurisdictions could rely on the opinions of the Liberian
Supreme Court. Additionally, a clear equality model that sets a specific standard of review lends
credibility to the court, which may attract international support.
Third, an equality model helps to build confidence in the court. According to Sara. C.
Benesh, four factors articulate the importance of public confidence in the court.396 The elements
are experience, knowledge, fair procedure, and institution design.397 She argues that, because
people interact with the court always, their experiences should count in evaluating the court. She
stated that people’s experience might differ depending on the level of their interactions. Some
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interact as plaintiffs, defendants, and/or jurors. Regardless of their experiences, “having real
information and knowledge of the court may operate differently.”398 She concluded that knowledge
of the court could improve its legitimacy and build public confidence.399
Benesh further notes that how people perceive procedural justice informs their decision on
how to evaluate the court.400 Most people do not have adequate knowledge about the court, which
interplays with how they perceive the fairness of the court. Benesh argues that institutional design
affects how people see the court. Generally, people want a court that is independent. 401 When
people see the court as separate, there is a greater likelihood that their perception will be positive.402
An explicit model of equality contributes to experience in that lawyers and party litigants
will come into practical contact with the model and its application in the court. The knowledge
gained after exposure to the court process and practical use of the model could enhance its utility.
Further, if the application proves to remedy cases in a fair and just manner, it will increase
credibility in the judicial system. Lastly, an explicit model could fully assist in making the judiciary
transparent and accountable.
As a prerequisite to the effective utilization of an equality model, the court must answer
four cardinal questions. First, which model should be used and why? Second, what portion of the
model is to be utilized; that is, whether the model needs to be modified or parts omitted? Third,
what enforcement mechanisms will be used and from where will their authority derive? Fourth,
how will this system operate taking into consideration the narrowness of the equal protection
clause and discriminatory statutory provisions?
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Recommending the adoption of the substantive equality model in Liberia does not suggest
that the model is flawless and perfectly suitable or that utilizing it is feasibly stress-free or, at most,
will assure total equality in society. The logic is to consider all facets of society including the
social, economic, and political spheres, before narrowing down on an equality model that will both
foster legislative goals, uphold the constitution, and focus on protecting human rights.
The plain meaning and use of the model as described in Chapter Three and Chapter Four
will be used as a standard definition for this dissertation. However, to have substantive equality,
the court could expand the definition to attain the quality of justice and fairness envisaged for
Liberian society. Additionally, the fundamental rights and equal protection clause provisions of
the constitution must be amended to allow affirmative action. Moreover, legislation that supports
equality and the promotion of human dignity must be enacted. The government must also be
deliberate about its equality policies and programs, and there must be mechanisms in place to
ensure that deserving citizens benefit. Additionally, the courts must be truly apolitical and
independent; they must review cases expeditiously and transparently, avoiding any semblance of
arbitrariness.
In furtherance of the objective of this chapter, a synopsis of the substantive model of
equality is provided. The summary demonstrates how the model could assist to remedy the
problems identified in Chapter Two. Each of those problems will be discussed considering how
the model could be applied. The section additionally points out the potential limitations of the
model and how those limitations may hinder its implementation in Liberia. The chapter concludes
that substantive equality is suitable for Liberia because it addresses historical discrimination and
discrimination from facially neutral laws.
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Arguably, normative and rational connection models of equality could help in improving
some of Liberia’s inequality problems but not adequately. Therefore, this dissertation recommends
the Substantive equality model as a standard model for reviewing inequality cases. This
recommendation is based on the following: (1) substantial portions of both normative and rational
connection models are embodied within the substantive model, therefore adopting the three models
will be repetitive. (2) Affirmative action, much needed in Liberia, is also embedded into
substantive equality. (3) Substantive equality remedies historical, social and economic
discrimination. (4) Substantive equality allows the court to use the proportionality test for the
review of cases, curtailing the use of discretion and arbitrariness.
A. The Layout of the recommended model: Substantive Equality Model
This section highlights the portions of the substantive model that could or could not be
utilized in Liberia and why. It further brings into perspective the kinds of questions that courts may
be inclined to ask when reviewing equality claims and how to apply the equality theory in
determining cases. Selection of the substantive equality model does not presume that other equality
models are not applicable in Liberia. For instance, aspects of the normative and rational connection
models could be relevant. Significant parts of these models are embodied within the substantive
equality. Finally, the recommended portions of the substantive equality model will be applied to
the problems identified and discussed in Chapter Two.
1. Substantive Equality Model
The substantive equality model “demands that an equality claim is examined within a
broader social and political context, considering persistent disadvantages suffered by certain
groups independent of the differentiation or facially neutral law under scrutiny.”403 It requires
careful consideration of the situation in which these disadvantaged or minority groups find
403
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themselves to determine the relationship between them or the differences that exist. The aim is to
identify claims that will place obligations on states to act affirmatively, in furtherance of the
general view that “the role of states is not to stop discrimination but to take positive steps and
measures to remedy disadvantage.”404 In short, substantive equality creates an obligation on
governments to address underlying systems of inequality, afford opportunities to correct laws that
are facially neutral but have disparate impact, direct or indirect discrimination, address deliberate
or unconscious discrimination, and laws that are facially discriminatory, as well as omissions in
the law. Notation is made herein that disparate impact works only for historically disadvantaged
people.
The exclusion of women in decision making and public governance and participation
articulate the level of marginalization in both the public and private spheres. Social inequality
comes about when there is a systemic pattern of inclusion or exclusion of people so that they are
marginalized, discriminated, stigmatized or disadvantaged based on their way of life, values, and
culture.405 Therefore, this dissertation seeks to recommend substantive equality from the
perspective that it demands that an equality claim is examined by the courts considering its social,
economic, and political context, focusing intently on reviewing the historical and continuous
disadvantage encountered by women, and other marginalized groups. Evaluating persistent
disadvantage suffered by these minority groups is essential because substantive equality requires
a careful examination of the situation in which these disadvantaged or minority groups find
themselves, to determine the relationship between them, or the differences that exist. The goal is
to create an avenue where citizens can raise their clams and receive a remedy. Also, citizens can
assert that their representatives make laws that will promote equality and human dignity.
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Additionally, citizens can pressure their government to design programs and policies that will
improve the living standards of the marginalized.
Some cardinal components of substantive equality that will apply are as follows, (1)
Finding that the legislative classification is reasonable; (2) Identifying prohibited bases of
legislative differentiation, by requiring that legislative classification are not stereotypical, and does
not impact the personal identity as individuals, or impose undue suffering. (3) Creating a platform
where people can be treated fairly, with respect, dignity, and can have recourse to the law when
the need arises. (4) Speaking to the issue of separate rights to particular people, equal treatment
for differently situated people, as well as an equal entitlement that is generated as a result of
separate and distinct situations. (5) Identifying differential treatment between categories of people,
And (6) identifying laws whose general application may seem facially neutral but have a disparate
impact.
Under the substantive equality mechanism, creating affirmative obligations to address
underlying systemic discrimination could translate to the government designing policies and
programs that will benefit underprivileged and disadvantaged groups or individuals, those that
have suffered historical discrimination and the under-represented. It will afford underprivileged
individuals or groups equal opportunity to benefit from society’s resources. The implementation
and enforcement of the government’s policies and programs will, as a matter of legal compulsion,
harness the joint and intentional efforts of the three branches of government and mandatory public
and private sectors collaboration.
Notwithstanding, there are numerous intricacies involved in placing a positive obligation
on government. Firstly, there are no constitutional or legislative provisions for positive obligation.
Therefore, such a claim may not pass muster in the court. Secondly, the government may not have
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the resources to fulfill requested needs because government works within specific budgetary
allocation. Thirdly, because there is no legal backing for such obligation, enforcement may be
challenging. Therefore, the positive right may not be immediately realistic but what is essential
and achievable is for the court to declare the rights of claimants and order the government to act.
Given the above, courts are the central figure in the equality equation for adequate
determination of discrimination claims. Consequently, there should be standard questions that
courts must ask to set a basis for reviewing cases. A standard is important to avoid vacillation and
inconsistency. The following issues are fundamental determinants, considering the countries
studied in this dissertation: (1) Whether there was an infringement on the rights of the claimant?
(2) Whether the infringement was unfair? And, (3) Whether the unfair infringement was justified.
These issues go beyond finding reasonability and connection between legislation and state
objective; it investigates in-depth limitations on rights. Moreover, the questions are not only meant
to determine if discrimination is unfair but speak to the issue of arbitrariness. In the same token,
there must be ways to measure the impact on the outcome of court opinions. Therefore, the Oakes
proportionality test discussed in Chapter Four could be adopted as the standard of review. This
three-component test is recommended with moderate alterations: (1) the measure must be fair and
not arbitrary, carefully designed to achieve the objective in question and rationally connected to
the objective. (2) The means should impair the right in question as little as possible, considering
persistent and historical discrimination and respect for human dignity. (3) There must be a
proportionality between the effects of the limiting measure (consideration should be given to
history, intent, and justification of the law) and the objective.

134

The Supreme Court of Liberia is the final arbiter of all cases.406 It has the constitutional
authority to decide whether any legislation violates the constitution.407 In determining claims, the
Court is guided by the following: intent, justification, and history of the law.408 Where there is no
precedent, it looks to other common law jurisdiction for guidance, mainly the United States, under
what is called the Receptive Statute. On other occasions, the Court has deemed constitutional
questions as political questions, thereby, leaving toxic constitutional questions unanswered. In
addition to these problematic approaches, the Court has on occasions even vacillated in its opinions
by deviating from its previous rulings in substantial ways. It is imperative for the Court to
determine standards of review that will guide it in reviewing cases.
2. Standard of Review
Substantive equality model in Liberia will seek to address gender discrimination within the
two legal systems; highlighting the eradication of historical discrimination. Its goal will be
conscious of the country’s social, political, and economic perspectives in resolving discriminatory
practices. It will address the pattern of inclusion and exclusion; giving voice to those that have
been excluded by recognizing their social identities and values and how their exclusion has
marginalized them. On the same note, substantive equality will promote gender balance in the
public sphere, where both sexes can participate in politics and governance equally. It will also
create a medium through which legislation that helps increase the participation of the marginalized
will be enacted. Additionally, the distribution or redistribution of the state’s resources should be
equitable. Accordingly, substantive equality in Liberia will remedy inequality by demanding that
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equality claims are reviewed within a broader social, political, and economic context, when
reviewing facially discriminatory laws, facially neutral laws and omissions in the law.
The Constitution mandates the provision of equal opportunity and equal treatment for all
its citizen. The designing programs and policies that will promote equality could help to support
equal opportunity. Programs and policies must be designed in a manner that fosters respect for
human dignity and positive cultural and traditional practices that conform to national development.
In the same token, the Court which is a cardinal factor will review cases in the context of whether
a right has been violated, whether the violation was unfair, and whether the unfair violation was
justified. The review process must be fair and not arbitrary; the means utilized should minimally
impair the rights in question, and there should be a rational relationship between the means and
the objective that the law seeks. The review must take into consideration the history, intent, and
justification of the law in question.
Therefore, when different natures of equal protection cases come before the court, it must
determine what standard of review is appropriate. Establishing a standard of review is important,
in that it lends credibility and gives a reflection that the court knows what it is doing. The Court
cannot continue to adjudicate cases without specifying the standard of review. Although in other
jurisdictions courts sometimes adjudge cases without stating the standard; this practice may not
augur well for a court system that has a credibility problem, as is the perception of the public in
Liberia.
As shown in the above questions, it is important to note that there should be a measure of
impact on the outcome of court opinions. Therefore, the three-prong Oakes proportionality test
discussed in Chapter Four could be adopted to analyze substantive equality cases. The threecomponent analysis is recommended with moderate alteration. Mortification of the test is
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necessary to accommodate values that promote respect for human dignity. Also, because of the
nature of historical discrimination, it is essential to consider the history, intent, and justification of
the law.
(1) The measure must be fair and not arbitrary, carefully designed to achieve the objective in
question and rationally connected to the objective.
(2) The means should impair the right in question as little as possible, considering persistent
and historical discrimination and respect for human dignity.
(3) There must be a proportionality between the effects of the limiting measure (consideration
should be given to history, intent, and justification of the law) and the objective.
The Oakes test has been modified to suit Liberia by adding in the second prong that consideration
be given to persistent and historical discrimination, and the respect for human dignity. Also, in the
third prong was modified to include the history, intent, and justification of the law. These
methodologies are aimed at developing a judicial system that looks at equality claims thoroughly
and transparently. And also as a means of increasing credibility in the system and create a standard
that is not arbitrary.
B. Conclusion
Inequality in Liberia is systemic; an equality model is needed to curtail or eradicate the
problem. Basically, gender inequality problems in Liberian Domestic Relations Law can be
examined from three perspectives; (1) the disparity between the statutory legal system and the
customary legal system; noting that the laws favor males and marginalized female, (2) culture and
tradition, which has been used to endorse inequality, and (3) discriminatory laws, gender-neutral
laws with disparate impact and omission in the law.
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There has always been tension between the two legal systems, the statutory legal system is
seen in practice as superior to the customary legal system, even though it is not pronounced as
such. For example, cases adjudicated in the customary legal systems could be either affirmed or
set aside by the statutory legal system. This tension comes about because people in the statutory
system see themselves as different from or superior to those in the customary setting. This
difference stems from the fact that in the customary setting most of the people are poor and or
illiterate; and those in the statutory system, while not necessarily rich, have access to State’s power
and resources. Being poor and or uneducated can be a recipe for marginalization, disadvantage,
and discrimination.
The Substantive Equality Model identifies legislations that support social stereotype, and
differentiation based on classifications that change the social status of individuals and groups. The
model promotes separate rights for people and equal rights for differently situated people. It insists
that legislation should be reasonable and not arbitrary; and creates a medium where people can be
treated fairly, with respect, dignity and have a remedy at law when there are violations. In so doing,
substantive equality model will strive to remedy the impact discriminatory law, gender-neutral
laws with disparate impact and omissions in the law.
The development of Liberia’s legal jurisprudence that promotes equality depends on a
system that is fair and transparent. Such a system will minimize arbitrariness and discretion and
lends credibility to the court. A credible judicial system does not only render fair and just
decisions, but also helps to create a stable society. Currently, discrimination cases do not follow
any standard of review as stated previously; as a result, the court contradicts itself in its opinions
and vacillates on similar issues. That is why the substantive model of equality is recommended to
resolve these problems.
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Substantive equality can adequately resolve discriminatory problems arising from
patriarchy and customary law. Substantive equality could pose a challenge to Liberia’s judicial
system, but the difficulty could be overcome by interpreting the laws based on the standards
recommended in this chapter. The government may not be readily agreeable to the idea of
substantive equality, but that too can be addressed on a step by step basis. Substantive changes do
not have to be drastic; the government could start by designing programs and policies that promote
gender equality. Additionally, the legislature can also amend laws that are facially discriminatory
or facially neutral but have a disparate impact on women.
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CHAPTER SIX: APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY MODEL
TO LIBERIA’S GENDER INEQUALITY PROBLEMS
The adoption of substantive equality in Liberia is important to change the legal culture and
reduce discriminatory practices that have suppressed women for many years. It does so by
introducing a legal context with clear doctrinal approach and standard of review that guide decision
making. Substantive equality also entails the duty to provide409, and this duty can be seen from the
Liberian perspective as equality of opportunity. For example, for females who were deprived of
the right to education as opposed to males, the government and other institutions could design
programs and policies that are family-friendly, that allow a woman to work and provide childcare.
Applied to Liberia, the courts will use substantive equality standards to evaluate a claim of
unfair discrimination to a category of people not necessarily to establish that they have been
discriminated against, but to assess the impact of an action on such claimants; whether the
differential treatment is justified and conclude that the legislative treatment pursuant to the law is
not unfairly discriminatory. For example, affirmative actions to increase women participation in
the Legislature may not be equated to discrimination against male contestants, but an impetus to
increase women participation and balance political representation. Additionally, employing
substantive equality features in Liberia may require measures such as equal distribution or
redistribution of state resources. Equal distribution will not necessarily translate to goods and
services being distributed equally to all citizens, but all individuals or groups could have their basic
needs: food, clothing, health, shelter, education, road, and the right to participate. Redistribution
means sharing national resources in a way that a portion will be taken from those who have so that
the have-nots will benefit; because substantive equality focuses on impact. It does not necessarily
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mean taking resources from the rich and giving to the poor; the ultimate target is to treat people
according to their current disadvantaged situation, by taking affirmative action to improve their
status. It may mean that the government distributes what they have control over in favor of the
disadvantaged or ordering private actor to do certain things. It is a means of taking a distribution
system and tilting it to benefit certain people. The major difficulty is that the Supreme Court may
not endorse this move because of the absence of laws that mandate affirmative actions. Therefore,
enforcing equal distribution and redistribution measures may require the enactment of affirmative
action legislation or constitutional amendment to include relevant affirmative action provisions.
The overall objective here is to improve or correct a systemic gender and class imbalance.
Additionally, substantive changes could be made through amendments and repeals. These
changes could have a positive impact on the disadvantaged and marginalized, in both the private
and public spheres. This chapter seeks to apply the substantive equality model to the discriminatory
problems identified in Chapter Two. It will demonstrate how substantive equality doctrine and the
various standard of review could be applied in resolving cases.
A. Unequal treatment in civil and customary marriages
Women married in civil and customary unions are treated differently under the two legal
systems. Civil married wives have more rights than those in the customary setting. While this may
not be a gender equality issue when women in the customary legal system get different treatment
and rules, women get hurt, and this is a violation of their rights.
Liberia has two legal systems, customary and statutory; and three kinds of marriages:
civil/statutory, customary and presumptive marriage. The disparity between the marriages is vast.
These marriages treat the issues of divorce, contract, and inheritance differently. In some instances,
males are favored above females, in others, statutory married women are treated favorably as
compared to customary married women. The painful reality compounds unfairness that marriage
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presumption has received less attention and legal interpretation because of the ambiguity of the
statute.
As discussed in Chapter Two, civil marriage limits the husband to only one wife, the wife
can contract in her name, and her contracts are not binding on her husband nor are his binding on
her. She can divorce as a matter of statutory right as provided in Chapter 8 Sub-Section 8.1 (a),
(b), (c) and (d) of the Liberian Domestic Relations Law.410 Divorce under this provision allows
statutory wives to participate in the distribution of property. On the contrary, customary marriage
allows for multiple wives and holds that none of the wives can contract in her name except with
her husband’s consent. As to inheritance, the disparity exists in the right to inherit from the
husband. Unlike statutory marriage that gives one-third of the husband’s estate outright to the
single wife, customary marriage provides that all the wives are entitled to the same one-third dower
rights upon the death of their husband. Customary law does not provide for divorce. Therefore, a
customary woman’s legal rights are undetermined upon the termination of a marital relationship.
Generally, juxtaposing problems identifies from the two forms of marriage might not count
as gender discrimination. However, they are problems that hurt women and therefore they must be
addressed. The issue of customary wife needing the consent of her husband to contract is facially
discriminatory and does not require a substantive analysis, expect that the law can be amended or
repealed through positive engagement by women to their legislators. Second, customary law does

Domestic Relations Law, 9 LIBERIAN CODE OF LAWS REVISED § 8.1 (1973). “An action of divorce may
be maintained by a husband or wife to procure a judgement divorcing the parties and dissolving the marriage on any
of the following grounds: (a) The cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant such that the conduct
of the defendant makes the continued cohabitation as husband and wife dangerous to the physical or mental wellbeing of the plaintiff. (b) The desertion of the plaintiff by the defendant for a period of one or more years, provided
that it is alleged and proved that the plaintiff has without avail endeavored to induce the defendant to return to marital
duties. Desertion means the willful and unjustified abandonment of a spouse by the other. (c) The commission of an
act of adultery by the defendant after the marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant. And (d) where as a result of
incompatibility of temper the defendant is so extremely quarrelsome and intolerably pugnacious to the plaintiff that
life together between the plaintiff and the defendant becomes dangerous to the plaintiff.”
410
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not have a provision for divorce. Substantive equality is necessary in this case because of an
omission in the law. Therefore, one of two things could happen. First, women in the customary
setting could demand enactment of a divorce law because their fundamental rights to freedom and
liberty are violated. Second, they could require that the same divorce law that applies to civil
marriage be applied to them also.
1. Dower rights for Customary Wives
Under the Equal Rights of Customary Marriage Law of 1998 [2003], the wife and husband
are entitled to one-third of each other’s personal and real property upon death; regardless of
whether either party contributed to the acquisition of the property.411 However, the one-third right
does not take into consideration whether a man marries one or multiple wives. In general, all wives
are entitled to one-third dower rights and the remaining two-thirds goes to the children,
rationalizing that the children of the marriage are being treated equally.412 While the law may seem
facially neutral at least as applies to the children, it has a disparate impact on customary wives.
Customary husbands have the right to take as many wives as they desire.
These issues are cardinal to how a judge proceeds with and opines on cases, in that, if there
are no set methods of distribution, the judge only uses his or her discretion as to who gets what.
Some wives could be disadvantaged by the blanket distribution or by judges who use their
discretion. The issue of discretion must be revisited because, when discretion is not defined, it can
be abused. Most often, judges seem to have absolute discretion due to the lack of defined
discretionary authority. The court itself has not set limits to discretion and the framework in which
this power can or cannot be exercised, apparently, because customary laws are and have been a
very challenging issue for the court.
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Equal Rights of the Customary Marriage Law of 1998 § 2.3—Decedents Estates Law, 8 LIBERIAN CODE
(1972).
412
Id. at § 3.2.
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For instance, in traditional marriage, there is seniority among the wives. Most of the time,
the senior wife is the first wife, and she spends a more extended period with the husband. The
senior wife is seen as the leader of all the other wives and is most respected because of this position.
Commonly, she and the husband acquire most of their property and dowry from the subsequent
wives. Given that scenario, it seems unjust for this one-third property right to be applied equally
to all the wives, including those that the husband may have married just before his demise.
However, no wife should be denied benefiting from property upon the death of her spouse
simply because she did not directly contribute towards its acquisition. There may have been ways
that she contributed other than monetary means attached. For example, she could have assisted in
making farms to feed the family or she may have been the family’s cook, and at the same time,
responsible for caregiving and child rearing. That said, to promote justice and fairness, there must
be a set standard of distribution that will consider the duration of stay in the marriage, and other
contributions made to the family’s wellbeing.
Whether or not a wife’s contribution should be considered in the determination of
distribution may be a delicate issue because it could be difficult to measure contributions. There
are many ways a wife can contribute to the marriage. Additionally, there must be a defined standard
to measure contribution, which may be a challenge in the customary setting. Further, using input
as a measure to determine who gets what upon the death of a spouse could betray the very essence
of a marriage, which is love, sharing, and caring.
The difficulty in determining how property is distributed in customary marriage as
compared to statutory marriage speaks to the imbalance between the two. Principally, substantive
equality measures would be employed to determine that the law is facially neutral, but has a
disparate impact on customary wives. It would further demonstrate that though there is no apparent
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differentiation between the two marriages based on the perceived notion that the one-third property
right is equal treatment; but one-third distribution to multiple wives is disadvantageous.
Substantive equality would also investigate the impact the law had and continues to have on
customary wives and their subjection to family influence and control. Thus, a substantive equality
claim could be pivotal in the following ways: (1) amending the current law to include methods of
distribution; (2) determining whether the one-third distribution to multiple wives is just; and (3)
demanding that the state ensures there is equal property rights distribution in both statutory and
customary marriages, at least to the extent that both receive equal concern and respect and not
necessarily equal treatment.
The distribution of property in customary marriage has usually been left to family
members, which is generally not beneficial to the wife and children because there is no inquiry
into (a) the duration of each wife in the marriage, (b) a wife’s contribution to the marriage, or (c)
the number of widows. The property rights under discussion do not include communal property.
Further, under the substantive equality model, this law as is would be unconstitutional as it would
be considered unfair, lacking moral conscience, and irrational. Any claim would be subjected to a
proportionality review.
The substantive equality model would demand equitable distribution of property to the
decedent’s wives and children if the marriage was polygamous. Equitable distribution could have
a set of criteria, such as length of stay, number children, and, perhaps, contribution to the marriage.
As stated earlier, contribution may not be a reasonable basis because it is difficult to quantify. On
the other hand, if the marriage was monogamous, it should have the same rights as in civil marriage
since the statute under discussion references that the remaining property after distribution to spouse
and children should be distributed according to the Decedents Estates Law.
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There is continuous debate regarding the advantages of polygamous marriage and whether
it should be abolished, and this dissertation questions whether substantive equality would be
required to abolish polygamy. Theoretically, substantive equality ameliorates historical advantage,
and polygamy falls within that category because the practice has favored men over women for
many years. Substantive equality would consider the age-old disparity between customary and
statutory marriages and remedy the discrimination by addressing the unfair treatment meted out to
customary wives. It would also examine how customary wives have been adversely impacted by
such discrimination. For example, the issue of how difficult it is to distribute the one-third inherited
property among multiple wives without any defined standard vis-à-vis statutory wives having a
more defined standard of distribution. Additionally, the property in most instances is not
distributed by law, but at the discretion of family members. Although substantive equality is most
suitable to address this issue, its accomplishment could prove difficult because of cultural and
traditional norms that are entrenched within the practice of polygamy.
There is no doubt in the use of substantive equality model, but the difficulty in using it is
that it recognizes culture and tradition while, at the same time, trying to overcome the problems of
patriarchy and the suppression of women that are integral components of culture and tradition.
Nonetheless, the upside is that the model ultimately looks beyond all these problems and seeks to
foster the dignity of human beings. Therefore, courts should recognize the claims of multiple
wives’ rights to equitable distribution of their deceased husband’s property.
The issue of inheritance in the context of comparison with civil marriage is facially neutral,
but has a disparate impact on women in the customary setting. It is a clear case of violation of
equality rights. The court, in determining this question, will want to know the following: (1)
whether the lack of inheritance rights infringe on the rights of women in customary marriages, (2)
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whether the infringement is unfair, and (3) whether the unfair infringement is justified. The court
will then use the proportionality standard of review to address the violation.
2. Wife’s control over her property
A customarily-married woman has exclusive right over her property “acquired or owned
before or during the marriage.” She also has the right to do business in her name under the law,413
but then, that same law contradicts itself immediately by stating that she can only contract with
her husband’s consent,414 which is repugnant to the Constitution of Liberia that guarantees the
right to contract.415 Under civil marriage, the wife can contract and do business in her name without
the consent of her husband.416 In short, when the marriages are juxtaposed on the issue of contract,
statutory marriage is again more advantageous.
When the right to contract is reviewed only under customary law, facial discrimination
exists because wives are required to get the consent of their husbands and not the reverse. It does
not require a substantive equality claim because it is direct discrimination. This provision allows
the husband to contract without the permission of his wives, but not the other way around. In
essence, if a husband does not consent, a wife cannot contract. A formal equality model can easily
fix this claim either by amending the provision or repealing it.
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Equal Rights of the Customary Marriage Law of 1998 § 2.6—Decedents Estates Law, 8 LIBERIAN CODE
(1972); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA OF 1986, art. 23. “The property which a
person possesses at the time of marriage or which may afterwards be acquired as a result of one’s own labors shall
not be held for or otherwise applied to the liquidation of the debts or other obligations of the spouse, whether
contracted before or after marriage; nor shall the property which by law is to be secured to a man or a woman be
alienated or be controlled by that person’s spouse save by free and voluntary consent.”
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OF LAWS REVISED (1972).
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On the other hand, if the government intent is to preserve culture and tradition by promoting
such a law, then the government is promoting patriarchy. Patriarchy is one of the direct mediums
through which women have been oppressed and disadvantaged. Additionally, while this law treats
women in the civil and customary system differently, it also subjects women to the whims and
caprices of men, which is discriminatory on its face. Normative equality could help to resolve this
problem since it addresses discrimination when people are differently situated, but it needs to be
supplemented by substantive attention to the way that patriarchy preserves structural inequalities.
Substantive equality can also adequately remedy facially discriminatory laws.
A patriarchal society is a male-dominated society in which men have authority over
women. This is an ideal society for the promotion of discrimination and marginalization. Liberia
is known to be a male-dominated society in which males are seen in almost all sectors of society.
In the past, male preference was visible in homes, school, and community participation. The
consequence is still visible today in public offices and elected positions.
For example, it was a cutting-edge historical event for a woman to be elected president.
Further, the arrangement of the roles of men and women in society is formal employment for men
and housekeeping for women. The court could strike a claim raised in this instance as irrational
and not promoting any rational governmental interest as this law is counter-productive to women.
Substantive equality would consider historical disadvantages encountered by women and demand
the government to act to ameliorate the disadvantage. It would further allow the court to determine
the irrationality and unreasonableness of the statute and show any disconnect between the
legislation and the object that it tries to promote, thereby allowing courts to strike down the
irrational laws.
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3. Widow’s liberty after husband’s death.
A customary wife has the discretion to either leave or remain in the home upon the death
of her husband. If she chooses the former, it deprives her of her legitimate inheritance right to her
husband’s property. If she decides to stay, she becomes the subject of family rule and control. 417
On the other hand, she may remarry. If she marries any person other than a family member, she
will have to leave her home and, consequently, forfeit all rights to her decedent husband’s property.
This law applies whether the marriage involved one or multiple wives.
Again, this law is not only discriminatory on its face, but it is also unequivocally
disadvantageous to women and deprives women in the customary legal system of their right to
inherit from their husbands, as well as freely choose how to live the rest of their lives after the
death of their spouse. Unlike women under customary marriage, civil married wives are entitled
to their marital home as a matter of right because of the right of survivorship. Therefore, three
basic issues arise: (1) Whether a customary widow is entitled to her marital home as a matter of
right? (2) Whether the family of a deceased husband in the customary system has an explicit right
to control the decedent’s property upon his death? (3) Whether it is legal for a customary wife to
forfeit property rights if she remarries a man of her choice after the death of her husband?
These three cardinal issues could raise substantive equality claims. A substantive equality
claim, for example, could stem from the idea that this legislation mirrors social stereotypes that
have the potential of affecting the personal characteristics of an individual, altering a person’s
lifestyle, or even interfering with their core values. The argument here is that the family of a
deceased spouse has control over the property of the deceased though they may not have assisted
or contributed to its acquisition. The family’s control and subjection of a widow are demeaning

417

Brown v. Bormor, [1965] 16 L.L.R. 227, 239 (Liber.).

149

and is a violation of basic human rights. Moreover, for the law to require the widow to remain in
her marital home without remarrying—unless she marries someone from her husband’s family—
is interference with her privacy and fundamental rights to choose.
It is normal in customary marriage for a 60-year-old man to marry a 25-year-old woman.
If the man dies at 70, the woman would be only 35 years old. In that case, the law would suggest
that a 35-year-old woman remain single for the rest of her life, marry one of her deceased
husband’s family members, or, if she marries outside of her deceased husband’s family, forfeit her
10 years of labor and property acquired during the marriage.
Another element to this puzzle is the responsibility of the state to remedy this form of
discrimination by either repealing or replacing the law to make the two marriages comparable on
the issue of losing inheritance rights by remarrying or leaving. Customary wives should have the
same rights as civil wives when it comes to owning property with their husbands in its entirety and
gaining the right of survivorship.
Further, the government should design programs and policies that reduce male dominance
in customary settings, while maintaining culture and tradition. For example, the government could
design programs that would give women the opportunity to contribute financially towards the
family in a substantive manner. The more often that men encounter women at the same table
discussing issues that affect their communities and making important decisions, the more likely
they will be in recognizing women’s strengths and knowing that they have equally valuable
contributions, and that they were not created solely for subjection and control by men.
4. The absence of a divorce provision
The Equal Rights Marriage Law does not have a provision for divorce, but, in practice, a
husband can return his wife to her parents if he wishes to terminate the relationship. The absence
of this legal remedy to terminate a marital relationship in customary marriage is a major omission
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in the law and points to discriminatory practices embedded in customary law that has consistently
suppressed women. In the past, a man could recover dowry paid to his bride’s family if he wanted
to terminate the relationship or if she did something that was degrading, such as infidelity.
Similarly, he can return the woman to her family when he chooses, and that would serve as a final
divorce decree.
Progress has been made on this issue. Currently, the law prohibits the recovery of dowry;
and dowry recovery is a first-degree felony.418 However, there is still the need for a clear law that
speaks to the issue of divorce. It is worth noting, though, that there are provisions that seem like
grounds for divorce, but fall short of articulating such a view in a definitive manner. For example,
Section 2.5 states: “Every customary husband shall respect his wife’s Human rights; any violation
of this section shall entitle the wife to seek redress in a court of law.”419 A wife’s human rights
should encapsulate her right to terminate a relationship when her safety is at risk.
The lack of divorce law prohibits a customary wife from exercising her human rights to
leave a relationship that she no longer wants. The lack of a divorce provision is an omission in the
law. Notwithstanding, it is gender discriminatory because, in practice, there is a method of divorce
available to men. This issue can be handled in one of two ways: (1) as a facially discriminatory
claim since formal equality standards could resolve this issue. The more favorable option could be
(2) a substantive equality claim that demands the government provide a means for divorce. The
government’s response could be to either enact a divorce law or to apply the current divorce laws
to both customary and statutory marriages.
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Equal Rights of the Customary Marriage Law of 1998 § 2.2—Decedents Estates Law, 8 LIBERIAN CODE
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B. Marriage Presumption
The marriage presumption doctrine is the same as common-law marriage; it is a form of
marriage conferred on couples based on their conduct. This form of marriage gets its credibility
from the endorsement of family, friends, and the community. The validity of marriage presumption
is usually determined through a judicial decision. Marriage presumption grants legal marital status
to cohabitants who live together as husband and wife. These cohabitants ascribe marital status
upon themselves, although their union has never been solemnized or licensed according to law.
Typical factors that motivate couples to see themselves as married are procreation and rearing of
children, common last name, common investment, listing each other as beneficiary on employment
documents and real property, and comingling of finances.
Section 25.3 of the Liberian Civil Procedure Law under the caption Marriage, gives
authority to marriage presumption. It states that “Persons who live together as husband and wife
and hold themselves out as such are presumed to be married.”420 The basic problem with this
statute is that it is ambiguous. For example, it does not state what holding out means, how long the
couples should hold out, whether the presumption is absolute or rebuttable, or what the standards
of proof are for a couple to be presumed married. These are very critical limitations to the
provision, which has disadvantaged those that sought, or wanted to seek, remedy under the law.
Because of these ambiguities, the court finds it difficult to opine on the issue.
As with the previous problems discussed, a substantive equality claim would resolve this
problem. Although the law is not facially discriminatory, no party can affirmatively claim that the
law discriminates against them. Therefore, it is safe to say that this is a facially neutral law that
has disparate impact on women for the following reasons: (1) children born in this relationship are
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illegitimate and, therefore, do not have automatic inheritance rights; (2) mothers have to petition
for paternity, and paternity only establishes support obligation, not inheritance rights; (3) there are
no property rights for women; (4) when the man dies, the relationship could be deemed by
interested parties, such as the man’s family, as illicit; and (5) there is a significant amount of
insecurity and uncertainty for women, but not for men.
Given the above the above reasons, a substantive equality disparate impact claim could be
raised. To resolve this problem through substantive equality, claimants can demand an amendment
of the law to give adequate definition to “holding out,” the time duration of the marriage, rebuttal,
and standard of proof. When the law is defined, establishing marriage under the law will be
standardized for both the applicant and the court.
C. Custody
The issue of custody will be discussed from the perspectives of both statutory and
customary legal systems without necessarily comparing the two, but pointing out how women in
both legal systems have been affected by the law.
Under the statutory legal system, married couples are jointly responsible for the care,
nurture, education, and welfare of their minor children while they are living together. When they
separate, the father becomes the primary custodian of any child or children of the marriage. The
exception is when the father is determined to be unfit. When unfitness of the father is determined,
the mother has competing rights for the custody of the child with other petitioners. The court then
uses its discretion to award custody.421

Domestic Relations Law, 9 LIBERIAN CODE OF LAWS REVISED § 4.1 (1973). “A married woman is a joint
natural guardian with her husband of the minor children of their marriage while they are living together and maintain
one household. Each parent shall be equally charged with their care, nurture, welfare, and education. When such parent
are living in a state of separation, the father shall be the custodian of the minor children of the marriage as against the
claim of any person whomever; but if he is unable or for any other reasons he fails or neglects to perform such duties,
upon petition to a circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus or other appropriate relief and a showing in the proceedings
thereon of such inability, moral unfitness or failure on the part of the father, the minor children of the marriage shall
421
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On the other hand, in the customary legal system, custody of children is with the surviving
spouse.422 The family of the decedent spouse does not have competing rights to custody with the
mother.423 The problem here is that, since divorce is not recognized in customary marriage, at least
as to procedure, there is uncertainty as to what happens when a couple separates. Therefore, the
issue of who takes custody of the children if the couple separates seems to be in limbo. In practice,
the husband usually takes custody of the children because of the prevalence of male dominance in
traditional and cultural settings.
The issues raised are equal treatment since there is no rational basis to prefer fathers to
mothers in custody matters. These claims can be remedied through amendments to the law in order
to provide for equal custody rights to both parents. It is important to note that in the Liberian
setting, substantive equality can be used to remedy this discrimination, although other forms of
equality models—such as formal equality—can also be used to address this issue. Further, the
court can strike the current legislation as facially discriminatory or expand the definition of the
law. For example, the court could decide that, when custody is an issue, the fitness of both parents
should be determined relative to the best interests of the child. Some factors that could be
considered in this determination would be establishing which parent is the primary caregiver, each
parent’s financial standing, and whether either parent has a history of violence or criminal activity.
Although this issue can be resolved using more than one equality model, the most appropriate
solution would be to amend the statute on custody to include equal custody rights for both parents
based on standardized guidelines.

be entrusted to the mother or some other person who is capable of performing such duties. If the father is dead or
absent, the mother shall have custody of the minor children of their marriage unless it is established that she is unable
or unfit or failing to perform her duties toward them.”
422
Equal Rights of the Customary Marriage Law of 1998 § 3.7—Decedents Estates Law, 8 LIBERIAN CODE
OF LAWS REVISED (1972).
423
Id.
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In addition to amendments and repeals, the courts could review the equal treatment claim
based on the equal protection clause. Mothers under civil marriage could claim that awarding
custody to fathers by the statute is arbitrary since there is no legitimate basis for the preference.
The court could use the rational basis level of scrutiny to review whether the objective of the statute
is rationally related to any governmental interest. Although, under the rational basis, there would
be “a strong presumption of constitutionality,” but the statute could be invalidated if there is no
reasonable basis for unequal treatment or if the treatment is arbitrary.424
On the other hand, since the customary law does not provide for divorce, it is undetermined
how custody matters would be handled. In the absence of laws to address divorce, one of three
things could happen: (1) the court could order the government to provide ways in which divorce
issue is remedied in a customary marriage, and the government, in turn, could enact laws to address
the issue; (2) there could be an assumption that statutory custody laws also apply to the customary
setting since there is an effort to harmonize both. In that way, substantive equality will be
applicable in both legal systems; and (3) customary married women could demand the government
to enact a law that remedies the issue. Even if this is done, it does not remove the unequal treatment
within the statutory custody rule. Therefore, the statutory custody law must be amended in a
gender-neutral manner to benefit both parents.
D. Illegitimacy
Children born out of wedlock are illegitimate and do not have automatic rights to
inheritance. Children born to cohabitating parents are also illegitimate regardless of whether the
couple considers themselves to be married. The statute on marriage presumption, as stated earlier,
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is ambiguous. Therefore, establishing marriage is difficult. The ambiguity of the statue raises
controversial legal questions, and the statue has an adverse impact on children.
Children born under civil and customary marriages are considered legitimate and have
clear parity of rights. Conversely, a child born to unmarried parents is considered illegitimate. The
term used to describe children born out of wedlock is “bastard,” which is derogatory. The law on
legitimation states that “the natural father must make an application to the court and then the child
will become the legitimate child of the applicant as though the child were born in lawful
wedlock.”425 A father’s failure to go through the process of legitimation renders the child
illegitimate and results in the child not being entitled to an automatic inheritance right. The child
born in a presumed marriage experiences negative treatment when compared to children in
customary and civil marriage.
The determination of a child’s legal status by only one parent is unfair. Placing the legal
status of a child purely in the hands of the father is allowing the father to benefit from his wrong.
That aside, a child should not suffer because of his or her parents’ action or inaction. Depriving a
child of inheritance because he or she was born out of wedlock is discrimination based on the
condition at birth. A child’s birth status should not determine his or her rights to inheritance. The
right to inherit should be automatic and not contingent on parents’ marital status. Children as a
class should not be differentiated because of the way they were born since their birth was not based
on their choice. Whether a child is born in or out of wedlock should not be a determinant of their
right to inherit.
The law favors the father over the mother, which is facially gender discriminatory. To the
extent that the law is facially discriminatory, formal equality would apply and could be resolved
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by legislature amending or repealing the facially discriminatory legislation. However, there is a
disparate impact component that connects to the underlying structural inequality that women
experience. That is the burden of caring that is shifted to women for deprived children and the
social stigma for both mother and child associated with illegitimacy. This claim raises the issue of
basic violation of human dignity because it treats certain children as inferior to others, which could
trigger a normative claim.
Nonetheless, substantive equality can also remedy this peril. It resolves the problem of
disparate impact on women. The court could use the same disparate analysis mentioned earlier to
resolve this matter.
E. The absence of a dedicated and stand-alone Domestic Violence Law
Domestic violence is an issue that cuts across civil marriage, customary marriage, and
marriage presumption. Currently, this issue is minimally addressed by the Penal law and the
Children’s Bill. There is no stand-alone domestic violence law in Liberia. Domestic violence
committed against children is treated as a first-degree misdemeanor, that is, when the duty of care,
protection, and support is breached. On the other hand, when committed against adults, it is
regarded as endangering behavior or threats.
Domestic violence claims can also be in the form of aggravated assault or simple assault.
The Penal law investigates physical abuse and is unclear on how to remedy psychological, sexual,
and economic abuse, which are also important to human well-being and dignity. The Children’s
Bill addresses sexual abuse and exploitation, prostitution, and pornography. The vagueness of the
provisions leaves little room for application and enforcement.
There is a need to pass legislation specifically covering such a situation. Both normative
equality and substantive equality claims can be utilized, to remedy the issue of the lack of defined
stand-alone domestic violence law. Normative because the absence of law weighs on the dignity
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of the affected class, and substantive because citizens can petition the court to request the
legislature to pass a law that addresses the issue. While this may be an assertion of positive rights,
the state can also take affirmative action to ensure that their rights to have domestic violence laws
are granted.
F. Conclusion
There are factors which make substantive equality model suitable for Liberia, although
other models of equality could also be utilized. These factors are cultural and traditional influences,
historical, political norms/culture, low literacy rate which speaks to the poor understanding of the
role of the court. These factors have perpetuated age-old male dominance and the suppression of
females, which has propelled the research of four models of equality, in a bid to find an appropriate
model that will curtail or eradicate discrimination in Liberia.
Based on this research, this dissertation espouses that formal equality does not fit the
Liberian setting because it divides people into categories without stating how these classifications
were made. Also, it perpetuates discrimination by treating likes alike and rendering different
treatment to those outside the like classification. Discriminatory legislation is substantiated, further
widening the social gap. For example, the disparity of treatment between civil and customary
marriages which has already been expounded could form a legitimate basis for male supremacy
and validation of cultural and traditional practices that have long subordinated women.
On the same note, the rational connection model as is, will encourage discriminative
statues and diminish the opportunity for disadvantaged classes, based on legislative classification
and policy. Poignant is the fact that it gives a lot of power to the executive branch of government
that arguably already has excessive power. Notwithstanding these demerits, it is important to note
that there should always be a salient connection between legislative classification and legislative
policy; that connection should not be arbitrary but serve a legitimate purpose. Governmental
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interest should not be politically motivated but geared towards the interest of the governed, since
the legislature that makes the law is the representative of the people. In that way, it establishes a
genuine governmental interest that can be candidly proven in a competent court. The goal is to
have sound legislation that protects every citizen and at the same time equip government with the
requisite tool to prosecute violators and demand justice from the court.
Conversely, the nonexistence of a rational nexus between the legislative classification and
legislative policy should defeat any governmental interest in a competent court. For example, in a
civil marriage, both parents are obligated by law for the care, nurture, and welfare of a child during
the marriage, but upon divorce, the father becomes the paramount custodian of the child by law.
What interest does such a law seek to protect or promote without inquiry into the fitness of each
parent? Courts should have the capacity to strike laws based on discrimination and irrationality.
When governments seek to prove the court sustains a candid governmental interest, then justice is
served in the process.
The normative model will be useful to Liberia in that morality and legal reasoning can be
used to arrive at non-discriminatory decisions, especially in customary courts that are hugely
influenced by cultural and traditional practices. Additionally, the doctrine of comparative rights
can also be employed to bring about equal treatment based on particular circumstances. For
example, equality of marriage in customary and civil legal systems. Comparative rights are
equalizing the treatment of differently situated people, creating some relationship in treatment by
providing equal treatment to differently situated people, or giving preferential treatment to a group
of people to have some form of equality.426 The form of equality can be achieved through some
form of the affirmative action plan.
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The normative model can also be utilized by creating a system where widows are accorded
the same rights to inherit regardless of the form of marriage. Comparatively, women would enjoy
the same right even though they may be differently situated regarding legal jurisdictions. On the
same note, customary wives could be entitled to contracting in their names without the consent of
their husbands, thereby promoting equal treatment between men and women.
Given the above analysis, the historical, social, economic, and political perspective of
inequality issues in Liberia must be critically examined to make an informed decision on
determining which standard of equality is the most suitable for Liberia. Historically, males are
presumed the breadwinners and female the caregivers. It underpins the patriarchal way the laws
are written and how the courts have interpreted the laws. Therefore, a normative equality model is
relevant to consider how society has created a modus operandi where males are preferred over
their female counterparts. The normative model would give a realistic profile of the country,
considering morality and legal reasoning to derive comparative rights and separate rights to
treatment.
In my view, the essence of an equality model is not to treat similarly situated people alike
or differently situated dissimilarly because people’s differences and similarities could be a factor
of external elements that are controlled by societal factors or simply uncontrollable. Therefore,
equality models should meet the practical needs of their beneficiaries, having the ability to be
measured and consisting of a proper standard of review. That is why the substantive equality
model, which has affirmative actions embedded, will assist the eradication inequality in Liberia.
Also, substantive equality will help create the flexibility for the government to design programs
and policies that will improve the lives of citizens. It will help reduce the presence of laws that
disadvantage and discriminate citizens, and where there are omissions in the law, the citizens can
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petition the court to enact the necessary law. Courts, on the other hand, can remedy claims of
facially discriminatory laws and facially neutral laws.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: RECOMMENDATIONS
The success of an equality model that could reduce gender inequality in Liberia would
require statutory and Constitutional amendments. The process of statutory amendment is much
easier, and the likelihood that a legislature will or can amend a statute is more foreseeable. A
constitutional amendment is a more complex issue. However, there are ways to address some
discriminatory issues without necessarily amending the constitution substantively. Affirmative
programs and policies could be utilized. This chapter suggests the need for statutory and
Constitutional amendments. It also recommends language for proposed draft constitutional and
statutory amendments.
Given the disparity in the two legal systems and the discriminatory laws, the issue could
be resolved through the following methods. First, by amending or, if necessary, repealing facially
discriminatory laws and facially neutral laws that have a disparate impact and enacting laws that
fully address such equality issues. Second, by drawing from the examples of other countries,
Liberia should have an equality model that would guide both claimants seeking remedy and the
courts in adjudicating cases. Administrative policies could detail actions to be taken that are
consistent with the law in order to eradicate or curtail gender inequality. The problem with this
method is that no constitutional provision mandates the government to do so; therefore, there is no
obligation. On the same note, the government, on its own, could decide to enact legislation and/or
design programs and policies that deal with inequality—as done in Sweden—but that would be
leaving the solution for the problem to chance.
As discussed in Chapter Five, the substantive model of equality is recommended for
Liberia. The effectiveness of the model depends, in part, on amending the equal protection clause
of the Constitution, which would serve as the foundation for legislating new laws, while
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simultaneously amending or repealing ineffective laws. This chapter contextualizes all the
previous chapters by recommending legislative and constitutional amendments to curtail the
gender inequality problems identified.
As established in Chapter Two, some of the laws are either facially discriminatory or
facially neutral, but have a disparate impact on certain groups. Additionally, there are cardinal
gender issues not effectively addressed by existing laws; an example is domestic violence. Such
omission disadvantages citizens and deprives them of an effective legal remedy. It is the
prerogative of a nation to enact laws that will benefit its citizens. For enacted laws to be utilized,
the laws must be clear and justiciable since ambiguous laws are subject to the discretion of the
court. Interpretations of laws should not be discretionary; they should be based on their clear
meaning and legislative intent.
This chapter further seeks to propose legislation that will curtail the problems identified in
Chapter Two, that is, unequal treatment between civil and customary marriages, marriage
presumption, custody, domestic violence, and illegitimacy. Equally, there must be a constitutional
amendment to expand the definition of the equal protection clause to permit affirmative action. It
is an important guarantee that empowers citizen to demand certain rights from their government,
while at the same time, accommodating the utilization of the model of equality in a court of
competent jurisdiction.
The proposed legislation and constitutional amendments are intended to redefine some of
the current domestic relation statutes and the equal protection clause, thereby increasing their
utility. The wordings of the proposed amendments to the equal protection clause mirror that of
South Africa, the US, and Canada. The amendment for the statutes is an expanded version of
recommendations made in my LLM thesis, “The Problems of Gender Inequality Raised by
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Unmarried Couples in Liberia.” Additionally, I will use the current proposed Domestic Violence
Draft Act as a template for my domestic violence legislation.427 A portion of the Massachusetts
Domestic Relations Statute will be adopted to strengthen the proposition.428
A. Constitutional: The Equal Protection Clause
Discriminatory laws are harmful to people. To remedy the harm, those laws must be
amended or repealed. The eradication of discriminatory constitutional provisions is possible
through amendments. In the case of Liberia, the Equal Protection Clause, which is a constitutional
provision, needs to be amended so that the necessary anticipated changes can be realized. The goal
of amending the constitution is to provide authority for legislative amendments and court opinions.
This section seeks to revise the equal protection clause as a basis for instituting the proposed
substantive equality model.
The expansion or amendment of the current equal protection clause is necessary because it
is the foundation upon which equality claims are generated in all sectors of society. The success
of the substantive equality model proposed in this dissertation can be buttressed by a modified
equal protection clause that would explicitly provide for affirmative action and give citizens the
right to petition the court to demand certain rights from their government. It would also allow the
government flexibility to design affirmative action programs and policies that benefit the
underprivileged. The current Equal Protection clause states that “All persons are equal before the
law and are therefore entitled to the equal protection of the Law.”429
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1. The Proposed Amendment to the Equal Protection Provision
For the effectiveness of the substantive equality model, the amended equal protection
provision should read as follows:
All persons are equal before and under the law and are therefore entitled to the
equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination based on race, sex,
gender, ethnic origin, age, religion, culture, language, sexual orientation, mental or
physical disability. (b) The State may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, marital, status,
ethnic or social origin, color, age, mental and physical disability, religion, and birth.
(c). The Legislature shall enact laws to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.
(d) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (b) is unfair
unless it is established that the discrimination is fair. (e) This section shall not
exclude any law or measures, activity or program designed to achieve the
advancement, protection and the amelioration of conditions of the marginalized and
disadvantaged individuals and groups to enable their full and equal enjoyment of
all rights and freedom.430
The expansion of the equal protection provision above creates the flexibility for affirmative
action legislation, policies, and programs. Subsections (a), (b), and (c) articulate the grounds on
which the state should not discriminate and creates the avenue where the state could use affirmative
action to ameliorate historical discrimination. It also obligates the government to fix inequality
and not only allow affirmative actions. Meanwhile, subsection (d) and (e) espouse that some
discriminations are fair while others are unfair and that the legislature should pass laws that prevent
unfair discrimination. The amended language of the equal protection article is borrowed from the
Canadian and South African constitutions. Subsections (a) and (b) are from Section 15(1) and (2)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom. Subsection (c) is a modified version of section
15(1) of the Canadian Charter and Article 9(3) of the South African Constitution. Subsections (d)
and (e) are taken from Article 9(4) and (5) of South Africa’s equality provision.
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The growth and development of a nation depends on the concerted effort of all its citizens.
Therefore, equal protection of all citizens should not be symbolic. That is why this chapter has
recommended the amendment of the equal protection article of the Constitution to allow
marginalized and disadvantaged citizens to raise direct equality claims. The amendment also
allows the government to design programs and policies that would ameliorate discrimination and
marginalization. This amendment would further strengthen the court with additional sources for
reviewing equal protection claims. Additionally, the substantive equality model that has been
proposed is not only meant for gender equality cases but for all inequality claims. This model,
along with all the recommended proposed legislation working together, could significantly reduce
willful inequality in Liberia.
B. Proposed Statutory Amendments
This section also seeks to amend statutes on marriage presumption, legitimation, custody,
and support. Although the domestic violence law has not been enacted, there is a need to improve
on the current draft to increase its utility. Further, apart from the expansion of the equal protection
clause and the domestic violence law, the other named statues will be revised based on research
conducted in Kenya, Sierra Leone, and New York.
1. Marriage Presumption
Section 25:3 of the Civil Procedure Law defines Marriage Presumption as “persons who
live together as husbands and wife and hold themselves out as such is presumed to be married.”
The law, as it is written, is ambiguous and leaves too much room for interpretation. Because of its
narrowness, courts have mostly used their discretionary power to interpret the law and opine on
cases of this nature. As a result, claimants have little, if any, firm legal support for their claims. In
most cases, the court will resort to the conduct of the parties, which is not a defined standard of
reviewing such a case. Given the above, this dissertation seeks to redefine and include cardinal
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terms such as holding out, time requirement, rebuttal, and standard of proof, which could aid in
the interpretation of the statute and adjudication of cases.
a. The Proposed Amendment on Marriage Presumption
1. The marriage shall be presumed under the following circumstances:
i. The male is at least 21 years old, and the female is at least 21 years old at the time
from which the presumed marriage is claimed;
ii. They have lived together as husband and wife openly and notoriously for a
continuous period of at least two years;
iii. They have held themselves out to most of their family, friends, community, and
employers as married;
iv. Neither party is already married under civil law or the customary law;
v. Other factors that may be examined in the determination of marriage are, joint
businesses, joint property ownership, comingling of finances and reasonable
expectation of marriage
2. They shall be deemed to be married as if it were under civil marriage law notwithstanding
that they may not have performed the appropriate ceremony as provided by civil marriage
laws.
3. The burden of proving presumed marriage is upon the party alleging marriage and that
party must prove marriage by clear and convincing evidence. Marriage presumption is
rebuttable for incapacity to marry for reasons other than age or marriage
The amendment of the Presumed Marriage statute will help applicants and the courts to get
a remedy and decide cases, respectively, with much greater ease. The amendment also posits that
common law marriage is considered a form of civil marriage because it is provided under the civil
procedure law and because it does not follow a specific traditional norm of any locality. Further,
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common law marriage can be proven based on judicial decision and, since it gets its authority from
a civil statute, it can be presumed that it was meant to be under civil and not customary law.
2. Legitimation
When a child is born out of wedlock, in some instances—even out of Liberia—the issues
of legitimacy, support, and custody become a problem upon dissolution of the relationship. For
example, in Kenya, children born out of wedlock are illegitimate and can inherit from the mother
only, unless paternity is established.
In Liberia, paternity does not automatically legitimize a child. Parentage is established for
determining support obligation, but it gives no legal right relative to property. Illegitimacy causes
children to be deprived of inheritance from their fathers. Additionally, it gives the father the option
to decide which of his children he wants to benefit from his estate. It also promotes unequal
treatment of children, which could develop into a family feud.
Further, determining paternity separately from legitimation is an additional burden on the
court, the mother, and the child. Liberia could expand its laws on paternity to denote that, once
paternity is established or recognized, the child automatically becomes legitimate. This sort of law
abolishes discriminatory language such as “bastard” and “lack of inheritable blood” used to
describe children born out of wedlock.
There are strong actions Liberia can take. For example, since children do not ask parents
how they should be born, they should not be deprived of inherence once they are born just because
of the parents’ legal status. To avoid burdening the court, once paternity is established, the child
should be viewed as legitimate. The process of establishing paternity and legitimizing a child
should be equally available to parents of both genders. The propositions that follow elucidate these
steps.

168

a. PROPOSED AMENDMENT ON LEGITIMATION AND PATERNITY LAWS
I. Definition
a. Legitimation means the act or process of authoritatively declaring a person legitimate,
especially a child whose parentage has been unclear.
II. A child born out of wedlock is deemed illegitimate and can be legitimate under the following
circumstances:
a. When the parents subsequently intermarry, except where parental rights are terminated
before it, such child shall become legitimate and shall become for all purposes the
legitimate child of both parents;
b. Once paternity is established, the child is deemed legitimate as though born in a valid
marriage.
III. Paternity may be established by:
a. A father’s name on a child’s birth certificate with the father knowledge and consent;
b. Public acknowledgment by the father
c. Where paternity is contested, either parent shall have the right to apply to the court to
determine paternity of the child
This proposed amendment to the legitimation law is intended to allow children born out of
wedlock to inherit from their fathers, as though they were born in wedlock. It also erases the
possibility of discrimination based on birth. Additionally, the responsibility of care and support of
an illegitimate child will not rest on the mother alone because she can petition the court to declare
the rights of her child to inherit from his or her father.
3.Custody
As a rule in Liberia, mothers are the primary custodians of illegitimate children. Fathers
are the custodians of legitimate children upon termination of a marital relationship and those to
whom paternity has been established. There is no explanation as to what factors constitute the basis
of custody decisions, but, as the law is written, the gender of the parents plays a vital role.
However, the court should exercise caution in using the gender of the parents to grant custody.
The gender of a parent could be necessary when the child is of tender age or if the parent is the
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primary caregiver. If a father is given custody of a three months old breastfeeding baby just
because the statute says so, the best interest of the child is not achieved. Is it better to wean the
child because the father, according to the law, is the primary custodian or should the health and
nutrition of the child be the primary concern? The law on custody is gender-biased and should be
completely repealed or amended to be gender neutral.
Custody should not be based solely on the gender of the parent, but the best interest of the
child. The following factors play an important role in determining a child’s best interest: (1) the
child’s health and safety; (2) need for continuing care and control; (3) age of the child; (4) the
primary caregiver; (4) interaction and interrelationship of child and parents; (5) the need for
stability, and the child’s adjustment to school, home, and community; (6) the choice of the child,
contingent on the child’s age and maturity; and (7) any history of abuse and violence.431
Custody decisions should not be blanket decisions where it is either the mother or the
father that takes custody of the child. Custody should be adjudged based on the capacities of the
parents, and legal and physical custody should be granted appropriately. A parent could be fit to
have legal custody, but not physical custody. For example, a single father of a two-year-old that
has been unemployed for a protracted period may not be legally fit to have physical custody of his
child. In the same token, an unemployed mother who is an addict could be unfit for custody of an
illegitimate child. Legal custody is the authority to make a significant decision on a child’s behalf,
including decisions about education, religious training, and healthcare while physical custody is
the right to have the child live with the person awarded custody by the court.
a. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO CUSTODY LAW
Definitions:
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a. Custody means the care and control of a child.
b. Physical custody means the right to have the child live with the person awarded custody
by the court.
c. Legal custody means the authority to make significant decisions on a child’s behalf,
including decisions about education, religion, training, and healthcare.
d. Health means the quality, state, or condition of being sound or whole in body, mind, or
soul, especially freedom from pain and sickness.
II. The court shall award legal or physical custody of a child based on the best interest of the
child.
III. The court may award joint or shared custody based on the best interest of the child.
IV. In determining the best interest of the child, the Court should consider the following factors:
a. Health and safety of the child;
b. The need for continuous care and control of the child;
c. Interaction and interrelationship of the child and parents;
d. Need for stability;
e. The parent who has had primary care of the child;
f. Child’s adjustment to school, home, and community;
g. Relationship with siblings
h. History of abuse or violence; and
i. The child’s preference if the child is sufficiently mature.
j.

The gender of a parent is irrelevant to the custody award.

4. Support
In some African countries, the support obligation for illegitimate children is with the
mother unless the father acquires parental responsibility.432 At the same time, when marriage is
presumed, the support obligation is with both parents. Notwithstanding, in other countries, support
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obligation is on anyone who is legally liable for support.433 While in others, the father is
responsible for child support regardless of marital status. There is no discrimination between
illegitimate and legitimate children when it comes to the issue of support.434
In Liberia, the determination of support obligation of children born in and out of wedlock
is at the sole discretion of the court. However, support of a legitimate child is with both parents.
Generally, support obligation of the natural father is not enforceable when a child is born out of
wedlock, unless the father adopts or acknowledges the child in open court or with a written
acknowledgment before a Justice of the Peace or a notary public. Nonetheless, the court can make
temporary support determination based on the need of the mother or the child.435
Some countries use child support guidelines for determining support, and the court has the
discretion to modify support if applying the guidelines will produce an unjust or inappropriate
result.436 For example, support determination for children with special needs, such as mental or
physical disabilities cannot be the same as healthy children. The determination of support for such
children may be unfair if the standardized guidelines are used.
There are problems of inequality, biases, and inference of male supremacy associated with
some provisions of the Liberian support law. Those provisions confirm the age-old norms that
fathers are the breadwinners and head of the home and mothers are caregivers and house-keepers.
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As such, fathers are charged with the responsibility of family support. There is a glaring conflict
in the law because a mother must support her child when the child is illegitimate, but has no
obligation to do so when the child is legitimate. There is no legal justification for why the law is
written in this manner. Both parents should be responsible for the support of their children; the
determination of support should not be based on gender or legitimacy, but on the incomes of both
parents, except where a parent loses parental right.
Also, the support law for legitimate children is biased against men and stereotypes women
as non-income earners. It overlooks the fact that some mothers could have a higher income than
their spouses could. Therefore, the development of a standardized child support guideline would
establish a nationwide uniform system that is applicable to both males and females. The court may
still have to exercise its discretionary power when the guideline result proves unjust. For example,
in the case of children with special needs and parents’ earnings that are above the guideline’s
limits. Additionally, maintaining the same standard of living for children upon the separation of
their parents may require the court’s discretion.
The government must create agencies that will oversee and enforce the system to establish
a standardized system. The support guidelines should be set by one agency, and another agency
should be responsible for the enforcement to ensure transparency. For instance, the Ministry of
Gender or the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare could be responsible for setting the guideline
while the National Police Women and Children division could be responsible for enforcement.
a. PROPOSED AMENDMENT FOR SUPPORT
I. Definition
a. Child includes a stepchild, foster child, child born out of wedlock, or likely to be born out
of wedlock under age twenty-one, or a son or daughter twenty-one years of age or older
who is unable to maintain himself/herself based on mental and physical disability and is or
is likely to become a public charge.
b. Marital property means property acquired during the marriage.
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c. Quasi-marital property means all property real or personal wherever situated, acquired
before or after the date of this statute in either of the following ways:
i. By either spouse, while domiciled elsewhere which would have been community property
if the spouse who acquired the property had been domiciled in this country at the time of
its acquisition.
ii. In exchange for real or personal property, wherever situated, which would have been
marital property if the spouse who acquired the property so exchanged had been domiciled
in this country at the time of its acquisition.
d. Income refers to all earnings, including but not limited to the following: salaries, commissions,
wages, bonuses, rents, dividends, interests, trust income, and worker’s compensation benefits.
e. “Reference to married person including formerly married person” means: a reference of
“husband and wife,” “spouse,” or married person,” in a comparable term, including persons who
are lawfully married to each other, person who were previously lawfully married to each other
and persons the court declared to be married, as is appropriate under the circumstances of the
particular case.
f. Parent means the lawful father or mother of someone, that is, a biological father or mother, an
adoptive father or mother, or a person adjudicated a father through a paternity proceeding.
g. Estate means a person’s interests in land or other real property.
h. Support means an obligation on behalf of a child, spouse, or family.
II. This section shall be an appended to chapter five of the Domestic Relations Law.
a. The Division of Child Support Services is at this moment created within the Ministry of
Gender Children and Social Protection. The division shall administer all services and
perform all functions necessary to establish, collect, and distribute child support.
b. It is further determined that the Ministry of Gender establishes a standardized child support
guideline and the guideline should be administered by theWomen and Children division of
the National Police.
c. The National Police Women and Children Division is responsible for the enforcement of
this section.
III. Duty of parents
The father and mother of a child have an equal obligation to support their child in the manner
suitable to the child’s circumstances regardless of their marital status.
IV. Duration of support duty
a. Normally, the duty of support is up to the age of twenty-one
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b. The duty of support continues as to an unmarried child who has attained the age of twentyone, is a full-time student, and who is not self-supporting, until the time the child completes
college.
c. Nothing in this section limits a parent’s ability to agree to provide additional support or the
court’s power to inquire whether an agreement to provide additional support has been
made.
d. The father and mother have an equal responsibility to maintain, to the extent of their ability,
a child of whatever age who is incapacitated from earning a living and without enough
means.
5. Domestic Violence
As mentioned in Chapter Two, there is no domestic violence law in Liberia. Currently,
there is a draft domestic violence law that has not been enacted. This dissertation posits that the
draft law is inadequate to remedy domestic violence offenses. Therefore it is important to add other
provisions that will enhance its utility. For example, what happens to a victim of domestic violence
when a complaint has been filed, what should be the court’s immediate action, or, if an order has
been filed in another jurisdiction, is that order effective in another? What will be the rights of the
abused and what are the duties and powers of law enforcement officers? Provisions on temporary
orders, orders without notice, protection orders issued by another jurisdiction, and powers and
duties of law enforcement officers; notice of rights and rights of the abused when added will assist
the court in handling domestic violence, assist claimants in asserting their rights, and empower
law enforcement as to their power and rights.
a. Rights of the abused
A victim of domestic violence shall have the right to go to court and file a petition
requesting an order for protection from domestic abuse under this Act; such an order may include
the following. (1) An order restraining the abuser from further acts of abuse. (2) An order directing
the abuser to leave the victim’s household. (3) An order preventing the abuser from entering the
victim’s residence, school, business or place of work employment. (4) An order awarding the
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victim or the other parent temporary custody or visitation with any child or children. And (5) an
order directing the abuser to pay support to the victim and the minor children while the matter is
pending.437
b. Temporary Orders; Order without Notice
(1)Upon the filing of a complaint under this provision, the court may enter such temporary orders
as it deems necessary to protect a plaintiff from abuse; such relief shall not be contingent upon the
filing of a complaint about divorce, paternity or support action.
(2)If the plaintiff demonstrates a substantial likelihood of immediate damage or abuse, the court
may enter such temporary order without notice as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff from
abuse and shall immediately after that notify the defendant that the temporary order has been
issued. The court shall give the defendant an opportunity to be heard on the question of continuing
the temporary order and of granting other relief as requested by the plaintiff no later than ten days
after such order is entered.
(3)The notice shall be served to the defendant according to law.
(4) Failure on the part of the defendant to appear at such subsequent hearing shall be a basis for
the temporary orders to be continued in effect without further order of the court.438
c. Protection orders issued by another jurisdiction
(1)Any protection order issued by another jurisdiction shall be given full faith and credit
throughout the Republic of Liberia and enforced as if it were issued in such jurisdiction for as long
as the order is in effect in the issuing jurisdiction.
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Massachusetts: Title III Domestic Relations (Chapters 207-201) Chapter 209A Prevention of Abuse,
Remedies available through Order for Protection from Abuse ALMGL Ch. 209A. §§. 3
438
Id. at § 4 (discussing Temporary Orders, Order Without Notice).
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(2) A person entitled to protection under a protection order issued by another jurisdiction may file
such order in any court of competent jurisdiction throughout the bailiwick of Liberia. Such person
shall swear under oath in an affidavit, to the best of such person’s knowledge that such order is
presently in effect as written.
(3) A law enforcement officer may presume the validity of and enforce the protection order issued
by another jurisdiction which has been provided to the law enforcement officer by any source;
provided, however, that the officer is also provided with a statement by the person protected by
the order that such order remains in effect. Law enforcement officers may rely on such statement
by the person protected by such order.439
d. Powers and duties of law enforcement officers; Notice of rights.
Whenever any law enforcement officer has reason to believe that a family or a household
member has been abused or is in danger of abuse, such officer shall use all reasonable means to
prevent further abuse. The officer shall take the following actions:
(1) Remain in the scene of where the said abuse occurred or was in danger of occurring if he
has reason to believe that at least one of the parties involved would be in immediate
physical danger without the presence of the law enforcement officer.
(2) Assist the abused person in obtaining medical treatment necessitated by an assault, which
may include driving the victim to the hospital.
(3) Assist the abused person in locating and getting to a safe place; the officer shall consider
the victim’s preference in this regard and what is reasonable under the circumstances.
(4) Inform the victim that the abuser will be eligible for bail and may be promptly released,
and
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Id. at Chp. 209A §§ 5A. (discussing Protection order Issued by another jurisdiction)
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(5) Arrest any person a law officer witnesses committing or has probable cause to believe has
violated a temporary or permanent restraining order or judgment.
E. No law enforcement officer investigating an incident of domestic violence shall threaten,
suggest, or otherwise indicate the arrest of all parties to discourage a request for law
enforcement intervention by any party. 440
The proposed additions to the current draft domestic relation laws above are borrowed from the
Massachusetts Domestic Relation Statute.441 These additions are intended to buttress the draft act
proposing provisions that are important to the proper application and utilization of the act. It also
suggests the enforcement mechanism. It is important for the claimant, especially women, to report
domestic violence cases and prevent them from further abuse.

440

Id. at Chp. 209A §§. 6 (discussing Powers and Duties of Law Enforcement Officer; Notice of Rights)
Massachusetts: Title III Domestic Relations (Chapters 207-201) Chapter 209A Prevention of Abuse,
Remedies available through Order for Protection from Abuse ALMGL Ch. 209A.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION
Gender discrimination in Liberia is systemic; it has no boundary. It is seen in both the
public and private spheres. It dates beyond 1847 when Liberia gained its independence, when only
men could take part in politics and women were recognized for stereotypical roles, such as making
of the Flag. I note that the problem of female marginalization is attributable to a few situations:
entrenched socio-economic discrimination against women, preferential treatment of males over
females—especially as to educational opportunities, early/forced marriage, and a patriarchal state.
All of which is influenced by culture and male chauvinism. There have always been female roles
and male roles. Boys could go to school, but girls had stay at home to help their mothers with
household chores. Men could beat their wives because women were considered chattels. Patriarchy
was acceptable, in both the civil legal system and customary legal system, which is why women
were not allowed to vote until 1946.
Given the above, the legal system has not been very kind to women. Laws were drafted to
favor men and, since the interpreters of the laws were also men, women have always been
disadvantaged. This paradigm must be shifted with public awareness and intentional state actions.
Women should not subjected to the whim and caprices of their male partner, but as equal citizens
with capabilities to contribute towards nation building. The burden is not only on women to rise
above their status but also on the state to enact laws that will increase women’s role in the three
branches of government. The concerted effort of the three branches will increase women’s
participation and involvement in both the public and private spheres. The significance of elevating
women through affirmative actions at the national level can see some potential positive impacts
on our country.
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Affirmative actions and other steps towards equality can come about as the result of the
substantive equality model that has been recommended. The substantive equality model would
guide the three branches of government on legislating, interpreting, and enforcing the laws. It
would also allow the flexibility of affirmative action policies and programs while, at the same,
obligating the government to fix inequality problems. Legislation and constitutional amendments
have been recommended to ensure the utilization of substantive equality. There is no guarantee
that the substantive equality model would work or would even be accepted in Liberia, but it is
worth trying. This new model would be a paradigm change for the country in its role leading
toward equality between men and women.
Moreover, the substantive equality model could be used in other African countries that
have similar problems to Liberia. For instance, women in Ghana could use a substantive equality
claim to petition the court to declare their property rights. Like Liberia and many other African
countries, Ghana’s traditional practices marginalize and discriminate against women. Ghanaian
customary spousal rights are undefined, although the 1992 constitution authorizes the legislature
to enact laws that define their rights.442 The Parliament has not enacted any laws to define the
property rights of women in customary marriage, and women are considered the property of their
husband. Therefore, they are part of the husband’s estate and are not allowed to participate in
property distribution.
Notwithstanding, women’s roles are very important to the Ghanaian economy. They
contribute towards the economy by engaging in agriculture, wholesale and retail, marketing,
teachers, nurses, etc.443 Ghana is a male-dominated country; the women could benefit from

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, art. 22(2). “Parliament shall as soon as practicable
after the coming into force of this Constitution, enact legislation regulating the property rights of spouses.”
443
https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ghana/02990.pdf
442

180

substantive equality to obligate their government to fix historical, social, and economic
discriminations. Other countries, such as Sierra Leone, Guinea, and L’Cote d'Ivoire, could also
benefit from substantive equality to fix their discrimination and inequality problems.
Additionally, the adoption of substantive equality may not only be applicable to Liberia
Domestic Relation problems. It could also be applied to issues outside of Domestic Relations law,
like political representation. Currently, women represent only 18% of the legislature. The
introduction of a gender quota would help increase the number of women in the legislature. It
would give more women the opportunity to participate actively in government and to push the
agenda of less unfortunate women. It would also mean moving women from the private sphere to
the public sphere. Substantive equality could also increase women’s political representation at
local government levels. Substantive equality could create a paradigm shift in Liberia, changing
from a male-dominated society to a country with equal rights, equal treatment, and equal
opportunity. The onus will not only be on women to rise above their current status but also on the
legislature to enact laws that promote equality and on the government to design programs and
policies that promote the same. The elevation of women through affirmative action legislation,
programs, and policies will create a potentially positive impact on the country’s economic, social,
and political growth.
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